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Globally, state forest organizations have a wide scope of tasks. They play a central role in managing 
state-owned forestlands. In addition, they are responsible for implementing forest law on both private 
and state-owned forestlands. This task's complexity causes a huge challenge for evaluating state forest 
organizations. The active role that state forest organizations play in policy processes increases these 
difficulties because of power, which is considered a crucial factor for achieving forest outcomes. The 
constitutive publications of this thesis identify a link between state forest organizations' power and forest 
outcomes in the case of Tunisia. Following the revolution of 2011, the state forest organizations lost 
power and faced new challenges to achieve sustainability goals. The main objectives of this thesis are 
(i) to scrutinize the role of power in driving the performance of state forest organizations to achieve 
specific forest outcomes and (ii) to look for a larger empirical basis to check the relevance of power as 
a driver of the state forest organizations in different contexts. 
Theoretically, this thesis develops a new power-linked three-layer model (3L model) based on political 
evaluation and power theories. The 3L model was selected due to its comprehensive coverage of a broad 
range of ecosystem services, including timber production, biodiversity, and carbon sequestration. The 
actor-centered power approach was selected because it links power to a specific actor and makes the 
elements of power well measurable. Within the developed model, actor-centered power is integrated on 
the theory level and linked with the state forest organization's outcomes in forestry as a driving factor. 
The link between power and outcomes' achievements by state forest organizations was first explored in 
the case studies of Tunisia. In addition, a systematic literature review was conducted to extend the 
empirical basis for the power-linked 3L model.  
The results show that achieving high outcomes requires both high interest and the strong power of state 
forest organizations. Furthermore, state forest organizations combine the different power elements of 
coercion, (dis-)incentives, and dominant information flexibly to implement forest policies effectively. 
Despite empirical evidence of 49 case studies from the global north and south, this empirical basis 
remains too limited and selective to check the power-linked 3L model comprehensively. As a practical 
solution to improve the evaluation of state forest organizations in the future, a new platform is designed 
to collect consistent data globally. The power-linked 3L model provides a guide for creating the 
platform's content and specifies the data input enabling a theory-based comparison between different 
countries. Finally, some policy and management requirements for establishing such a platform are 
discussed. To conclude, the new power-linked 3L model can significantly improve the evaluation of 





Weltweit haben staatliche Forstorganisationen ein breites Aufgabenspektrum. Sie spielen eine zentrale 
Rolle bei der Bewirtschaftung von Waldflächen im staatlichen Eigentum. Darüber hinaus sind sie für 
die Umsetzung des Forstrechts sowohl im privaten als auch im öffentlichen Wald verantwortlich. Diese 
komplexe Aufgabe ist eine große Herausforderung für die Evaluierung staatlicher Forstorganisationen. 
Die aktive Rolle, die staatliche Forstorganisationen in der Politik spielen, erhöht die Schwierigkeiten 
der Evaluation noch zusätzlich, weil Macht ein entscheidender Faktor ist, um bestimmte Wirkungen 
(Engl. outcomes) im Wald zu erreichen. Die vier konstitutiven Veröffentlichungen dieser 
Promotionsschrift identifizieren eine Verbindung zwischen Macht und den Ergebnissen der staatlichen 
Forstorganisation in Tunesien. In der Revolution 2011 verlor die staatliche Forstorganisation wesentlich 
an Macht und hatte mit großen Problemen zu kämpfen, um Nachhaltigkeit im Wald zu sichern.  Ziele 
dieser Arbeit sind, (i) die Bedeutung von Macht als wichtiger Faktor für die Forstorganisation zur 
Erreichung bestimmter Ergebnisse (Engl. outcomes) im Wald zu klären und (ii) die empirische Basis 
für die Überprüfung dieser Frage im weltweiten Kontext zu erweitern. Die Promotionsschrift entwirft 
ein neues machtbasiertes drei Ebenen Modell (Engl. 3L Model) für die Evaluierung staatlicher 
Forstorganisationen. Es integriert das bestehende „3L Model“ mit akteursbezogenen Machttheorien. 
Das „3L Model“ wurde wegen der großen Vielfalt an Ökosystem-Services ausgewählt, die es umfasst 
und die von Holzproduktion bis Biodiversität und CO2-Bindung reichen. Ein akteursbezogener 
Machtansatz wurde ausgewählt, weil dadurch die direkte Verbindung zu einem Akteur – hier die 
staatliche Forstorganisation – gegeben ist und die Elemente der Macht einfach gemessen werden 
können. Das neue Modell integriert die Macht auf der Ebene der Theorie und verbindet diese direkt mit 
der Ebene der Ergebnisse im Wald (Engl. outcomes), die die staatliche Forstorganisation bewirkt. 
Wirkungen der staatlichen Forstorganisation und Machtprozesse wurden zuerst in vier Fallstudien in 
Tunesien erforscht. Zusätzlich werden in einer auf das machtbasierte „3L Model“ gestützten 
sytematischen Literaturauswertung die empirische Basis um 49 Fälle aus dem globalen Norden und 
Süden erweitert. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass hohe Ökosystemleistungen im Wald nur bei großem 
Interesse und großer Macht der staatlichen Forstorganisation erreicht werden können. Darüber hinaus 
kombinieren staatliche Forstorganisationen die unterschiedlichen Machtelemente: Zwang, Anreiz und 
dominate Information flexibel, um größere Wirkungen in Wald und Forstwirtschaft zu erreichen. 
Obwohl 49 Fälle aus unterschiedlichen Ländern literaturgestützt untersucht werden konnten, ist die 
empirische Datenlage zu begrenzt und selektiv, um das neue Modell umfassend zu überprüfen. Als 




entworfen, die die Erhebung konsistenter Daten weltweit ermöglichen kann. Das neue machtbasierte 
„3L Model“ liefert eine Vorgabe für den Inhalt der Plattform, die theoriebasiert die Daten spezifiziert 
und einen weltweiten Vergleich ermöglicht. Zusätzlich werden Erfordernisse des Managements und der 
Politik diskutiert, um eine solche Plattform zu  etablieren. Insgesamt wird gezeigt, dass das neue 
machtbasierte „3L Model“ die Evaluierung von staatlichen Forstorganisationen wesentlich verbessern 
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1 Introduction: Challenges of state forest organizations  
State forest organizations1 are one of the main actors of the forest policy processes. More than 70% of 
forestlands are state-owned globally, and the management tasks of these lands are generally transferred 
to these state forest organizations (Stevanov 2014; White and Martin 2002). Furthermore, these 
organizations play a central role in managing state-owned forestlands to provide different goods and 
services for the public interest and satisfy the market demand in terms of timber and non-timber 
products. The state forest organizations' main challenge is to achieve simultaneously high economic, 
environmental, and social standards. Beyond the tasks related to sustainable forest management, state 
forest organizations are in charge of implementing forest law and providing extension services to private 
forest owners. 
These rising complexity and scope of state forest organizations’ tasks and, at the same time, the 
reduction of the resources allocated to these organizations (Stevanov 2014; Möhring et al. 2017) are 
increasing the need for reforms. These reforms are also required within a context of globalization and 
governance trends that are putting pressures and constraints on national policy processes and choices 
made by domestic actors. Governance aims to involve various actors with different interests and power 
sources in policy formulation and implementation (Hay 2006; Hans Klijn 2012; Hufti 2011).  
Consequently, for at least three decades, policymakers in many countries have pushed reforms such as 
adopting the ‘New Public Management’ option to optimize public organizations' performance 
(Stevanov 2014). Together with the concept of ‘good governance,’ New Public Management was 
developed to increase public organizations' effectiveness and efficiency (McDonald and Lane 2004; 
Hibou 2019; Hufti 2011).  
For such reforms, collecting information about these organizations' performance is considered a 
prerequisite (Stevanov 2014). In this vein, several international processes have focused on formulating 
different sets of criteria and indicators to evaluate forest management's sustainability. The criteria are 
based on the different goals of multiple-use and protection of forests and targeting the measurement of 
the goals' achievement. Many of the relevant existing evaluations focus on specific aspects such as the 
economic ones (e.g. (Möhring and Rüping 2008; Chiabai et al. 2011). 
In order to broaden the scope of these evaluations and complete them, the three-layer model (3L model) 
has been developed. This model is one of these evaluation frameworks that aim to measure state forest 
organizations' performance regarding the wide range of responsibilities allocated to them (Krott and 
                                                 
1 State forest organizations1 can be defined as “public organizations making decisions regarding particular problems based on legal 
standards and implementing specific measures to solve these problems” (Krott 2005). In this thesis public/state forest administration are 




Stevanov 2008; Stevanov and Krott 2013). The benchmark set of criteria in this model are considered 
as (i) relevant to countries' policy goals, (ii) simple to use due to the link established between these 
goals and suitable theories, and (iii) empirically applicable. 
Additionally, the model aims to identify the factors that drive state forest organizations' performance 
and lead to specific outcomes. However, some of these driving factors might not be explicit in this 
evaluation. One of these crucial political factors is the actors' power, driven by their interests.  
Several studies showed that actors' power influences a certain outcome, like timber harvesting for 
market or keeping the sustainability of forest stands, by hindering or enhancing it. From the Tunisian 
case studies of the constitutive publications, it was possible to identify the importance of state forest 
organizations’ power in shaping particular forest outcomes. For example, the observed increase of 
illegal logging and wildfire after the revolution of 2011 was linked to the weakened state coercive 
capacities to control these illegal activities (Hasnaoui and Krott 2019a; Hasnaoui et al. 2020). One of 
the frameworks that empirically measure power applied in the constitutive papers is the actor-centered 
power approach (Krott et al. 2014).  
This thesis's main objectives are (i) to explore the role of state forest organizations’ power as a driver 
of their performance to achieve forest outcomes, which is evaluated by the 3L model, and (ii) to look 
for larger empirical evidence from literature review to check the relevance of this power in different 
contexts.  
Overall, the current thesis aims to answer the following questions: 
 Is power a relevant driver of the state forest organizations' performance? 
 How can the description and the measurement of power be improved? 
 Can the integration of power measurement expand the evaluation of state forest organizations, 
and will this improve the explanation of state forest organizations' specific performance? 
Answering the questions above would require a larger empirical basis to support developing a 
framework that integrates power in evaluating state forest organizations' performance. 
In order to broaden the empirical basis compared with the constitutive cases, a systematic literature 
review was applied. This literature review aims to scrutinize all existing publications using the 3L model 
and those applying the actor-centered power framework in order to identify in both categories of 
publications the mention of any link between the use of power by state forest organizations and specific 
outcomes in the forestland. The choice of these two frameworks is justified by two main reasons: (i) to 
keep coherent with the Tunisian case studies which apply these two frameworks (ii) to avoid fuzzy 




Following the systematic literature review, an improved power-linked 3L model that brings together 
both frameworks is established. Through this model, the evaluation of state forest organizations can be 
expanded and can contribute to analyzing better the achievement of certain performance and outcomes 






2 Theoretical framework of the 3L model and power 
This thesis's theoretical frameworks are mainly based on (i) the forest political evaluation approaches 
using criteria and indicators and (ii) actors’ power theories. Both frameworks are discussed in the 
following two subsections with the aim to establish a link between them and integrate actors’ power as 
an explicit driving factor of the state forest organizations´ performance.  
2.1 The 3L model for a comprehensive evaluation of state forest organizations 
The 3L model was first developed by Krott and Stevanov (2008) to comprehensively evaluate the state 
forest organizations in different contexts from the global north and south based on benchmarking 
criteria. In general, several governments adopted evaluation criteria within the New Public Management 
that pushed states to review expenses, calculating performance indicators, and comparing them to 
concurrent (Hibou 2019). In other words, it is practicing benchmarking by evaluating these 
administrations regarding established benchmarks (Hibou 2019). Benchmarking can be broadly defined 
as the comparison, which is based on a wide range of criteria generated from practice (Grundmann 
2001; Krott and Stevanov 2008). 
The 3L model aims to tackle several challenges and bridge the gaps identified in the different sets of 
criteria and indicators developed within international processes.  
Compared to the existing sets of criteria and indicators such as the pan-European criteria2, the 3L model 
aims to better fulfill the requirements for applicable benchmark criteria. Policymakers consider that a 
useful evaluation should be based on criteria that fulfill the following three requirements (i) first is the 
political relevance. Evaluation should be based on criteria that reflect the priorities of national policies 
in a precise way. Despite their relevance, existing international criteria are considered vague in 
providing a clear orientation of balancing ecological and socio-economic goals and translating them 
into specific national forest policies. (ii) The second is the possibility of identifying driving factors. 
While providing information about the specific status of the forests and which targets are met, 
international criteria leave the issue of identifying the causes and the ways to improve the situation 
unsolved. (iii) Finally, simplicity is a fundamental requirement to apply benchmarking. The definition 
and the use of indicators for the international criteria remain a complex resource and time-consuming 
task (Krott and Stevanov 2008). 
All these requirements are considered the advantage of applying the 3L model (Krott and Stevanov 
2008; Stevanov and Krott 2006; Stevanov 2014). 





The 3L model focuses on evaluating state forest organizations' performance using eight benchmarking 
criteria covering different aspects of sustainability. These criteria represent different outcomes in the 
forestlands covering the provision of market and non-market goods and services, economic outcomes 
(profit-making, technical efficiency, and exploring new markets), conflict and interest mediation, and 
sustainability of forest stands (see figure 1). These forest outcomes represent the achievements that are 
observable in the forestlands, like maintaining or increasing the forest size. The forest outcomes are 
different from the forest administrations’ outputs, like producing plans for planting and maintaining 
new forest stands to increase the forest size and produce wood sustainably. Unlike outcomes, the 
administrations’ outputs do not include the changes in the forestland and forest sector. Outputs are 
restricted to the activities of the administrations made in order to achieve an outcome. The following 
table (table 1) summarizes the eight criteria of the model and the theories in which they are anchored. 
The first criterion concerns the state forest organizations' orientation toward the market demand by 
focusing on forest goods and services that may be exchanged on the market, such as wood. The 
orientation toward non-market demand is the second criterion dealing with state forest organizations' 
focus on providing forest goods and services that are not exchangeable on the market (public goods) or 
those securing public welfare (merit goods). The third criterion is the sustainability of forest stands 
focusing on maintaining forest size and continuously producing wood. Technical efficiency is the fourth 
evaluation criterion that assesses the efficiency that allows approaching the maximum of production. 
The fifth criterion, the profit from forests, deals with evaluating the revenue generated from forests 
benefiting the state forest organizations and/or allowing other actors to make profit. The orientation 
toward new market goods is the sixth evaluation criterion focusing on organizations' orientation toward 
creating new revenue sources from forests supporting economic performance. The seventh and eighth 
criteria aim to assess the state forest organizations' role in advocacy for forestry or mediation between 
different interests. The advocacy's role deals with the organization's focus on particular forestry-related 
interests and ignoring other different actors' interests. The mediator role concerns the forest 





Table 1. The criteria of the 3L model (Hasnaoui and Krott 2019b) 
Criteria (C) Explanation of the criteria 
C1: Orientation toward market demand 
Concerns forest goods and services that can be 
exchanged on the market (e.g., wood) and the market 
limits. This criterion is anchored in economic, market 
theories.  
 
C2: Orientation toward non-market demand 
Relates to forest goods and services that cannot be 
exchanged on the market (public goods) or those which 
are considered as necessary to secure public welfare 
(merit goods). For example, conservation activities, 
poverty alleviation. These orientations are also 
financed by public means and can be anchored in public 
economics theories. 
 
C3: Sustainability of forest stands 
Refers to the goal of maintaining forest size and the 
capability to continually produce wood using forest 
management theories that are part of natural sciences. 
 
C4: Technical efficiency 
Refers to the efficiency that allows production to 
approach the maximum, which can be anchored in 
business management theories. 
C5: Profit from forests 
 
Concerns the evaluation of the importance of revenue 
generated from forests. It may concern state forest 
organizations’ own revenue and/or opening the 
possibility for other actors to generate revenue from 
forests. This criterion can also be anchored in business 
management theories. 
 
C6: Orientation toward new forest goods 
Focuses on organizations' orientation toward 
developing new revenue sources from forests, 
supporting the market's orientation and economic 
performance. Similar to criteria 4 and 5, this criterion 
is linked to business management theories 
 
C7: Advocacy for forestry 
Relates to the role, within political processes, of forest 
organizations in managing the use and protection of 
forests. The advocacy's role shows the organization's 
focus on specific interests in forests without 
considering all different actors' interests. This criterion, 
as well as criterion 8, are anchored in political theories  
 
C8: Mediation between all interests in the 
forest 
Deals with the capability of the organization to apply 
forest governance. It is an opportunity for stakeholders 






The 3L model comprises three levels (layers) that allowed the extraction of the evaluation criteria and 
indicators. The first layer is ‘political relevance.’ This layer includes all related forest policy goals. 
These goals are formulated mainly in forest laws and programs and are in general considered as 
complex. The second layer contains theoretical frameworks such as economic, natural, and political 
theories. The third layer is the empirical evidence layer that allows measuring the state forest 
organizations' performance empirically using a set of indicators for each criterion.  
In the following, the process of the emergence of the eight criteria and their particularities are explained. 
First, the benchmarking criteria selection process started with identifying different goals and common 
priorities developed in forest laws and programs that were considered the standards for this selection. 
This focus allows the criteria to be better integrated into the processes of reforms as perceived from a 
policy perspective (Stevanov and Krott 2006, 2013). In the case study of Tunisia, the benchmarking 
criteria were found to be capturing different goals of recent policy programs formulated in the forest 
strategy (2014) and the program of forest investment (2016), which are targeting the sustainable 
multiple-use of forestlands.  
Priority objectives included in the general goal of sustainable forest management are highly relevant on 
the political level. Nevertheless, they remain difficult to operationalize. The vague terms used in 
political discourses can be interpreted in different ways. To specify these goals, suitable theories were 
applied to anchor the goals into more accurate scientific terms. Theories provide the possibilities to 
identify different processes and their driving factors. For example, the economic theory contains a 
description of different market mechanisms that influence forest use. Identifying the aspects of 
sustainable forest management influenced by the market can help better understand the process and plan 
optimization actions. (Krott and Stevanov 2008). Furthermore, ecological theory can be used to identify 
different aspects defining the forest's capacity to produce timber continually.  
The link to theories also allows identifying causative factors that may explain a certain performance of 
state forest organizations. For example, such criteria can help to explain if a weak performance 
regarding a specific goal, such as sustainability, is caused by economic, ecological, or political factors. 
Identifying the driving factors can help to optimize the performance of these organizations by adjusting 
their activities. 
The combination of the political relevance with the theories resulted in the emergence of the eight 
evaluation criteria that were selected based on policy programs’ priorities and scientific significance.  
Furthermore, this combination with theories grants a better operationalization of the selected criteria 
and then the possibility of empirical performance measurement. Measurement indicators (layer 3) can 




related to sustainability (criterion 3) is based on forest management theories. This anchoring allowed to 
easily find related indicators that include annual increment, growing stock, and forest area development, 
indicating whether the requirement for sustainability is achieved over time. In the same vein, the link to 
theories grants the possibility to compare several state forest organizations in different countries since 
theories allow to extract standard scientific terms that can be, in general, understood in the same way in 
different contexts. In Tunisia's case studies, it was possible to use the definition of annual increment 
similarly to other case studies in Europe since this definition and how to calculate its value were found 
in the Tunisian forest inventory. 
Overall, the eight criteria emerged from linking the layer of complex policy programs-layer 1- 
(represented by clouds in figure 1) to clear and well-defined theories -layer 2- (geometric shapes in 
figure 1). Linking the political goals to specific theories allows specifying these vague goals and then 
allowing their measurement by developing a set of indicators for each criterion (Layer 3).  
Based on the above-developed explanation, the criteria of the 3L model are considered as relevant to 
different policy goals (layer 1), well based on theories that allow an easier application for comparisons 






Figure 1. Power as a driving factor of forest outcomes: linking the actor-centered power approach to 
the 3L model 
 
2.2 Expanding the 3L model evaluation by integrating power as a driving factor 
Despite covering a wide range of forest administrations' tasks, the 3L model does not explicitly show 
all the driving factors influencing the forest sector's outcomes produced by state forest organizations. 
Two important drivers can be the natural factors and actors' power (figure 1). A natural wildfire or the 
ecosystem conditions are examples of natural factors that may hinder the outcomes in terms of 
sustainability (criterion 3) even in the presence of a strong performance of state forest organizations in 
terms of management. These natural factors are included in natural sciences theories (figure 1), but their 
influence on the outcomes is not considered an explicit driving factor.  
Another relevant driving factor is the actors' power, driven by their interests in the forest sector. Power 




model (figure1). It was considered implicitly in developing some criteria of the model (criteria 7 and 
8). However, it was not directly included in the evaluation as a driving factor. Considering the power 
as a driving factor in this thesis is due to its central position in political theory.  
The following description of the power concept is mainly developed within the theoretical framework 
of one of this dissertation's constitutive papers3. 
The concept of power has been extensively analyzed in academic literature. However, there is no 
unanimous definition of this concept despite the high number of related works. The definitions and 
interpretations of power's notion in literature depend on the disciplines and the social contexts in 
question. These definitions encompass those from a political science perspective (Dahl 1957; Allison 
and Zelikow 1971; Wight 2002), sociology (Crozier and Friedberg 1980; Scott 2010), and political 
philosophy (Foucault 1991). In some definitions, power is considered a 'possession,' meaning that it 
cannot be shared and should be related to a specific function and place. This perception of power was 
particularly promoted by developing sovereignty and legitimate authority theories (Holeindre 2014). In 
contemporary societies, power is perceived as a 'social relation' between different actors (Revault 
d'Allonnes 2014). Foucault considers that within a relation or practice of power, an actor's behavior can 
be altered by another actor without any obvious use of coercion (Foucault 1991). According to Weber, 
power is not bound to having the capacity but to executing this capacity. He defines power as the 
possibility to impose one's will within a social relation despite resistance and regardless of the means 
on which this possibility is relying (Weber 1978[1922]). In the same vein, Weber perceives the state as 
the entity with the exclusive legitimacy to use force and coercion for law enforcement while imposing 
a 'general interest' over self-interest (Weber 1978[1922]). 
From a more empirical perspective, Krott et al. (Krott et al. 2014) further developed the definition of 
power and its central elements in the frame of an 'actor-centered power' approach. Empirically, the 
authors define power as "a social relationship in which actor A alters actor B's behavior without 
recognizing B's will." In this relationship, the relation between A and B can be summarized as follows: 
Actor A, who acts as a 'potentate' (who is altering the other actor's behavior), forces actor B to react as 
a 'subordinate'.  The ‘will’ of an actor is a fundamental part of the power definition in the actor-centered 
power theory. It indicates the importance of considering actors' interests as the main driver of power 
(figure 1). Further, actors’ interests are considered as the driving force of forest policy (Krott 2005). 
                                                 
3 The paper is entitled: “Contesting State Authority in Forestland Use: A Power-Based Case Study Within Arab Spring 





That is to say, forest policy goals formulation and implementation depend greatly on the interests of 
involved actors.  
The three fundamental power elements defined by the actor-centered power are coercion, 
(dis)incentives, and dominant information. These three power elements of the actor-centered power 
form the main advantage of this approach in terms of empirical measurement of power (figure 1), which 
is initially considered invisible (Krott et al., 2014). According to  actor-centered power, the use of power 
(i.e., the three power elements) is driven by the interests of the actors (figure 1). 
(a) Coercion 
The aim of the use of coercion is "altering the behavior of a subordinate by force." This force can be 
related to declared or anticipated physical actions. For example, forbidding the physical access to 
forestland resources above ground (wood, wildlife, arable land) and below ground (mining, oil) and 
restricting the access to a certain area through the deployment of armed forest rangers or fencing. In this 
case, the subordinate can try to resist by damaging or traversing the fencing or accessing the forestland 
by avoiding forest rangers' periods of presence in the field. Resisting the potentate's coercion can also 
be by using violence (e.g., armed rebellion, wildlife poaching, illegal logging). The threat of force is 
considered as the main sort of power in this form of social relationship. Forest administration can often 
use this threat to implement political steering and to oblige people to respect the regulations. The scope 
of the threat's influence depends on the subordinate's belief concerning the potentate's power capacities. 
The main factor influencing this belief is the degree of visibility of the potentate's force. The potentate 
can use the subordinate's belief to threaten even though the truly existing power sources are weaker than 
what is expected by subordinates. 
Furthermore, threats can be observed within public or closed discourses in the political processes. For 
example, forest law encompasses several sanctions that include physical force, such as incarceration. 
Forest administrations can use these sanctions as a threat to alter the behavior of subordinates. 
(b) Incentives and disincentives 
Using (dis)incentives aims to "altering the subordinate's behavior through disadvantages or advantages." 
For example, State bureaucracies can use penalties as disadvantages through forest police to control 
illegal logging or offer wood certification facilities within the public market. In this case, the potentate 
has different aims than those of the subordinate. The subordinate is pushed to change his/her behavior 
and obey the potentates' rules to avoid penalties or profit from particular advantages. The use of 
disadvantages to influence the subordinate's behavior is closely linked to the potentate's coercion. As 
an example, being forced to pay the penalty is considered coercion. However, the amount of the penalty 




(Dis)incentives can be material or immaterial. Material incentives may be applied by providing money, 
materials (e.g., machines, devices), or essential resources (e.g., water, food).  Immaterial incentives 
consist of offering advantages, such as those related to education, health care, or moral demands. These 
sources can be used simultaneously as disincentives like reducing the provision of some subsidies or 
admitting a certain action as threatening some social conventions. 
(c) Dominant information 
Dominant information was defined by Krott et al. (Krott et al. 2014) as being the social influence where 
a powerful actor (the potentate) is "altering the behavior of subordinate using unverified information."  
Actor-centered power distinguishes between 'shared information,' which acknowledges a certain level 
of information for both actors (potentate and subordinate), and 'dominant information,' which restricts 
the subordinate's capacity to verify this information. In the latter case, the potentate can omit particular 
facts while providing information. Based on this incomplete information, the subordinate can make 
inappropriate decisions leading to a behavior that does not correspond to his initial will. Not being able 
to verify given information can be (i) inescapable if the subordinate lacks the means to verify it and 
consequently is obliged to accept the information as it stands. For example, forest-dependent people are 
hardly apt to check the accuracy and comprehensiveness of forest management related information. 
Nevertheless, it can also be (ii) voluntary when the subordinate trusts the potentate's 'goodwill' and the 
ideologies that he/she defends.  
Several power theories look at the actors' behavior and the outcomes as both parts of power's essence.  
Actor-centered power considers that actors' behavior in a power relationship is not the only factor 
determining a specific outcome's achievement. The potentate targets a certain outcome and struggles to 
impose a position within a specific social relationship by forcing the other actor(s) to change their 
activities. Nevertheless, additional ecological, economic, and social factors also the outcomes which are 
beyond the power relations of the potentate. In some cases, the potentate can have a wrong 
understanding of some factors and impose a behavior leading to an outcome opposite to expected. 
Overall, based on actor-centered power, power is considered as a crucial social factor but not the only 
one shaping outcomes. 
Figure 1 illustrates the integration of actor-centered power as an explicit factor driving the state forest 
organizations' outcomes in forestlands. Power is included in the political theories (figure 1). 
Nonetheless, it is not explicitly integrated into the performance measurement made by the 3L model. 
Establishing the link between the actor-centered power approach and the 3L model allows exploring 
the relevance of power in influencing state forest organizations' performance and, consequently, shaping 





Based on this theoretical framework, the following hypotheses were formulated: 
H1. In addition to natural and technical factors, state forest organizations need both high interest and 
strong power in order to produce high forest outcomes. 
H2. State forest organizations use a combination of different power elements to produce aspired 






3 Methodological approach 
This thesis aims to scrutinize the role of power as a driving factor of state forest organizations and to 
extend the empirical evidence beyond the Tunisian case studies presented in the constitutive papers. 
These constitutive papers were based on data that was collected between May 2016 and February 2020. 
A substantial part of the data collection process was mainly relying on documents related to the forest 
sector in Tunisia (e.g., national strategies, annual reports, forest law, development projects and 
unpublished workshops reports, and statistics from the General Directorate of Forests). Key experts’ 
interviews were conducted via phone, email, and face to face with experienced actors from forest 
organizations, research institutions, and ministries officials at national and local levels as well as local 
forest people (Hasnaoui and Krott 2018, 2019a, 2019b; Hasnaoui et al. 2020). Besides, my field 
observations (in 2013 and 2014) allowed me to check the provided information further. In the fourth 
publication, a mapping was realized to analyze the evolution of different forestland land uses from 2000 
to 2019 in a case study from the Northwest of Tunisia (Hasnaoui et al. 2020).  Additionally, regular 
meetings with the research group allowed avoiding personal bias. Besides, the triangulation of all these 
data sources increased the results' accuracy further (Hasnaoui and Krott 2019a, 2019b). 
In addition to this collected data for the Tunisian case studies, a systematic literature review was 
conducted to extend the empirical basis of this thesis. This type of literature review aims to identify, 
assess, and produce a synthesis of all relevant studies in order to answer specific questions (Petticrew 
and Roberts 2006). It is a scientific tool rather than a discussion of literature. A systematic review can 
be used to summarize, evaluate, and share the results of research (Petticrew and Roberts 2006). The 
systematic literature review process starts with a review planning phase, which includes defining the 
research questions and developing a review protocol. The second phase is the review conducting by 
identifying and selecting relevant research, assessing the studies’ quality, extracting the required data, 
and synthesizing it. The last phase is the document review through writing a review report and validating 
it (Brereton et al. 2007). 
In this thesis, the identification of relevant studies was based on Google scholar citations. Among 
different scholarly databases such as Web of Science and Scopus, google scholar is considered to be 
able to find most of the citations in social sciences publications4. Out of 217 citations of Krott et al. 
(2014) on google scholar5, 39 studies are based on the actor-centered power approach (applying it as a 
theoretical framework and/or for result analysis) and dealing with state forest organizations. All these 
                                                 
4 https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2019/12/03/google-scholar-web-of-science-and-scopus-which-is-best-for-
me/ 




publications were reviewed in order to identify the possible link between power use by state forest 
organizations and a certain forest outcome. First, these publications were regrouped into seven 
categories according to the main issues they address: (i) Decentralization and participatory approaches; 
(ii) Community forestry/social and small scale forestry; (iii) Political changes/transitions; (iv) Climate 
policy/REDD implementation; (v) Sustainable Forest Management, ecosystem services, and 
certification; (vi) Land use conversion and; (vii) Biodiversity and conservation policy. This 
categorization allows for easier identification of the forest outcomes that these studies deal with and 
understanding the power dynamics regarding a specific issue in different contexts. When identified, the 
outcomes are linked to the suitable criteria of the 3L model. For example, if the state forest 
administration possesses limited power sources, that results in more forestland conversion into 
agriculture. In that case, a link will be established to criterion 3 of the 3L model "sustainability of forest 
stands." The results show that the state's weak power has hindered the achievement of high outcomes 
regarding sustainability. This influence of power on outcomes should have been directly or indirectly 
highlighted by the author(s) of the study in question. 
Similarly, the ten existing studies that apply the 3L model as an analytical framework to evaluate the 
state forest organizations' performance were reviewed. Their identification was based on the internal 
literature system of the Chair Group of Forest and Nature Conservation Policy and crosschecked with 
google scholar. The objective is to investigate the possible link between a certain outcome (final 
evaluation of a criterion) and the use of power elements by the state forest organizations. These research 
studies are not explicitly mentioning the power elements of the actor-centered power approach. Thus, 
based on the definition of these power elements, the description of state forest organizations' specific 
behaviors and tools were associated with power elements. For example, if the authors mention that the 
state supports sustainability due to forest law's strict application, this would be identified as a clear use 
of coercion to push the stands' sustainability (criterion 3).  
The case studies considered in the analysis are presented in table 2. The four constitutive publications 
on the Tunisian case study (two applying the 3L model and two based on the actor-centered power 




Table 2. The selected studies for the literature review 
Analytical 
frameworks 
Countries Number of 
studies  
Authors 




Nepal 3 (Basnyat et al. 2020; Basnyat et al. 2018; Harrer 
2016) 
Bangladesh 9 (Islam et al. 2014; Islam et al. 2015; Islam and Sato 
2018; P.K. Sarker et al. 2017; Rahman and Giessen 
2017; Rahman et al. 2016; Rahman et al. 2018; 
Sadath et al.; Giessen et al. 2016) 
Indonesia 12 (Ekawati et al. 2019; Fatem et al. 2018; Maryudi et 
al. 2016; Mulyani and Jepson 2017; Prabowo et al. 
2017; Purnomo et al. 2018; Sahide et al. 2020; 
Sahide et al. 2018; Sahide et al. 2016; Wibowo and 
Giessen 2015, 2018; Yusran et al. 2017) 
Cameroon 1 (Awung and Marchant 2016) 
Vietnam 1 (Bach 2018) 
Germany 1 (Schusser et al. 2013) 
Sweden 1 (Guillén et al. 2015) 
China 1 (Ba et al. 2020) 
Armenia 1 (Burns et al. 2017) 
Portugal 1 (Marques et al. 2020) 
Pakistan 1 (Zeb et al. 2019) 
Tunisia 1 (Hasnaoui and Krott 2018; Hasnaoui et al. 2020) 
International 
studies 
66 (Dobšinská et al. 2020; Hasnaoui and Krott 2018; 
Juerges et al. 2018; Kirchner et al. 2019; Schusser 
et al. 2015; Stanzel et al. 2020) 
Studies based on 
the 3L model 
Tunisia 2 (Hasnaoui and Krott 2019a, 2019b) 
Laos 1 (Phommachanh 2019) 
Philippines 1 (Daisog 2020) 
Brazil 1 (da Motta Bustamante et al. 2018) 
Poland 1 (Chudy et al. 2016) 
Romania 1 (Hapa 2019) 
Comparative 
studies 




                                                 




4 Results: Power as a driving factor of state forest organizations’ performance 
Based on the review of existing literature, the main findings presented in this section focus on 
identifying the influence of state forest organizations’ power on achieving different outcomes in the 
forestlands7. Furthermore, state forest organizations' use of strong or weak power sources was linked to 
outcomes. They can either enhance or hinder the achievement of high outcomes. Powerful or weak 
public forest organizations can use, strongly or weakly, only one or a combination of power elements. 
The analysis of the specific power was made by the authors of the reviewed publications. The results' 
presentation is divided into two main sections: (i) analysis of studies that are applying the actor-centered 
power approach, (ii) analysis of studies using the 3L model. Each section contains information about 
the outcomes considered influenced by states’ power and the different (combinations of) power 
elements used by state forest organizations. Furthermore, the sections include a deeper analysis using 
the examples of the Tunisian cases presented in the constitutive publications. 
4.1 State forest organizations’ power in the studies based on the actor-centered power approach  
Overall, the results show that the studies based on the actor-centered power theory establish a link 
between state forest organizations' performance and particular outcomes in the forestlands. State's 
power has influenced mainly the provision of market and non-market demand (criteria 1 and 2, Table 
1), sustainability (criterion 3), economic performance (criteria 4, 5, and 6), and the management of 
interests and conflicts between different actors in the forest sector (criteria 7 and 8). The results also 
show the use of different power combinations by state forest organizations to produce forest outcomes.  
The following subsections summarize the results based on tables. These tables include the cases where 
a specific outcome is hindered or enhanced for each category of outcomes due to the state forest 
organizations' (weak or strong) power. Different power combinations used by state forest organizations 
are also outlined.  
4.1.1 Provision of market and non-market goods and services 
The analysis focuses on research studies dealing with state forest organizations' power regarding the 
market and non-market orientations (criteria 1 and 2). The results are summarized in Table 3. Overall, 
state forest organizations' use of power to push market orientation was found in four analyzed studies. 
However, no publications were dealing with hindering this outcome due to the organizations’ power. 
Regarding the orientation toward non-market demand (i.e., public goods and services), 14 cases mention 
that the state forest organizations' power influenced this outcome. In 12 cases, the outcome was 
hindered, while enhanced only in two cases (table 3).   
                                                 




In several case studies, public forest organizations' power is mentioned with the market and non-market 
orientations as one of the driving factors leading to strengthening or hindering these orientations. The 
orientation toward market demand is pushed in general by a powerful state. Only one case was 
associated with a weak state forest organization. This case was a study from Armenia showing that the 
forest administration was very weak and dependent on donors. This dependency allowed the World 
Bank to influence the national policy and promote market development while restricting local 
inhabitants' forest use (Burns et al. 2017).  
Regarding the non-market orientation, the results show that the outcomes were impeded in most cases 
despite the presence of strong state forest organizations. The causes for such a result are varying 
depending on the context as well as the analyzed issue. For example, in Portugal, despite considering 
the state as a powerful actor, it is still challenging to control wildfire and pests. This performance is 
explained by the inefficient management strategies of fire and pest control (Marques et al. 2020). These 
kinds of activities of protection are defined within the 3L model as non-market orientation. In another 
international study, strong states hinder biodiversity conservation, which is also a non-market 





Table 3. State forest organizations' power influencing market and non-market orientations 
Identified Criteria 
(representing the 
outcomes in the 
forest) 
Identified influence 
direction on the 
outcomes (criteria) 
Number of cases 
where the state* 
is considered  
strong 
Number of cases 








Outcomes enhanced 3 1 4 




Outcomes enhanced 2 0 2 
Outcomes hindered 9 3 12 
 
*The state refers to the state forest organizations.  
** only the cases where a power's influence on outcomes was identified are considered in this table 
 
4.1.2 Achievement of sustainability goals 
The reviewed studies show that achieving sustainability goals remains a challenge in several countries. 
There are 10 cases where the sustainability-related outcomes are considered to be hindered while it is 
enhanced in one case only. In all these studies, the power of state forest organizations influences these 
outcomes. Six out of ten cases show a link between the hindered sustainability outcome and the 
existence of weak state forest organizations. However, there are still four case studies where the state is 
considered as powerful. Depending on the case study in question, the origins of such a contradiction are 
varying. Rigid laws in the forest sector can block the power of the state. In the case of Bangladesh, the 
forest department has incentives and dominant information power. However, the ban-related regulations 
block their ability to use this power to achieve sustainable forest management (Giessen et al. 2016). In 
Pakistan, the state implemented a logging ban efficiently to limit forest loss. Nevertheless, this ban, 
despite the coercion, has not achieved the intended goals.  Instead, a higher loss of forests was observed 
due to a shift to illegal selective logging with the same significance (Zeb et al. 2019). Besides, some 
cases show that a certain change, such as decentralization, can lead to new actors' involvement in land-
use conflicts, which reduces the state's capacity to protect forest stands and timber interests. In 
Indonesia, despite possessing coercive power, the central state could not control land conversion. Within 
a decentralization context, the palm oil industry gained more power and got supported by local 





Table 4. State forest organizations' power influencing sustainability 
Identified Criteria 
(representing the 
outcomes in the 
forest) 
Identified influence 
direction on the 
outcomes (criteria) 
Number of cases 
where the state* 
is considered  
strong 
Number of cases 






of forest stands 
Outcomes enhanced  1 0 1 
Outcomes hindered 4 6 10 
 
*The state refers to the state forest organizations.  
** only the cases where a power's influence on outcomes was identified are considered in this table 
 
4.1.3  Economic efficiency in the forest sector 
A limited number of reviewed studies that use the actor-centered power approach focus on the economic 
outcomes in the forest sector (criteria 5 and 6). None of these studies is mentioning that these 
performances are hindered due to the state's power.  Only four cases deal with the profit from forests 
and mention that the state's power is intended to push this outcome (Table 5).  
Regarding the orientation toward creating new forest products to explore new markets and increase 
economic performance, merely two cases mention a link between a powerful state and enhancing such 
an outcome. It is even possible that the state forest organizations, based on their interest, create 
exceptions for specific forest goods. In Indonesia, the state has broken a deadlock created by a "deep 
root bureaucratic politics" of biodiversity conservation to implement a geothermal project. In contrast, 
this deadlock was maintained for community and traditional use (Sahide et al. 2018).  






Table 5. State forest organizations' power shaping economic outcomes 
Identified Criteria 
(representing the 
outcomes in the 
forest) 
Identified influence 
direction on the 
outcomes (criteria) 
Number of cases 
where the state* 
is considered  
strong 
Number of cases 





C5: Profit from 
forests 
Outcomes enhanced  3 1 4 
Outcomes hindered 0 0 0 
C6: Orientation 
toward new forest 
goods 
Outcomes enhanced 2 0 2 
Outcomes hindered 0 0 0 
 
*The state refers to the state forest organizations.  
** only the cases where a power's influence on outcomes was identified are considered in this table 
 
4.1.4 State forest organizations’ power to advocate and mediate different actors' interests 
A large number of the analyzed publications is dealing with the power of the state to keep control over 
forests and to remain the leading representative of the sector (table 6), in other words, to push its role 
of advocacy of forestry (criterion 7). In these studies, Criterion 7 and Criterion 8 are most of the time 
opposed to each other. For example, when the state pushes centralization processes or does not support 
community forestry and participatory approaches, it enhances its advocacy role and, at the same time, 
reduces its role in the mediation of other actors' interests in the forest sector (criterion 8).  
In 20 cases, state forest organizations' advocacy role was enhanced by powerful organizations. 
Consequently, in 19 out of these 20 publications, the mediation of other interests was hindered. As 
above-mentioned, the main issues treated concerning this outcome are re-centralization processes and 
community forestry, for example, in Indonesia (e.g., (Sahide et al. 2016), Bangladesh (e.g., (Islam et al. 
2015); Vietnam ((Bach 2018); China (Ba et al. 2020), and Nepal (Basnyat et al. 2020; Basnyat et al. 
2018). Another publication in European countries in transition shows that the state is still powerful 
despite a successful restitution process and trying to keep the hand over private forests' use (Dobšinská 
et al. 2020).  
Only one case is showing that a powerful state is pushing the mediation role. In Sweden, the forestry 
department is trusted by small scale foresters because of the expertise (dominant information) provided 
to fulfill their interests through a "client-based approach." (Guillén et al. 2015)  
The advocacy role can also be hindered in the presence of a strong state. Despite the coercive power in 
Indonesia, the central state could not keep the hand over forests because of the local government's 




Table 6. State forest organizations' power and their role in solving the forest conflicts of interest 
Identified Criteria 
(representing the 
outcomes in the 
forest) 
Identified influence 
direction on the 
outcomes (criteria) 
Number of cases 
where the state* 
is considered  
strong 
Number of cases 





C7: Advocacy of 
forestry 
Outcomes enhanced 20 0 20 
Outcomes hindered 1 1 2 
C8: Mediation of 
different interests 
Outcomes enhanced 1 0 1 
Outcomes hindered 19 0 19 
 
*The state refers to the state forest organizations.  
** only the cases where a power's influence on outcomes was identified are considered in this table 
 
4.1.5 Power elements (combinations) influencing outcomes 
After analyzing the state's overall power to influence forest outcomes, different power elements used 
by state forest organizations were scrutinized. The aim is to identify the power sources that the state 
forest organizations use to produce a particular outcome. The systematic literature review did not go 
beyond identifying the state's power sources due to the diversity of power evaluation and interpretation 
methods applied by the authors. Depending on case studies, the same combination of power can be 
associated with a strong or weak state. Furthermore, in several case studies, there is a lack of precision 
regarding the importance of using different power elements compared to each other. There are cases 
where the state uses strong coercion, dominant information, and (dis)incentives simultaneously. In 
contrast, this same combination is used in other cases but relies mainly on coercion and using the other 
elements in a less significant way. Moreover, the methodology of how to come up with a specific 
evaluation of the strong or weak use of a power element is not clarified in all publications.  
Figure 2 shows that state forests rely on a combination of power elements in more than 50% of the cases 
(22 out of 37 studies where power elements were mentioned to be used by state forest organizations to 
influence forest outcomes). Five cases mention that public forest organizations are mainly relying on 
coercion, while only two use dominant information. The remaining cases are using different 
combinations of two of the power elements. None of the studies shows that a state forest organization 
relies, for the most part, on (dis)incentives.  
The dominance of different power combinations indicates the expansion of state forest organizations' 
role, which is not limited to the police role. Within these social relationships, state organizations aim to 




incentives, and regulation). The importance of such combinations for stable power relations is further 
detailed in the following case study of Tunisia. 
 
Figure 2. Different power combinations used by state forest organizations to shape forest outcomes 
based on the 3L model publications 
 
4.1.6 Tunisian state forest organizations: power dynamics and influence on outcomes  
Building on two constitutive papers of this dissertation ((Hasnaoui and Krott 2018; Hasnaoui et al. 
2020), insights into the Tunisian case study are presented. These studies allow a better understanding 
of power's role in shaping the relationship between state forest organizations and other categories of 
forest users and generating forest outcomes within a particular context of political change. The main 
results are dealing with the weakening of the central state’s power after the revolution of 2011 (decrease 
of the advocacy role, Criterion 7) and the hindering of sustainability outcomes (criterion 3). However, 
the state's power and influence on outcomes that followed the revolution cannot be generalized to the 
whole country. It depends on the power elements used to regulate specific land use within forestlands. 
Furthermore, the Tunisian case shows the importance of combining specific power elements to control 












































A wide range of tasks is allocated to public forest administrations in Tunisia. The share of state 
ownership of forestlands exceeds 90%, making the management of these lands quite challenging. 
Tunisian forestlands have mainly social and protective public goals. The livelihood of nearly 750,000 
inhabitants depends on the access to these forestlands, among other things, for grazing, firewood, and 
non-wood products. In this regard, public forest administration needs to balance different interests and 
solve the conflicts that may arise in relation to these different interests. This major challenge around 
regulating access to forestlands has been exacerbated since the revolution of 2011, marking the start of 
a series of contestations in the Arab world known as the ‘Arab Spring.’ After this event, the state's 
authority was contested by the population. It has become defying for the public authorities to enforce 
the regulations related to access to natural resources, including forestlands. The main effects observed 
are the acceleration of forest loss, mainly through illegal logging and wildfire, which considerably 
affected the stands' sustainability (figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. Evolution of recorded infractions in the forests and the clear-cut areas between 2000 and 
2018 in the forest of Mekna -Northwest Tunisia (Hasnaoui et al. 2020) 
 
In general, since the revolution, there has been no complete shift of power from government to other 
actors' categories, such as market and forest inhabitants. The state is still resisting the other actors and 
trying to gain control over forestlands again and use different power sources. However, depending on 
the land use and the regions, the state's power and other actors' resistance capacity vary. A particular 
case study from the forest of Mekna in the northwest region revealed several ruptures and continuities 




the periods of pre-and post-revolution. This case study shows that the state's use of specific 
combinations of power elements can influence its relation with other actors differently. A weakened 
state due to an unusual political event such as the revolution can still keep the hand over some land uses 
and avoid contestations if a set of power elements was used before the occurrence of this event. Based 
on this case study, different power dynamics resulting from combining power elements (Coercion, 
dominant information, and (Dis)incentives) by the state are discussed: 
(a) The association of coercion with incentives to keep stable power balances 
Since Tunisia's independence, forest and agricultural land ownership have been one of the main 
advantages of reinforcing its coercion capacities. Despite inefficient management of agricultural lands 
caused mainly by the limited resources8, land ownership remains a good option for the state to use as 
incentives to solve conflicts related to different land uses, including access to forestlands.  
In general, public bureaucracies have the tradition to use force (coercion) coupled with financial 
sanctions (disincentives) to control natural resources access. However, the use of such a combination 
of power has shown its limits after the revolution of 2011. Since this political change, a shift in power 
balance has been observed. As subordinates, forest users gained more power to resist and avoid 
destabilized state coercion and sanctions’ capacities. Consequently, forest authorities could not control 
illegal logging properly (criterion 3 decreased).  
Simultaneously, another example of power sets used by the public authorities showed that a stable 
power could be kept even after the revolution. Tunisian Ministry in charge of forests and Agriculture 
planned in 2003 to relocate inhabitants from a forest area to install a water dam. Legally, the state can 
decide and enforce, through coercion, projects of public interest on state-owned lands such as 
constructing a water dam. However, the concerned authorities have the responsibility and obligation to 
provide compensation for people living on these lands. Before starting the water dam construction, the 
state has planned to provide incentives for these forest people. Land compensations with much better 
access to different facilities were provided instead of forcing people to move or allocate poor quality 
lands. The use of incentives under a clear legal framework allowed state authorities to implement this 
planned project without facing any resistance from forest people. Furthermore, after the revolution, the 
situation has not changed and the inhabitants have not tried to challenge the forest administration. 
Therefore, implementing the law while providing incentives proved to bring more stability into the 
power relation.  
 
                                                 





(b) The use of coercion in association with shared information and dominant information  
The case study from northwest Tunisia brings a contribution to the actor-centered power approach to 
better understand the use of coercion by the state forest organizations. As defined in this theory (Krott 
et al. 2014), coercion builds on the use of force as a source of power. This definition supports Max 
Weber's understanding of the state as the actor who dominates the use of political force through its 
different administrative entities.  The state's coercion capacity is supported by a legal framework giving 
the rights to apply control sanctions. The case study results from northwest Tunisia show that shared 
information among actors (potentates and subordinates) is an essential requirement to properly use 
coercive power. As long as different actors have an equal level of knowledge about "(i) the existing 
resources, (ii) how much of this can be used, when and where (iii) the possible sanctions that the non-
state actors risk when they commit infractions such as illegal logging." It is called shared information, 
which does not set power on any individual or group of actors. This shared information stops to exist 
when non-state actors gain the power of dominant information. In this case, the state loses the coercive 
capacities despite the existence of a legal framework supporting the use of coercion. These interactions 
between shared information, dominant information, and coercion are explained through the example of 
hidden illegal logging, which can be considered as a form of dominant information power.  
The state has the potential to use coercion against illegal logging. Nevertheless, subordinates' ability to 
hide illegal logging inhibits forest authorities' coercive capacities to cease it physically.  
The Tunisian case study reveals that hiding illegal logging includes the use of dominant information 
additionally. For example, the collaboration between the private forest users and forest people who have 
considerable knowledge about the available resources increases the likelihood of more access to 
resources and hiding information from the state. Furthermore, the state's access to information about 
harvested quantities decreases mainly due to the administration's lack of personnel to control different 
field activities. This limited access to information forces the authorities to accept the information 
provided since they cannot verify it. Additionally, during the night or in areas that are difficult to reach, 
forest administration gets no information and cannot react against illegal logging due to the limited 
capacities of control. This example provides empirical evidence of the importance of shared information 
as a prerequisite to use coercion. 
Overall, using coercion to regulate logging and other forest-related activities needs to be associated with 
shared information among all actors or to monopolize the use of dominant information. When non-state 
actors acquire the capacity to hide information about illegal logging or other forest activities, the equal 
sharing of information is suppressed and leaves room for dominant information used as a power source. 




impact of the revolution on sustainability (decrease of criterion 3) and state's authority (decrease of 
criterion 7) could have been (partly) avoided by using specific sets of power elements that allow to 
mitigate and control the contestations of the administration's authority.   
4.2 State forest organizations’ power in the studies based on the 3L model 
Despite the limited number of publications based on the 3L model, the analysis reveals a link between 
some performance evaluations and the state forest organization's power. The identified influence of 
power on outcomes in these studies concerns (i) the orientation toward non-market demand (criterion 
2); (ii) Sustainability of forest stands (Criterion3); (iii) Economic performance of state forests 
organizations (criteria 4 and 5) and; (iv) the role of these organizations in managing different interests 
and conflicts in the forest sector (Criteria 7 and 8). 
Unlike the studies based on the actor-centered power, a powerful state is associated with strong 
outcomes in almost all cases, while a weak state drives weak evaluation results.  
4.2.1 Orientation toward non-market demand and sustainability  
Overall, two cases are dealing with the orientation toward non-market demand. One case shows that a 
powerful state enhances this outcome, while the other case reveals a hindered outcome in the presence 
of a weak state forest organization. The lack of personnel and financial resources in Serbia and Croatia 
slows down implementing different programs, such as those related to non-market orientation (Stevanov 
and Krott 2013). Community development plans produced in Tunisia are targeting poverty alleviation 
by providing incentives. Poverty alleviation activities are considered as non-market orientation and are 
enhanced in this particular case.  
Regarding forest stands' sustainability, the outcome is hindered and driven by weak state forest 
organizations in all identified cases. Either in Romania, Serbia, Croatia, or in Tunisia and Laos, the 
weak control and law enforcement capacities and the lack of resources are driving the low sustainability 
of forest stands and the continuance of illegal logging (Hapa 2019; Stevanov and Krott 2013; Hasnaoui 






Table 7. Market and non-market orientations outcomes driven by state forest organizations’ power 
Identified Criteria 
(representing the 
outcomes in the 
forest) 
Identified influence 
direction on the 
outcomes (criteria) 
Number of 














Outcomes enhanced 1 0 1 
Outcomes hindered 0 1 1 
C3: Sustainability 
of forest stands 
Outcomes enhanced 0 0 0 
Outcomes hindered 0 4 4 
 
*The state refers to the state forest organizations.  
** only the cases where a power's influence on outcomes was identified are considered in this table 
 
4.2.2 Economic performance of state forest organizations 
Regarding economic performance, the influence of power was identified regarding criteria 4 and 5 
(Table 8). Overall, weak state forest organizations are hindering the technical efficiency in the forest 
sector. In Brazil, a study shows that the state provides weak incentives to support concessions, which 
affects the technical efficiency within these concessions (da Motta Bustamante et al. 2018).  
There is only one exception in an international UNECE9 study showing that powerful states can drive 
weak performance in some countries. The rigidity of bureaucratic rules using disincentives hinders the 
establishment of reliable accounting systems used in the 3L model as an indicator to measure technical 
efficiency (Stevanov and Krott 2019).  
In only one case, profit from the forest is being enhanced by a powerful state forest organization. The 
case study from Tunisia, where an organization focuses on poverty alleviation and creating income 
sources for forest people, pushes the profit from forests through implementing development projects. 
The state uses mainly dominant information by producing specific plans for these activities and 
providing incentives for these people (Hasnaoui and Krott 2019b).  
                                                 




Table 8. Forest economic outcomes driven by state forest organizations’ power 
Identified Criteria 
(representing the 
outcomes in the 
forest) 
Identified influence 
direction on the 
outcomes (criteria) 
Number of cases 
where the state* 
is considered  
strong 
Number of cases 







Outcomes enhanced 0 0 0 
Outcomes hindered 1 3 4 
C5: Profit from 
forests 
Outcomes enhanced 1 0 1 
Outcomes hindered 0 0 0 
 
*The state refers to the state forest organizations.  
** only the cases where a power's influence on outcomes was identified are considered in this table 
 
4.2.3 Solving conflicts of interest in the forest sector 
In the analyzed publications, three cases highlight the link between the state forest organizations' power 
and their role as forestry advocators (Table 9). In comparison, four cases show the link to their position 
as mediators between different interests.  
The advocacy of forestry is slowed down in the presence of weak organizations only, while it is pushed 
in one case by strong forest administration. The use of strong coercion in the Philippines is reflected in 
the strong control of forests and bureaucratic rules' rigidity. This rigidity increases the advocacy role 
since the state does not consider the community forestry's interests properly (Daisog 2020). This strong 
advocacy position consequently leads to weakening the mediator role.   
The mediation role is hindered in all three identified cases (Table 9). Two cases are linked to weak state 
forest organizations. For example, Poland experienced a lack of expertise and trustful cooperation with 
different actors (dominant information), limiting state forest organizations' role as a mediator of 
different interests (Chudy et al. 2016). 
A study from Balkan countries shows that state forest organizations have weak influence in private 
forests and were not recognized as advocators or mediators by other actors, resulting in a weak 









outcomes in the 
forest) 
Identified influence 
direction on the 
outcomes (criteria) 
Number of cases 
where the state* 
is considered  
strong 
Number of cases 





C7: Advocacy of 
forestry 
Outcomes enhanced 1 0 1 
Outcomes hindered 0 2 2 
C8: Mediation of 
different interests 
Outcomes enhanced 0 0 0 
Outcomes hindered 1 2 3 
 
*The state refers to the state forest organizations.  
** only the cases where a power's influence on outcomes was identified are considered in this table 
 
4.2.4 Power elements influencing outcomes  
Despite the limited number of studies, the key information to extract from identifying the use of power 
elements is that the state forest organizations, based on the issue and the context in question, can use 
different combinations of power elements to influence a certain outcome (Figure 4). It does not mean 
that the identified power combinations are the unique ones used. Further, it does not represent the overall 
power of state forest organizations. It is limited to the outcome to which the link to power is established. 






Figure 4. Different power combinations used by state forest organizations to shape forest outcomes 
based on the 3L model publications 
Overall, the literature review shows the existence of power influence on the forest outcomes evaluated 
by the 3L model. However, the limited number of studies is insufficient to conclude about a specific 
influence of a particular combination of power elements and a specific outcome in the forestlands.  
4.2.5 Evaluation of state forest organization in Tunisia 
Two constitutive papers from this dissertation assess state forest organizations' performance in Tunisia 
(Hasnaoui and Krott 2019a, 2019b). The first one is more specific to social sustainability by focusing 
on the performance that impacts forest people (Hasnaoui and Krott 2019b). The second one evaluates 
the performance within the context of the revolution of 2011 (Hasnaoui and Krott 2019a). 
4.2.5.1. The state forest organizations’ priorities (interests) shaping the outcomes 
Evaluations of state forest organizations based on the 3L model have the advantage of being relevant to 
national policy goals and reflect the national priorities. These priorities can be different from what is 
expected at the international level or international organizations' interests.   
For example, to achieve strong economic outcomes, state forest organizations are expected to have 
strong technical efficiency performance (criterion 4). In Tunisia, state forest organizations have weak 
performance in terms of technical efficiency, which can be perceived as negatively impacting economic 
outcomes in general. However, public forest organizations prioritize poverty alleviation goals. Forest 
people in Tunisia have very limited technical skills in performing forest activities. Nevertheless, state 
forest organizations are strategically employing these people by providing short contracts in order to 





























avoid social contestations and more illegal logging, on the other hand. If state organizations were 
targeting higher technical efficiency, these people would be excluded from realizing these activities and 
replaced by machines or contracts with professional enterprises. 
Consequently, their income from forests would decrease. This case shows that state forest organizations' 
interests and priorities, which drive their power use, can shape the forest outcomes. Priorities of forest 
organizations can widely vary depending on political and socio-economic contexts, influencing the final 
outcomes (e.g., being more market-driven or focusing on non-market orientation).  
4.2.5.2. The role of state forest organizations’ power in producing forest outcomes 
In all studies using the 3L model, state forest organizations' power was considered as a factor 
influencing different outcomes. The situation was particularly complex in Tunisia due to a political 
change. Following the revolution of 2011, the state's coercive capacities were considerably hindered. 
However, there was no significant shift from government to governance. Other national actors such as 
those from the market and civil society have not gained the possibility to contribute directly to decision-
making and policy formulation processes. Nevertheless, a central role was played by foreign donors 
such as the World Bank and the GIZ10 in shaping the new political orientations in the presence of 
weakened state organizations. Under this influence of international organizations, mainly through 
incentives and dominant information, policy programs have been formulated after the revolution 
claiming the improvement of different forest sector outcomes.  
However, many hindering factors were identified, which can slow down the implementation and, 
consequently, hindering the achievement of the targeted outcomes.  
                                                 




(a) Weak state forest organizations under the influence of foreign donors, shaping post-
revolutionary policy goals 
The new forest policies that have been formulated since 2014 have prioritized the production of 
management plans and forest inventories to contribute to achieving higher sustainability outcomes.  
Forestland planning is an important factor contributing to reducing illegal logging and forestlands 
conversion into agricultural lands. However, such information systems can also benefit other actors 
fulfilling their interests in different land uses, leading to less sustainability in forest stands. Forest 
inventories define some notions like tree height. Based on these definitions, some areas might be 
excluded from the forestlands, allowing other sectors to identify the possibility of converting these lands 
into other uses such as agriculture (Burns and Giessen 2016). In Tunisia, The Forest investment plan 
includes an entire project dedicated to developing agricultural lands facing erosion threats. Developing 
this project within a forest policy program indicates that this sector is getting more important, which 
might lead to future policy changes benefiting the agricultural sector, especially in the presence of 
weakened forest administration.  
In terms of budget, new forest policies in Tunisia allocate negligible amounts to capacity building 
despite the important role of these organizations to realize different tasks in forests and rangelands. 
Between 0.1% and 3% of the total budget amount of these formulated programs are allocated to 
individual and institutional capacity building. By considering the decrease of the personnel's number 
since the year 2000, mainly because of the non-replacement of retired employees, ignoring capacity 
building might slow down implementing these policy programs. The lack of personnel in the field was 
one of the main factors causing an increase in illegal logging and wildfires. Inventories and management 
plans can be more useful when more attention is allocated to the individual and institutional capacity 
building  
(b)Weak state forest organizations failing to plan a coherent implementation process for the post-
revolutionary forest policies   
The forest production processes and the economic sector's activities require different implementation 
time (Krott 2005). Thus, considering the time dimension in planning forest policies' implementation is 
an important requirement to maintain or improve sustainability. 
40% of the total budget of the Tunisian forest strategy (2014-2025) was allocated to forest resources 
development, including producing management plans. The main claimed goal of this investment is to 
improve sustainability. Additionally, achieving sustainability outcomes is assumed to be enhanced by 
adopting a co-management approach between forest administration and forest people. In co-




an obligation to develop and protect new plantations and forest resources from different dangers such 
as wildfires and illegal logging. However, considering the time factor, these sustainability goals can be 
more difficult to achieve than expected. The formulation and the implementation of co-management 
plans are long processes (from law approval to tests, then to generalization on the whole forest area). 
Besides, this process should consider the time needed to convince forest people to adhere to these 
agreements and provide capacity building programs. Overall, such a long-term goal can take several 
decades to be effectively implemented in practice. In the meanwhile, new plantations and management 
plans can be produced within a much shorter time. Due to this gap and imbalanced time planning, there 
will be no qualified people to fulfill such management plans' requirements. This imbalance would 
engender considerable natural and financial loss.  
Overall, in the presence of weakened state organizations, other actors can intervene in shaping new 
forest policies through their power of incentives and dominant information. However, the resulting post-
revolution policies, claiming to push different outcomes and support more participation of different 
stakeholders, present several incoherencies, and do not fit the Tunisian context. These issues can 





4.3 Main findings: the power-linked 3L model 
The major contribution of this thesis is the establishment of a power-linked 3L model (figure 1). 
Initially, power was not explicitly considered as a driving factor in the 3L model. This model provided 
a framework for evaluating state forest organizations’ performance regarding different sustainability 
aspects based on eight benchmarking criteria. These criteria represent different forest outcomes and are 
relevant to policy goals, simple to use, and empirically applicable. The analysis of 49 case studies, 
including the Tunisian cases, shows that the criteria are relevant to policy goals in many global north 
and south countries. 
Furthermore, the evaluation provides a better explanation of the factors driving the state forest 
organizations' performance. Nevertheless, the link between achieving a particular outcome and state 
forest organizations' power was not explicit in this model. In the four constitutive papers, it was possible 
to identify this link in Tunisia's case study. In these papers, two kinds of evaluations were made 
separately. The 3L model was used in two papers to evaluate the state forest organizations’ performance, 
while the actors-centered power approach was applied in the other two papers to identify the power 
dynamics concerning forestland uses and outcomes. After exploring the link between power and the 
achievement of outcomes in the Tunisian case study, a systematic literature review was applied in the 
current thesis in order to support this link with more empirical evidence and check its soundness in other 
contexts. The literature review focuses on publications using the 3L model and those using the actor-
centered power approach summed up in 49 publications.  
The literature review revealed the existence of power influence on different forest sector outcomes as 
initially identified in the Tunisian case studies. In other words, successful forest policy-making and 
implementation are influenced by state forest organizations' power since they can be (partly) reflected 
by achieving certain outcomes. Furthermore, the results showed the importance of considering the 
interests of state forest organizations. The existence of hindered outcomes despite state forest 
organizations' power, mentioned 35 times, shows that powerful state forest organizations do not always 
aspire to achieve high outcomes in all relevant policy goals.  
Besides, the literature review and the Tunisian case studies show the common use of different power 
elements by state forest organizations to keep stable power relations rather than relying on the exclusive 
use of coercion. Supported by the Tunisian case studies, the results allowed confirming the formulated 
hypotheses that (i) “In addition to natural and technical factors, state forest organizations need both 
high interest and strong power in order to produce high forest outcomes.” and (ii) “State forest 





The systematic literature review gives empirical evidence for comparing multiple cases, but this 
empirical basis is still insufficient for testing specific hypotheses regarding power influence. The 
weaknesses are caused mainly by (i) the focus of the reviewed studies, which are varying based on the 
issues and the different contexts and scales; (ii) the description of power impact on outcomes made by 
authors, which is very selective and depending on their perception of how to assess and use the different 
power elements. 
These results are significant at this stage. However, they do not allow to measure in a deeper way (i) 
the significance of power's influence on outcomes compared to other factors such as the natural ones. 
(ii) the possible interactions between certain outcomes and specific combinations of power elements. 
Tackling these issues would require a higher number of relevant case studies that are based on a 




5 Designing a new platform-based concept for a power-linked 3L model 
This section is dedicated to presenting a new platform concept to apply the power-linked 3L model on 
a larger scale and create a comprehensive database. This database aims to centralize information 
regarding state forest organizations and their power sources by following a consistent data collection 
process to overcome the mentioned limitations of the current thesis. 
To achieve this goal, several questions should be answered in advance, including (i) how to proceed in 
order to create and manage such a platform, (ii) how to operationalize the concept of a power-linked 3L 
model within this platform concept? 
In recent years, several mechanisms have been developed to increase knowledge and to support science-
policy interfaces. For example, the knowledge and learning mechanism for biodiversity and ecosystem 
services (EKLIPSE) was developed to support decision-making on environmental issues based on the 
best available knowledge11. This mechanism may have some common aspects with the planned 
platform. The main similarity is producing high-quality knowledge and making it available for large 
scale use. However, this mechanism is acting mainly based on requests from policymakers and societal 
actors seeking more information regarding several issues related to biodiversity within Europe.  
The power-linked concept will actively work on different case studies and contexts to increase and share 
knowledge about one defined topic: the state forest organizations' power and performance evaluations. 
The challenge is to make the digital platform simple and comprehensible for data providers and users. 
Nonetheless, this platform's users can express their interest in obtaining data about their countries and 
request a collaboration for a study based on the power-linked 3L model. Furthermore, if needed, data 
users can request further details or clarifications on realized studies via the digital portal. The involved 
scientists and experts can answer these requests and contribute to improving the final evaluation results.  
A selection of some first ideas that can be relevant to creating and running this platform is presented in 
the following. These ideas are inspired by the European EKLIPSE mechanism and KNEU project 
results.12 Nevertheless, additional studies will be necessary to develop and operationalize a new 
platform for the power-linked 3L model.  
5.1 Creation of a network of knowledge  
The first step to establish this new concept would be to create a science-based network of knowledge. 
To start with, a search of existing networks of relevant organizations, researchers, current projects, 
NGOs, platforms of forest-related statistics should be made. This search aims to identify the networks 
that are already working on evaluating forest outcomes and actors’ power in interdisciplinary contexts. 






The network can further include organizations with knowledge about state forest organizations that are 
not necessarily available for the public. After the selection, these different networks will be contacted 
in order to ask them for a commitment to join this project. The process will start by contacting the 
already established network who can mobilize their own networks.  
This ‘network of networks’ will allow scrutinizing available knowledge and the research gaps to bridge. 
There will be no restrictions regarding countries of case studies. The collaboration can concern the 
existing networks regardless of their locations. The first criteria are to target interdisciplinary networks 
with closely linked activities to the topic of the concept.  
This Network of knowledge will be designed based on the platform-oriented model. This model is 
different from the informal network, which is based on the commitment of individuals. The platform 
model aims to officially engage organizations in order to reduce as much as possible external funding 
dependency (KNEU project 2014). Different tasks and roles will be distributed among these 
organizations. This platform model is based on membership. Each institution that becomes a member 
of this network would have rights and obligations to contribute. The number of engaged organizations 
and their size should be as limited as possible but still able to produce high-quality results. They also 
should be distant from political interests. Furthermore, different processes should be run transparently 
according to scientific standards and predefined rules and structures.  
5.1.1 Motivation for knowledge holders to contribute 
Engaging different knowledge holders to actively join the network and to contribute is considered a 
challenging task. Despite the importance of such networks, knowledge providers can lack time or 
motivation (KNEU project 2014). 
To increase the chances of active commitments, it is important to enhance the credibility and legitimacy 
of the network of knowledge by approaching well-known contributors and integrating different 
knowledge types from the beginning. Nevertheless, the process will also include less experienced 
contributors to support the learning process and capacity building.  
Additional benefits of this kind of networks can be a good motivation to be actively involved: 
- Having personal contacts and dialogue with peers within an interdisciplinary environment.  
- Giving them opportunities to develop new projects and to keep updated. 
- Developing careers (e.g., through scientific publications, agreements with peer-review journals). 
- Allowing the improvement of knowledge regarding methodologies to use in this kind of study. 




5.1.2 Knowledge collection and synthesis methods 
Specific data that is targeted by this power-linked 3L model does not explicitly exist comprehensively. 
Furthermore, available data differs based on the context. After presenting the concept to the network 
members, a collaborative process for developing a clear data collection guideline should occur. The 
starting point would be the existing 3L model manual developed by Stevanov and Krott (2013). This 
manual can be updated by integrating additional indicators that fit, as much as possible, different 
contexts, and especially by developing clear sets of indicators to measure the power of state forest 
organizations.  
The guideline questions should be simple and well-focused to ensure an easy data collection process for 
data providers. The answers will be collected following an interactive method on the digital platform. 
Building the database by providing data on the digital platform will be supervised by different groups 
of this network following an agreed task distribution process. For example, some groups from the 
network should develop tools for reviewing data that already exist online (e.g., statistics about forest 
cover evolution) to avoid long data collection guidelines for experts. Other groups would focus on 
completing missing data by targeting experts or organizations and asking them to provide specific 
information directly linked to their activity area and avoid asking them about available online data. They 
can also organize multiple expert meetings, workshops. 
In the EKLIPSE project mentioned above, 21 data synthesis methods have been identified, including 
systematic and non-systematic literature review, meta-analysis, participative mapping, and expert 
consultations. A combination of these methods that will be selected jointly by experts should be adopted 
to develop and answer the guideline's questions. Collected data should be reviewed by scientists and 
expert groups of the Network before being available for public use. 
5.1.3 Governance of the network of knowledge 
Governing such a platform would require the creation of several structures charged with specific 
responsibilities. These structures may include: 
(i) Knowledge coordination body; (ii) A small secretariat (iii) a strategic advisory board, (iv) business 
and IT experts, (v) small evaluation body. 
In addition to these structures, working groups on different topics should be formed from the established 
network of knowledge to conduct data collection and synthesis processes in practice. The number of 
members should be optimized in order to avoid high costs.   
5.2 Creation of a digital platform  
The digital platform has different functions. It allows to present and explain the concept clearly and 




The data collection guideline will be translated into interactive questions on the platform, which should 
be clear and offer a good experience and an easy data provision process (Annex 4). 
In addition to publications, the results will be presented attractively and clearly, allowing the user to 
select different filters and compare countries’ results (Annex 5).  
The platform will also be used as a forum for the community of interest. Each user will have the 
possibility to create an account and interact with other users and experts on the platform but also to 
make suggestions and give feedback (Annex 6). In this vein, the platform can additionally support 
webinars and online meetings for the community and the expert meetings. Furthermore, each user will 
have the advantage of staying tuned by receiving notifications regarding new inputs and collaboration 
opportunities based on the users’ expressed interests (Annex 7). 
The digital platform can also be used for flipped classrooms where students can read about theories and 
get access to empirical results to actively prepare for the classes.  
5.3 Possible funding models and partners 
Several funding models can support the network of knowledge. It can be (i) one major donor, (ii) 
project-based funding that is limited in terms of time, or (iii) core funding by the network members, 
which is considered as the most suitable to make the network operational in a short time by covering its 
basic costs (KNEU project 2014). Several organizations can be approached to support this concept, such 
as the International Union of Forest Research Organizations (IUFRO), the European Forest Institute 
(EFI), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). 
5.4 Specific content and advantages of a power-linked 3L platform  
As mentioned above, the data collection process and the digital platform will build on the power-linked 
3L model. The figure of this model (see figure 1) will serve as a navigation map for the user who can 
learn more about the model and the applied theories and be guided to provide data. Data providers will 
be guided through different criteria and indicators of the model. The indicators will be based on those 
developed in the existing 3L model manual that will be optimized when needed. Besides, indicators to 
measure power will be added. The first example of questions for the user is detailed in Annex 1. 
However, not all these questions will be included in the guideline. To keep it simple, only questions 
that cannot be answered from available online data should be included in this guideline.  The example 
of Annex 1 concerns the sustainability of forest stands criterion. For each indicator, a set of precise 
questions is developed. The indicators are mainly focused on 1) achieving the requirements for 
sustainability, 2) Forest management plans, and 3) available power sources used by the state forest 
organizations to achieve the sustainability of forest stands’ goal. These power-linked questions will be 




information). Using the same guideline for data collection will ease the process of obtaining relevant 
data and allow comparability between different case studies. 
The platform that is based on the new power-linked 3L model has several advantages. The main 
advantage is the focus on a specific topic regarding state forest organizations. Other platforms have a 
very broad scope, such as biodiversity and environmental issues. The requests to conduct evaluation 
related to biodiversity or the environment can be from different perspectives and disciplines, which 
needs to develop suitable measurement indicators for each case. These evaluations would need more 
resources (e.g., financial, staff, time) to run the platform and collect data. The power-linked model will 
have a predefined simple guideline focusing on the state forest organizations' performance and their 
power sources, making data collection clearer and easier to achieve.  
In addition, knowledge holders will not be asked to answer questions that can be answered from data 
available online, such as those related to sustainability requirements (e.g., forest cover evolution) and 
countries' policy goals and programs. Several tools, such as those based on artificial intelligence, can 
help extract such data from available online sources, saving time and financial and staff resources.  
The focus on specific data to collect with short and clear guidelines for each criterion will ease running 
the platform. It will encourage data providers to contribute by avoiding the duplication of information 
that can be found online. 
Overall, this platform will build on two analytical frameworks that are empirically applicable in order 
to centralize data on state forest organizations and their related power sources in different contexts 
worldwide. The platform can expand the evaluation of state forest organizations based on the power-
linked 3L model and offer the opportunity for knowledge sharing and development. This knowledge 
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Annex 1: Example of data collection questions (first ideas to be developed) 
 Each question and technical term will be defined for the user before answering 
 When relevant, questions will be followed by suggestions defined by experts 
 Data collection questions to be answered by experts will not concern data that is available 
online.  
 
Criterion 3: Sustainability of forest stands. 
 
1. Sustainability requirements: the majority of this data can be found online and will not be included 
in the manual of data collection to be answered by experts (except the cases with poor available online 
data) 
a- Forest cover evolution?  
b- Growing stock evolution? 
c- Annual increment evolution? 
d- Biodiversity indicators? 
e- Statistics about the impact of illegal logging for the last 20 years? 
How recent is this data? 
Cover last ten years 
Cover last 20 years  
Other: ……………………………. 
 
2. Management plans  
a- Validity of plans 
 What is in percentage the number of valid management plans 
 What is in percentage of the forest area covered by valid plans 
How recent is this data? 
Cover last ten years 
Cover last 20 years  
Other: ……………………………. 
 
3. Available state forest organizations’ power sources to support sustainability  
a- coercion power 




 In case of illegal logging or other infractions, who intervenes first? (police, forest 
officers…?) 
 What is the budget allocated to control activities and its proportion compared to the total 
budget? 
 How large is the forestland area (in%) where the sanctions are applicable? 
 How much of these sanctions are effectively followed by a completely legal process (in 
%)? Please provide yearly statistics for at least ten years. 
b- (Dis)incentives power 
 How much of the recorded financial sanctions (disincentives) resulting from a legal 
process effectively flow to the state’s treasury (value and percentage)? Please provide 
yearly statistics for at least ten years 
 Does the state forest organization provide incentives for sustainability? If yes: 
- For which activities? 
- For which actors? 
 What is the percentage of the budget allocated to sustainability activities (e.g., 
management plans, inventories updates)? 
c- Dominant information power 
 Does the state forest organization provide extension services? If yes, how much of the 
budget is allocated for such activity? 
 In the case of forest development projects funded by foreign donors, are the consulting 
experts national (from the state forest organization) or foreigners? Please provide the 
ratio of national and foreign experts for the last 20 years. 
 Does the state forest organization have enough personnel and financial/technical 
resources to control forests? Please explain the reasons and provide evidence supporting 
your answer  
 Availability of updated inventories/frequency of inventories realizations? 
4. Natural conditions: this data will be collected mainly through available online literature and will 
not be asked from data providers (except the cases with poor available online data) 
a- Rainfall 
Please enter information about the pluviometry in mm/m²: 
b- Natural wildfire 
 How frequent were natural wildfires in the last ten years? 




 Are wildfire an issue for state forest organizations (e.g., included in policy programs) 
c-  Forest stands (ecological) conditions 
 How is the situation of natural regeneration of forest stands? 
 How is the situation of the soil?  
 What is the ratio of natural and artificial stands?  
 Is there a recent orientation to integrate new species? If yes, for which reasons? 
How recent is this data? 
Cover last ten years 
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Abstract - The ecological basis of forests in Mediterranean countries is quite similar, but the 
management of ecosystem services differs substantially. The question is which political factors drive 
the different forest management concepts. Our political analysis looks on private and public actors and 
their power and interests which shape the management of the ecosystem services of the forests in 
Tunisia and compares the results with Italy, Portugal and Turkey. We apply an analytical study of 
interests, conflicts and actor-centered power with a triangulation of qualitative data (document 
analysis, qualitative interviews and observations) in 2016-2017. We compare our results with the 
results of ALTERFOR project covering European countries.Thestudy shows that in all cases the key 
actors are the state institutions, whereas the importance of other actors varies between the countries.In 
Tunisia and Turkey all forests are state-owned and the governmental institutions dominate forest 
management. However, in Portugal, actors from timber sector are considerably strong by providing 
incentives. A particularity of Tunisia is the noticeable impact of international organizations in forest 
management by the means of incentives and dominant information. In all cases, the shift from 
government to governance did not happen, but some indicators and previous experiences from other 
developing countries show the potential in Tunisia. 
 
Keywords: actor-centered power, interests, forest governance, ecosystem services, Mediterranean 
countries 
1. Introduction 
The management systems of forests in the Mediterranean countries present diversity and particularities 
for each country despite the similarities in climate and vegetation. These differences are mainly 
noticeable in land ownership (private or state-owned forests) and in goal setting for ecosystem 
services. In countries where forests are in majority state-owned, the most powerful actor is the 
government, while in other countries presenting a great proportion of private forests, such as Portugal 
with only 3% of state-owned forests (Juerges et al. internal report 2017:167), actors related to timber-
based activities are dominant. The interests of the actors may vary from ecosystem services’ 
provisioning, supporting, regulating and cultural interests, leading not only to the shaping of forest 
management policy, but also to many conflicts of interests among different actors. It is possible to 
identify the political drivers behind the ecosystem services of forests. Such knowledge might be 
important for implementing innovative management ideas in practice and for learning from other 
experiences. For this purpose, we identified different actors and mapped their interests in ecosystem 
service categories (provisioning, supporting, regulating and cultural ones) after describing roughly the 
most visible conflicts for each case study. Then we aggregate the actors in three main categories 
(governmental, market and civil society), evaluate their overall power resources regarding different 
ecosystem services and determine the power mechanisms that they use. The results about the power of 
actors allow checking whether there is a shift from government (classical regulation with a strong state 
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actor formulating and implementing policies) to governance (modern regulation empowering civil 
society and market actors to share power with the state) (Krott 2008). 
 
2. Materials and methods 
2.1. Analytical framework 
This work is based on the analysis of interests and power of actors implicated in forest management. 
Interest is defined by Krott (2005) as being "based on action orientation, adhered to by individuals or 
groups, and designating the benefits the individual or group can receive from a certain object, such as 
a forest". Power can be defined as "the capability of an actor to influence other actors" (Krott et al. 
2013 in Juergeset al.internal report 2017:30). This power definition is used to assess the power of 
actors in the actor-centered approach (ACP) which has been developed by Krott et al. (2013). The 
theoretical roots of this approach are detailed elsewhere (in Krott et al. 2013). According to this actor-
centered power approach, coercion, (dis)incentive, and dominant information are the mechanisms used 
by actors to influence other actors allowing, consequently, to evaluate these actors' power. These 
mechanisms are defined as following: 
 Coercion: is defined as "altering the behavior of the subordinate (other actors) by force". This 
definition concerns physical (real) force, the threat of force and even bluffing with force that 
does not exist in reality. In addition, illegal harvesting is considered as coercion since it is a 
kind of disobedience to other actors' rules. However, influencing nature (cutting, planting 
trees) is not considered as coercion because it does not affect other actors directly. Other 
actions are considered as power by means of coercion such as implementing laws by the 
governmental authorities, fencing a forest (legally or illegally) to stop access to this area by 
recreationalists, climbing over the fence to access the forest, wood harvesting for domestic 
heating in an illegal way, etc. (Juerges et al. internal report 2017:30). 
 (Dis)Incentive: isconsidered as "altering the behavior of the subordinate by means of 
advantages or disadvantages". (Dis) incentives can be material or immaterial. Material (dis) 
incentives concern money but also technical support such as machines, plants, etc. (e.g. 
subsidies for forest management activities, providing extension services by the state 
institutions for free, etc.) while immaterial incentives are based on social and psychological 
benefits (e.g. appealing to social conventions or to a moral purpose such as protecting some 
species from extinction) (Juerges et al. internal report 2017:31). 
 Dominant information:  can be defined as "altering the behavior of the subordinate by means 
of unverified information". In others words, the subordinate cannot check the validity and 
quality of informationprovided by the other actor, and the subordinate makes decisions by 
referring to this unverified information. This dominant information is provided by superior 
experts or can be based on particular ideologies (Juerges et al. internal report 2017:31).  
 
2.2.  Methods 
The methodology of this work is based on triangulation of qualitative data (interviews, document 
analysis, participatory observations) which is used in social science research by making observations 
from different points of view increasing the precision and accuracy of the work (Neuman, 2014:166). 
Data was collected in 2016-2017. The interviews were realized face-to-face, with questionnaires, via 
email or phone calls. We selected by the snowball system best informed eight experts from different 
institutions linked to the forest sector (General Directorate of Forests (interviews 1,2 and 3); Forest 
Use Authority (interview4); Ministry of Environment (interview 5); Research institutions (interviews6 
and 7) and the Northwest Silvo-Pastoral Development Office (interview8). In addition, the author had 
access and cooperation with the Tunisian General Directorate of Forests and other research institutions 
in the frame of previous research work which allowed a better understanding of the forest sector and 
the different actors involved. The validity of this comparison work is supported by the use of the same 
methodology in the European project entitled "Alternative models and robust decision-making for 
future forest management" (ALTERFOR) from which we used the obtained data, compiled in a 
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2.2.1. The actor-centered power approach 
To measure the power of actors for the Tunisian case, we identified the main actors who have interest 
in forest ecosystem services at several levels. We specified and evaluated these actors' interests (strong 
interest (+++), medium (++), low (+), no interest (0)) or even if some actors are against specific 
ecosystem services (-). Next, we compared Tunisia to other European cases in terms of actors with 
strong interest in different categories of ecosystem services. In addition, we made an overall 
assessment of power resources of three main groups of actors (governmental, market and civil society) 
regarding all cases to get an overview and a comparison of power for these groups. Based on the tables 
we compared the overall power concerning different categories of ecosystem services and the power 
mechanisms used by strong actors (coercion, (dis)incentives, dominant information) in different cases. 
This approach provided a qualitative and relative judgment of different actors' power driving forest 
management. 
 
2.2.2. About the selected cases 
(a) Tunisia 
According to the second national forest inventory (2010), the forest area in Tunisia is estimated at 
at1.141.628 ha, from which more than 90% are state property (Boussaidi, 2012). In these areas owned 
and managed by the state, forest people have always been an issue. In fact, from a total number of 
population estimated at 10.982.754 inhabitants (National Institute of Statistics, 2014), 733.613 persons 
live in and around five kilometers from forests (Tounsi and Ben Mimoun2012) and present a 
considerably high poverty rate (45.8%) compared to the average national one (15.5%) (Tounsi and 
Ben Mimoun 2012). The main conflicts existing in the Tunisian forest sector are between the 
governmental actors (responsible for law implementation and policy formulation and advocating 
nature protection and conservation) and other actors who are more interested in ecosystem services 
provisioning and especially forest people who live from forest resources. 
(b) Italy 
The total forest area in Italy is about 10.9 million ha with 9.3 million ha of real forests and 1.6 million 
ha of other wooded lands. This refers to nearly 36% of the total area of the country (Juerges et al. 
internal report 2017:85). There are roughly 66% of Italian forests which are privately owned with an 
intense fragmentation of ownership, while 34% of forests are public and characterized by a dominating 
role of municipalities (Juerges et al. internal report 2017:86).  Italian forests are underused despite the 
important forest cover that doubled in the last 50 years (Juerges et al. internal report 2017:86). The 
main forest policy problem in Italy is the fragmentation and inconsistency due to the failure of the 
decentralization process which started in the seventies. In addition, due to a lack of vertical integration 
in terms of forest policy implementation, there are permanent conflicts between municipalities, 
protected areas’ authorities and regional departments which feel as well embarrassed by sharing their 
decision-making with environmentalists (Juerges et al. internal report 2017:87; Juerges et al. 
Forthcoming). 
(c) Portugal 
Forests cover 35% of the total land area and are about 3.15 million ha. These forests are facing 
degradation due to repeated and severe wildfires. The majority of forests are privately owned (87%). A 
great priority is given to wood production in Portuguese forest management. However, there are 
different perceptions of priorities to formulate the forest policy and to implement multi-functional 
forestry (Juerges et al. internal report 2017:167; Juerges et al. Forthcoming). 
(d) Turkey 
The area of forests in Turkey is 22.3 million ha and represents 28% of the total land (Juerges et al. 
2017:259). Out of this area, 99.9% belongs to the state and only 0.01% are private forests (Juerges et 
al. internal report 2017:259). The majority of these forests are managed by the state forest organization 
named General Directorate of Forestry or Turkish Forest Service under the Ministry of Environment 
and Forestry (Sivrikayaet al. 2008). 
Over the years, the Turkish forest management has evolved to become more oriented towards the 
multiple use of ecosystems concepts (Juerges et al. Forthcoming). The common conflict of setting 
priorities for the different ecosystem services and the way to implement their multiple uses does exist 
mainly within the state forest organization.  
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3. Results and discussion 
3.1. The different stakeholders' interests related to forest ecosystem service 
The ecosystem services (ES) concept consists of the benefit that humans can obtain from ecosystems 
(MA 2005). The ecosystem services are classified into four main categories, namely provisioning ES 
(such as food, timber, water, fiber etc.), supporting ES (such as primary production, soil formation, 
etc.), regulating ES (climate and flood regulation disease regulation, water purification, etc.) and 
cultural ES (aesthetics, education, recreation, etc.) (MA 2005; Szücs et al. 2014; Blicharska et al. 
2016).  
3.1.1. The case of Tunisia 
In Tunisia the main actors interested in forests are the governmental actors (the General Directorate of 
Forests and the regional institutions representing it, state research institutions, Forest Use Authority 
responsible for forest products' sales, The Northwest Silvo-Pastoral Development Office, Ministries of 
Tourism, Agriculture and Environment interested in nature protection and ecotourism), market actors 
(mainly the industries of wood and non-wood products such as cork, rosemary, nuts...). International 
organizations are particularly interested in Tunisian ecosystem services by financing development 
projects and realizing studies (interviews 2,5 and 8). In addition, forest people living in and around 
forests have great interest in forest ecosystem services since they depend on them to survive.  
Regarding ecosystem services provisioning, timber industries have interest in them. However, it 
cannot be considered as strong interest since 90% of industry's need is imported (Daly-Hassan et al. 
2014).Non-wood products are more interesting for industries. For instance, there are five big 
enterprises of cork transformation which benefit from the resource and they export 100% of their 
products (interview 4). In fact, industrials buy a tone of cork (already harvested in the charge of the 
forest authorities) with an average price of 1700 Tunisian dinars (TND) (equivalent to 600 euros in 
August 2017), while one tone of cork gives, after transformation, 10 thousand bottle plugs sold for 0.5 
euros per plug (interview 4). For the extraction of essential oil from rosemary, according to the 
National Institute of Statistics (2015), the total value of exported oil in 2014 was estimated at 
11.219.336 TND, while in the Forest Use Authority activity's report of 2014, the total value of 
rosemary sales was 1.524.000 TND. Forest households are also interested in wood provision 
(especially fire wood which is for some of them the only source of energy, unlike in European 
countries where people have more options). In addition, they are particularly interested in non-wood 
products such as extracting traditionally essential oils from plants, bee-keeping, and transforming 
different types of nuts, especially pine nuts which are economically valuable (Hasnaoui 2014). Forest 
people benefit as well from grazing in forests to feed their livestock which provides 58% of the forest 
income for these people (Tounsi and Ben Mimoun 2012). Also, international organizations and 
research institutions show great interest in wood and non-wood product provision by working in the 
frame of development and research projects. All actors except industry which seeks increasing 
harvesting rate and access to the forest support Biodiversity and Habitats. Forest people, despite 
depending on the provision of wood (mainly fire wood) and non-wood products, contribute to the 
conservation by protecting and intervening in fire-fighting. 
Soil protection is particularly an issue in Tunisia. Fixing sand dunes (for example in the northwest 
coastal line of the country) was realized in a natural way by planting trees (especially pine trees). 
These activities of soil protection are performed by the state in collaboration with international funds 
and research institutions. 
With regards to cultural aspects, there is low to medium interest in these activities. As an example, the 
General Directorate of Forests, which manages 17 national parks and 27 natural reserves in Tunisia, 
does not apply any entry fees for entering these spaces despite the existence of law for some of them 
that refer to the obligation to pay entry-fees to access (interview 6). The following table (Table 1) 
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Table1: Interests of selected actors in ecosystem services in Tunisia 
+++: Strong, ++:Medium, +:Low, -:against, --: medium to strong against, 0: no interest 
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization; ES: Ecosystem Services 
Source: own field work 
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3.1.2. Tunisia in comparison with Turkey, Italy and Portugal  
The following table (table 2) presents the actors with strong interests in ecosystem services. It is 
important to mention that the table contains only actors with the relatively stronger interest as 
compared to other actors in their case. There might be some actors who have considerable interest, but 
who are not cited in the table since there are others with stronger interests. Table 2 allows identifying 
many important aspects of interests in forest ecosystem services.  
The first aspect concerns the comprehensiveness of interests in ecosystem services. In other words, it 
shows whether actors are interested in all ecosystem services or focus on only a few of them. In 
Portugal there is more comprehensiveness regarding ecosystem services than in the other countries. 
The actors are strongly interested in 12 out of 13 ecosystem services while in Italy, Tunisia and 
Turkey there are respectively six, eight and ten from these 13 services. The orientation of these three 
countries actors is more focused on specific ecosystem services. 
The second aspect is to identify which category of ecosystem services is most attractive. In all cases 
there are actors with strong interest in wood provision even though the number of these actors is 
different according to the importance and the multiple use of wood in the country. However, game and 
fish provision may interest fewer actors. Interests in regulating ecosystem services differ in the four 
countries. While carbon sequestration and climate regulation interest actors in almost all of the 
countries, wildfire reduction is a special issue in Portugal gaining strong interest from an important 
number of actors. The cultural ecosystem services are interesting strongly in Portugal and Turkey but 
not in Tunisia and Italy. 
The third point is to identify for each country the ecosystem services in which the most actors are 
interested. In Tunisia the non-wood product provision is of great interest for different kind of actors 
(the state forest institutions, forest households, industries, research institutions and international 
organizations) in addition to supporting biodiversity in which state forests and research institutions, 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and governmental institutions related to nature 
conservation (e.g. the Ministry of Environment) are interested.In Turkey the interest in ecosystem 
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services is more balanced with less focus of many actors on one particular service. This could be 
explained by the comprehensive multiple use approach of governmental actors which are the owners 
and managers of the Turkish forests (Juerges et al. internal report 2017:259). However, it is still 
possible to identify the ecosystem services that are gathering a relatively higher number of actors and 
which are pest control and non-wood products provision. 
In Italy wood provision is the service with the highest number of strongly interested actors. However, 
this is not due to the importance of domestic wood provision as it is the case in Portugal, but it is due 
to the multiple use of this wood. While the Italian Ministry of Agriculture focuses on rural 
development and support for local economies by producing wood and other forest products, public 
forest owners consider forest products as a source of income for their institutions and have strong 
interest in them (Juerges et al. internal report 2017:94). Private forest owners and forestry enterprises 
have determined interests in wood provision (wood imports in Italy are very important and the 
domestic production of wood is used almost for energy purposes; about 65% of the domestic 
production is used as energy (Juerges et al. internal report 2017:86). The bio-energy actors are directly 
interested in the provision of wood, while wood and paper industry rely more on imported wood. 
Regarding Portugal, two main ecosystem services noticeably aggregate the highest numbers of actors. 
These services are wood provision and wildfire reduction. Wildfire is a big issue in Portugal (from 
1980 to 2009 there were more than half a million fires which burned 3.2 million ha (Rego and 
Joaquim 2014)). 
The last aspectis to identify the role of governmental actors (in bold in the Table 2). In Tunisia state 
actors with their different functions and positions present strong interest in all ecosystem services. 
This could be explained by the state ownership of the forest. Similarly, in Turkey forests are state-
owned and the state institutions from different fields are strongly interested in different types of 
ecosystem services except ecotourism and recreation. In Italy state actors dominatein terms of interest 
in supporting ecosystem services, especially in biodiversity where they have strongest interest without 
any competition from other actors. Regulating ecosystem services are also of great interest for them, 
while service provisioning is less important. In Portugal the state institutions are not dominant as 
compared to the other actors. The NGOs are attracted by supporting and regulating ecosystem services 
stronger than the state. This contradicts the European Union strategy claiming that the state should 
have more interest in supporting and regulating ecosystem services, while the provisioning of these 
services should be of interest for market actors. The cultural services are in general not in the focus of 
state institutions in all cases. 
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Table 2: Comparative synthesis about the number and types of actors with the strongest interest in ecosystem services in the four cases 
-: does not exist 
 Number of actors (categories) with 
strong interest in the ecosystem 
services (ES) 
Type of the actor with strong interest in the ecosystem services 
 Tunisia Turkey  Italy Portugal  Tunisia Turkey  Italy Portugal   
Provisioning  ES 
Wood provision 
 
1 2 5 3 - Forest households - Forest management 
institutions 
- Timber industries 
- Chartered agronomists and 
foresters 
- Industry (wood and pulp, bio-
energy) 
- Forestry enterprises 
- Private forest owners 
- Public forest owners 
 
- Forest management 
institutions 
- Timber industries 
- NGOs representing 
employment in forests 
Game provision 1 0 0 1 - Governmental actors and 
NGOs (ecotourism, recreation, 
Hunting) 
_ _ - Hunting NGOs 
Non-wood products 
provision 
5 3 1 0 - Forest owner and manager 
(state forest institutions) 
- Forest households 
- Non-wood industry 
- International organizations 
- Research institutions 
- Forest management 
institutions 
- NGOs and governmental 
actors of nature conservation 
in forests 
- NGOs of ecotourism and 
recreation 
-Public forest owners _ 
Fish Provision 0 0 0 1 _ _ _ - Fishing NGOs 
Supporting ES 
Biodiversity 4 1 3 1 - Forest owner and manager 
(state forest institutions) 
- NGOs+ state institutions of 
nature conservation and soil 
protection 
- International organizations 
- Research institutions 
- NGOs and governmental 
actors of nature conservation 
in forests 
- Ministry of Environment 
- State forest service 
- Environmental NGOs 
- Nature and Environment 
conservation NGOs 
Habitats 4 1 3 2 - Forest owner and manager 
(state forest institutions) 
- NGOS+ state institutions of 
nature conservation and soil 
protection 
- International organizations 
- Research institutions 
- NGOs and governmental 
actors of nature conservation 
in forests 
- Ministry of Environment 
- State forest service 
- Environmental NGOs 
- Nature and environment 
conservation NGOs 
- Outdoor recreation NGOs 
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Table 2 (continued) 
-: does not exist; NGO: Non-Governmental Organization; ES: Ecosystem Services 
Source: Own field work, ALTERFOR project (2017) 
 
 Tunisia Turkey Italy Portugal Tunisia Turkey Italy Portugal 
Regulating ES 
Carbon sequestration 2 1 2 1 - International organization  
- Research institutions 
- NGOs and governmental 
actors of nature conservation 
in forests 
- Ministry of Environment 
- Environmental NGOs 
- Nature and environment 
conservation NGOs 
 
Climate regulation 2 1 0 1 - International organization  
- Research institutions 
- NGOs and governmental 
actors of nature conservation 
in forests 
_ - Nature and environment 
conservation NGOs 
 
Soil protection 4 2 0 2 - International organization  
- Research institutions 
- Forest owner and manager 
(state forest institutions) 
- NGOS+ state institutions of 
nature conservation and soil 
protection 
- Water and soil protection 
institutions 
- NGOs and governmental 
actors of nature conservation 
in forests 
_ - Water associations and 
companies 
- Nature and environment 
conservation NGOs 
 
Water quality  0 2 2 3 _ - NGOs and governmental 
actors of nature conservation 
in forests 
- Water and soil protection 
institutions 
 
- Ministry of Environment 
- Environmental NGOs 
 
- Water associations and 
companies 
- Nature and environment 
conservation NGOs 
- Hunting and fishing NGOs 
Wildfires reduction 0 0 0 5 _ _ _ - Forest management 
institutions 
- NGOs representing 
employment in forests 
- Outdoor recreation NGOs 
- Hunting and fishing NGOS 
- Water associations and 
companies 
 
Pest control 0 3 0 2 _ - Forest management 
institutions 
- Timber industries 
- Governmental actors of 
nature conservation in forests 
 
_ - Forest management 
institutions 




0 1 0 1 _ - NGOs of ecotourism and 
recreation 
_ - Outdoor recreation NGOs 
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3.2. Power of actors driving the management of forest ecosystem services 
A first insight into different power resources in Tunisia, Turkey, Italy and Portugal is provided in 
Table 3. The actors are aggregated intothree categories: governmental, market and civil society actors, 
while their power resources are indicated. These three categories enable to test a shift from 
government to governance, which is an important issue for forest and environmental policy (Juerges 
and Newig 2015; Arts 2014; Jedd and Bixler 2015). The governmental actors gather all the actors who 
have authority based on legislative, executive or jurisdictional responsibilities. Market actors are non-
public actors interested in generating an economic benefit including enterprises and all non-state 
organizations representing the interest of the enterprises. Civil society actors are the non-public and 
non-economic interest actors like environmental organizations (Juerges et al. Forthcoming). 
Table 3 shows that the governmental actors have strong power resources in all countries. Market 
actors' power differs from one case to another. In Portugal these actors are dominant and in Italy they 
are remarkably strong too. On the contrary, in Tunisia and Turkey market actors are weak.  
Civil society actors are not strong in any country, but they get some influence in Portugal and Turkey. 
Land ownership is a strong power source of the governmental actors in Tunisia and Turkey. In 
Portugal private forests dominate and market actors compete with governmental actors to become the 
strongest, especially in regards to timber provision. 
 
Table 3: Power resources of governmental, market and civil society in the different cases 
+++: Strong, ++:Medium, +:Low 
Source: own field work, ALTERFOR project (2017) 
 Governmental actors Market actors Civil Society actors 
Tunisia +++ + + 
Portugal +++ +++ ++ 
Italy +++ ++ + 
Turkey +++ + ++ 
 
Table 4 presents an overall evaluation of power resources in the four countries regarding different 
ecosystem services. The power support differs strongly in regards to different forest ecosystem 
services. Supporting of ecosystemshas strong power assistance in all four countries. Concerning 
regulating ecosystem services, the power resources are in majority medium. The only two exceptions 
are soil protection in Turkey and wildfire reduction in Portugal, which get strong support. The power 
resources behind provisioning wood are in two countries strong and in two weak. In Portugal a strong 
wood industry pushes timber provision. In Turkey the General Directorate of Forestry represents the 
forest owner and has therefore the power to set two priorities: wood provision and biodiversity. In 
contrast to all other ecosystem services cultural ecosystem services, even outdoor recreation and 
tourism, are not subject to great power resources. 
Regarding power mechanisms, coercion and dominant information are the most used. However, the 
dominant information is not highly applied by the Italian actors where coercion prevails. In addition, 
there is a relation between overall power resources and the number of power mechanism. Stronger 
power behind specific ecosystem services is based on a higher number of different power mechanisms. 
 
Table 4. Power resources and mechanisms used by actors interested in different ecosystem services 
-: does not exist; ES: Ecosystem Services 
Source: own field work, ALTERFOR project (2017) 
 Overall power resources Strongly-used power mechanism(s) by actors 
 Tunisia Turkey  Italy Portugal  Tunisia Turkey  Italy Portugal   















Medium Low Medium Medium Coercion 
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In practice power mechanisms are applied by specific actors. These actors are part of these three types: 
governmental, market and civil society actors. We will ask whether these different types make use of 
different power mechanism.   
To start with, the governmental actors' power in Tunisia is based on coercion, since these actors are 
responsible for law implementation, for protecting forests and regulating their use. Tunisian forests are 
protection forests rather than production ones. For this, the authority tasks are a priority despite the 
difficulties that state institutions have been facing to implement laws after the revolution of 2011. The 
general Directorate of Forests, with its different departments, regional and local representations, is 
responsible for producing management plans, the implementation the forest code laws, protecting 
biodiversity (creating and managing national parks and natural reserves) and even coastal lines by 
fixing sand dunes (World Bank 2016 (not published); annual report of activities of the General 
Directorate of Forests, 2015). The Ministry of Environment also has power based on incentives from 
financing and implementing conservation projects (in general, it is foreign money obtained in the 
frame of international collaborations) and dominant information while collaborating to record, for 
example, the species status (interview 5). The state research institutions use dominant information to 
produce reports and papers especially in collaboration with forest institutions and international 
organizations.In Turkey, where similarly to Tunisia, almost all forests are owned by the state, 
governmental actors have strong power based on coercion, while the immaterial incentives by 
appealing to morals for a higher nature conservation are important as well. Additionally, in most cases 
the governmental actors use the dominant information to influence forest management (producing 
inventories, recording species status, statistics, etc.). In Portugal, in addition to immaterial incentives, 
the use of media and regional agencies as dominant information is a common way of influencing 
forest management models (Juerges et al. internal report 2017:177). 
The power of market actors depends on the importance of wood industry in the country. Tunisia 
imports 90% of its need of wood and timber-derived products and the industrials do not appreciate the 
Tunisian wood since it has higher density than the imported one (Daly-Hassan et al. 2014). Thus, the 
timber industry’s power to influence forest management in Tunisia is not strong. However, coercion 
and incentives might be applied by industrials interested in non-wood products (e.g. by illegally 
harvesting herbs outside the limit defined by the government), but it is still far from being a strong 
power. Similarly, in Italy market actors have medium power (and low interest) since the domestically 
produced wood has no great economic importance (only 24% of the net annual increment is utilized) 
and also, the economic value of this domestic wood production has halved during the last 50 years 
(Juerges et al. internal report 2017:86). Nevertheless, this domestic woodis valued by the bio-energy 
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industry. In Portugal, market actors strongly impact the wood and pulp industry and this power is 
essentially based on incentives by paying higher prices for some species than for others. These actors 
in Portugal also apply the mechanism of dominant information to influence forest management 
through expert knowledge and ideology (Juerges et al. Forthcoming). Market actors in Turkey use this 
unverified information by lobbying processes, participation in public discourse, etc. (Juerges et al. 
internal report 2017:265). 
Civil society has low impacts on forest management compared to the market and governmental actors. 
Moral incentives and dominant information are the main mechanisms used by the civil society actors. 
In Tunisia, since the revolution, many actors have emerged trying to influence management by 
contributing to research projects or strategy/policy formulation. In the program of forest investment 
published in 2016, the civil society has contributed to the elaboration of this program by participating 
in workshops organized by the concerned state authorities. However, the role of civil society in 
Tunisia needs more time and autonomy since the different actors still depend on international funders, 
the governmental budget and even political parties (Abbou, 2016; Ben Hassen 2013) which makes 
their contribution in many cases an expression of the funders' agendas.  In Portugal, the groups 
representing hunters have moderate power to influence legislation in favor of "associative hunting 
zones". In Turkey, the civil society has medium power as well, since the state is the strongest actor and 
the civil society just pushes and contributes in a second position to implement new legislations and use 
basically the unverified information disseminated in public discourses and lobbying processes.  
The particularity of Tunisia, in comparison with the European cases, is the important impact that 
international organizations have by the means of incentives (financing development projects) and the 
dominant information spread by the reports and studies realized by overseas and national consultants. 
For example, the World Bank reports (e.g. second phase deliverable about forest and pastoral value 
chains development realized in 2016) call for adapting the legislative framework to improve the 
economic situation of forest peopleby adopting the co-management of resources as one of the possible 
solutions. The international organizations finance and collaborate even for the elaboration of forest 
strategies. The formulation of the Tunisian forest strategy (2015-2024) was supported by the German 
Corporation for International CooperationGIZ. 
The illegal use of forests is considered as coercion because illegal users avoid control. Tunisian forest 
people, who live in and around forests, have considerable power to avoid implementation of 
regulations and thus have coercive power. For example, they use the pinion of pine illegally by 
harvesting even before the adequate period and avoid public auctions to sell this product to industrials 
and big traders. Since 2010, the state institutions have not been able to organize auctions for pinions 
and they have not even got seeds for planting new stands (Hasnaoui 2014). 
 
3.3. Discussion 
In this study, actors interested in different ecosystem services were identified in four countries. Their 
different interests, their power resources and mechanisms to influence forest management are 
described and compared. 
The results show that the governmental actors are the most powerful in all cases (except in the case of 
Portugal where they are still strong, but they compete with the market actors in terms of timber 
provision). This state domination means that there is no real shift of power from the government to the 
market and civil society actors (from government to governance). In a policy steered by conflicts, it is 
not possible that non-binding processes such as governance take the place of binding ones from forest 
government supported by the state power (Krott 2008). However, some actors can influence the 
formulation of these binding solutions. In Tunisia, the international organizations are becoming more 
and more powerful by benefiting from the weakness of the state budget (interviews 2 and 5). They are 
funding many projects (with donations or loans) and they may influence the formulation or the change 
of laws and policy. The currently suggested reform about the co-management of resources between 
forest people and the General Directorate of Forests was initiated in the national strategy 2015-2024 
funded by the German Corporation for International Cooperation GIZ and then supported by other 
projects such as the World Bank. The estimation of a strong role of international organizations in 
Tunisia in the future is supported by other experiences from developing countries. In Bangladesh, 
international funders caused 17 policy changes from 1993 until 2012 and these changes are in majority 
substantive (Rahman et al. 2016). Also, in Armenia, by the means of dominant information and 
incentives, the World Bank consultants argued that the main cause of deforestation is the access of 
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local users to resources and proposed in their project to support production which allowed 
privatization of forest lands and a reform of forest administration that moved from the Ministry of 
Nature Protection to the Ministry of Agriculture.  These changes that restrict the access of local people 
are in favor of transnational private companies leading to an increase in wood harvesting and exports 
(Burns et al.  2016). 
The shift from government to governance may lead to fragmentation in forest policy. In Italy, the 
decentralization process has failed despite the fact that the process has started in 1977. However, up to 
now, no solid state institution organizations have been established to face different challenges of the 
sector. In fact, central institutions which kept the policy-making role have transferred all forest tasks to 
the regional institutions and provinces. These regional administrations are not all able to have effective 
policy and political actions, and they cannot play their political role in the sector interest, causing 
inconsistency and deficits in implementation (Secco et al. 2017). Thus, many responsibilities have 
been transferred back to central administration. The result of such a defective decentralization process 
was expressed by the total absence of a valid national forest program in Italy and the non-existence of 
comprehensive policy supported by coordinated budget allocation (Secco et al. 2017). 
 
4. Conclusion  
The most powerful actors in all cases drive the forest management process and compete to realize their 
interests in forest ecosystem services. There is a link between forest management models and these 
powerful actors and their interests. In Portugal the orientation toward the maximization of timber 
provision is driven by the strong power of market actors in the country creating conflicts between 
actors interested in provisioning ecosystem services (market actors) and those focusing on supporting 
ecosystem services (state actors). In Turkey, there is a comprehensive forest planning from state actors 
(Juerges et al. internal report 2017: 259). The power of the Turkish governmental actors is not reduced 
despite the strong interest in timber and the existing conflicts related to the use of resources. In Tunisia 
the governmental actors (forest administration, nature protection, etc.) are still the strongest and forest 
management is more oriented toward supporting ecosystem services. In Italy, too, the governmental 
actors are the most powerful despite fragmentation due to the failure of the decentralization process. 
This strong position of governmental actors in all cases explains the absence, until today, of a power 
shift from government (governmental actors) to governance (market and civil society actors). 
However, in the case of Tunisia, where state institutions depend on foreign money, the role of 
international organizations is increasing and trying to push toward the market demand which might be 
critical for many ecosystem services. The success of forest management concepts in practice depends 
strongly on the most powerful actors driving the sector, pursuing specific interests in the ecosystem 
and ignoring others which might be important as well from a common interest point of view. 
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Abstract: In Tunisia the livelihoods of nearly 750,000 “forest people” strongly depend on state forests.
State forest institutions that manage more than 90% of forests have a special responsibility for the
social sustainability of these people’s situation. Thus, it is important to evaluate the performance of
these institutions, as such evaluations represent an option to help formulate sustainable development
strategies for forest people. This study evaluates the performance of state forest institutions in regard
to forest people based on a comprehensive three-layer model. The data were collected in 2016 and
2017 from documents, observations and interviews. The results partly supported the first hypothesis
that “state forest institutions employ different market, non-market and political instruments to
influence the use and the protection of forests”, with an exception for market instruments. The second
hypothesis stating that “the outcomes of these instruments for forest people differ from those for the
general forest sector” was supported by empirical evidence. The evaluation revealed practices
in Tunisia that provide a basis for organizational reforms supporting forest people. Adapted
technologies that fit the traditional know-how of forest people and a better representation are
required. Furthermore, the strengthening of state forest institutions against the influence of foreign
donors would contribute to elaborating a development strategy for forest people.
Keywords: state forest institutions; forest people; evaluation; criteria and indicators; social
sustainability; Tunisia
1. The Unsolved Sustainability Issue of “Forest People”
In international literature, the term “forest people(s)” has often been used to describe local
forest people [1], people living in forests and having customary rights [2], or local and indigenous
communities [3,4]. In the Tunisian context, two languages are officially used to write legal and





while the translation from French is “forest people/population” (population forestière). Both terms are
used to describe forest users (only subsistence use) living in forests as well as those living within a
five-kilometer radius around forests [5,6]. Based on this definition, the term “forest people” is used in
this study to describe this category of people who live in and around forests and who have the legal
rights of access to forest resources for subsistence use.
Forest areas in Tunisia cover around 1.2 million ha and are considerably inhabited. Therefore,
forest people are an important social part of sustainable forestry. The social aspects of sustainability
considered in this study are focused on the contribution of forests to the living conditions of forest
people. From the total population of Tunisia estimated at 11 million inhabitants [7], nearly 750,000
people live in forests and within five kilometers from forests [5]. In general, there is no real diversity
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of ethnic groups in Tunisia due to the unity of language and culture, except in the case of some
minorities [8]. Nevertheless, in specific regions there are still cases of social organization in families
and tribes that are not significantly different from an ethnic perspective. In Tunisian forested areas, the
poverty rate is high (45.8%) compared to the national average (15.5%) [5]. Since more than 90% of these
forests are state-owned [9], the responsibility of state institutions to manage these resources is high.
During the pre-colonial period, most forests were owned by communities. When French colonization
started in 1881, these communities lost all property rights and the state became the legal owner and
manager of the resources. Moreover, forest people lost even their traditional user rights in 1890 [10].
From 1900 to 1970 there was a decline of 50% of the total forest area within the context of an
exceptional rural population growth and an increase of agricultural land areas [11]. Despite the
stabilization of this situation, forest people were subject to a continuous and repressive forest policy
regarding user rights, something that was inherited from the French colonists [11]. Forest people
expressed their hostility toward this coercive policy, which explains the development of many “illegal”
activities of product exploitation and the difficulties in registering many state-owned forest areas [11].
In 1988, forest people were given the possibility of organizing themselves within associations after
the Forest Code reform [6,12]. Despite the existence of initiatives to support these associations, the
representation of forest people remained weak. Furthermore, forest people faced a social crisis resulting
from the increasing competition of households to obtain social aid and temporary employment from
the state [11]. After the Forest Code reform, forest people gained access to resources only for subsistence
use and they were (and still are) not allowed to commercialize any forest product. The change in
legislation was not sufficient to stop or reduce the daily activities of illegal forest product sales by
forest people. Sales, especially those of charcoal, represent a way to gain a small additional income in
order to survive [11,12]. The incapacity of the state to control the use of forest products led to a certain
“legitimization of the illegal” [11]. Very often, forest officers or rangers responsible for control and
monitoring used to write fines only in case of “obvious” offenses. This made sound and sustainable
forest management impossible [11].
In general, limited customary rights, the deprivation of land tenure, and the weak representation of
forest people are among the main challenges in the Tunisian forest sector. Furthermore, the conflicting
situation has been amplified since the revolution of 2011. After the collapse of the old regime, the forest
administration lost much of their repressive control of forestlands, and this benefited forest people.
International pressure, as well as the increase of illegal logging and wildfires, led to the formulation of
a new forest strategy for 2015–2024, which claims to focus on solving this conflict between the Tunisian
administration and forest people, and to design strategic solutions to improve the living conditions, by
increasing people’s income from forests. At the same time, it should consider ecological sustainability
and the rational use, protection and development of natural resources.
What is more, in the new forest strategy the forest administration remains the main actor, with
the greatest responsibility regarding forest resources and forest people. Therefore, the issues of forest
people cannot be solved without considering the state forest organizations. This is not a question of
reforming forest bureaucracy in general, as discussed frequently, but of focusing on the specific role
the state forest organizations play in the issues affecting forest people. The existing evaluations and
conceptualizations of forest administrations provide no sufficient basis for such an analysis, since they
are more focused on the organizations as such [13,14]. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to find out
how state forest organizations deal with the important social issue of sustainability regarding forest
people and how they contribute to solving their problems and conflicts. It is essential to consider
economic as well as political interventions by state forest organizations in order to form a broad picture.
The purpose behind including forest administrations in the analysis of forest people’s issues is to add
one factor that will be highly relevant for the design of solutions to be applied in the future. In this
paper, the three-layer-model (3L-model) is described as a theoretical basis that is very suitable for the
evaluation of the role of state forest organizations in regards to forest people’s issues. Later, the study
presents the empirical methods of fieldwork carried out in 2016 and 2017, as well as the results.
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2. Comprehensive Model and Hypotheses Focused on Forest People
State forest organizations are often evaluated from an economic point of view focusing on areas
such as profit or cost efficiency. Such a narrow focus does not cover the multiple duties and activities
of state forest institutions well. In order to improve the evaluation Krott and Stevanov (2008, 2013)
have designed the 3L-model of state forest organization evaluation, which covers a broad range of
activities and goals [15,16]. It measures the performance of state forest institutions comprehensively,
covering economic, political and ecological aspects of sustainability. This model allows researchers to
approach the complex issues of forest people in an adequate way.
The 3L-model enables its users to make evaluations that are politically relevant and have a
solid foundation on theory and empirical data. Thus, political relevance, theories and empirical
measurements make up the three layers of this model, as shown in Figure 1: (1) the layer of policy
programs comprises all political statements formulated not only in forest laws and strategies, but
also in international agreements and dialogues; (2) the layer of theoretical frameworks consists of
suitable theories—from economics, natural sciences and political science—that are linked to relevant
goals of the first layer and are used to describe and define the factors driving the performance of
state forest institutions; (3) the layer of empirical measurement consists of empirical data produced
quantitatively and qualitatively [15,16]. The political goals of the first layer in Figure 1 are deduced
from the current forest laws and political strategies in Tunisia. This way, the evaluation becomes
relevant for the political discourse. The integration of a theory layer linking political programs to
empirical measurements is a specific strength of the 3L-model. Theories turn vague political terms
of the political discourse into specific terms that can be analyzed soundly. For example, one of the
specific evaluation criteria is “sustainability of forest stands”, which results from linking the vague and
complex political goal of sustainable forestry to precise forest management/natural science theories.
Thus, the linkage between policy and theories contributes to the emergence of eight evaluation criteria
(from C1 to C8 in Figure 1 and Table 1) observed empirically by means of indicators (I) (Figure 1).
The selection of suitable theories was made by researchers who developed the model [15,16]. Choosing
these specific theories to develop a set of evaluation criteria does not imply that other theories cannot
be linked to the same political goals. In other words, the vague political discourses described earlier
cannot be restricted to one particular theory.
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Figure 1. The three-layer model (3L-Model): designing criteria (C) and indicators (I) for a
comprehensive evaluation of stat forest institutions [16,17].
The selection of the criteria is oriented toward such prominent issues of the forest policy debate
as efficiency and profitability, performance in timber markets, new forest products, and also the
contribution of forestry to general interests, which often serves non-market demands. Additionally,
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the political role of representing the forest sector in the policy process is taken into account [15,16].
The theoretical basis of the criteria was detailed earlier [15,16]. The 3L-model makes explicit the link to
the political debate, theory and empirical evidence, whereas most other comprehensive evaluation
methods, e.g., the criteria and indicators by Forest Europe, are based on expert judgments that mingle
all aspects together [17]. This way they risk losing the link to politics as well as to scientific arguments.
There are other applicable frameworks relevant to the analysis of the issue of social and ecological
sustainability in general. For example, Ostrom in 2009 developed a general framework analyzing
the social-ecological systems that considers governance to be a subsystem interacting with many
other components [18]. However, in the current study the focus is on the performance of the forest
administration that manages almost all of the forest area in Tunisia, an area which can be better
evaluated by using the specific 3L-model.
Table 1. The eight evaluation criteria of the 3L-model (source: combination of own and previous
research [16,19].)
Criteria (C) Explanation of the Criteria
Orientation toward market demand Concerns forest goods and services that can be exchanged onthe market (e.g., wood) and the market limits.
Orientation toward non-market demand
Relates to forest goods and services that cannot be exchanged
on the market (public goods) or those which are considered
as necessary to secure public welfare (merit goods)
Sustainability of forest stands
Refers to the policy goal of maintaining forest size and the
capability to continually produce wood using forest
management theories.
Technical efficiency Refers to the efficiency that allows production to approachthe maximum.
Profit from forests Concerns the evaluation of the importance of revenuegenerated from forests.
Orientation toward new forest goods Focuses on the orientation of institutions toward developingnew sources of revenue from forests.
Advocacy for forestry
Relates to the role, within political processes, of forest
institutions in managing the use and protection of forests.
The advocacy’s role shows the focus of the institution on
specific interests in forests without considering all different
actors’ interests.
Mediation between all interests in the forest
Deals with the capability of the institution to apply forest
governance. It is an opportunity for stakeholders to take part
in policy processes.
The main challenge related to the use of the 3L-model is the operationalization of indicators to
measure the performance of the forest administration in different contexts. This model was applied in
several contexts, including selected Western Balkan countries, Poland and Brazil [17,19,20]. However,
some indicators were not applicable for this case study and needed to be adapted. For example, initially
the criterion “orientation toward market demand” was designed to evaluate the institution’s market
orientation. However, Tunisian state forest institutions do not generate any revenue from forests.
All revenue goes directly to the national treasury. Thus, the indicators of this criterion were adapted in
order to evaluate the support provided by state forest institutions to forest people in obtaining market
revenue. The details of the criteria and indicators will be explained later, together with the results.
Institutions are evaluated by means of a score, on a scale from zero (zero performance) to three
(strong performance). These scores result from a specific combination of indicators, as shown in
Appendices B and C (Tables A2 and A3). Some indicators may vary depending on the type of tasks
fulfilled by the institution evaluated (authority or management tasks) or on a particular characteristic
of the institution as determined through fieldwork and document analysis.
The criteria and indicators are able to cover the different activities of the forest administration,
ranging from key economic tasks, such as selling forest products in market, to political tasks, like
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playing the mediator role between different interests. This broad set of activities will lead to the
elaboration of a first hypothesis. However, focusing on the question of the impact of the orientation
of state forest institutions on forest people requires an additional theoretical framework for these
criteria. For example, within a stronger market orientation, it is important to differentiate between the
impact of high technical efficiency on the whole forest sector and that on forest people. The orientation
of state forest institutions toward market demand will transform these institutions into influential
market actors, a role they will play instead of being involved in poverty alleviation and livelihoods
development [21].
The following hypotheses were formulated based on the aforementioned theoretical framework:
H1. State forest institutions employ different market, non-market and political instruments to influence the use
and the protection of forests.
The 3L-model assumes that state forest institutions perform multiple activities to fulfill their tasks.
These comprehensive means can also be tested in regard to the issue of forest people.
H2. The outcomes of these instruments for forest people differ from those for the general forest sector.
It makes a difference whether state forest organizations are evaluated by their contribution to
the overall forest sector or to such specific issues as those related to forest people. For example, the
technical efficiency of the forest sector in Tunisia might increase by employing technologies relying on
harvesting machines. However, such a gain in efficiency for the overall forest sector will reduce the
opportunities for forest people to take part in forest activities and consequently they will benefit less
from forest resources. This evaluation study should make these differences visible.
3. Triangulation of Multiple Empirical Methods
The fieldwork applies multiple empirical methods and checks the collected data by means of
triangulation. Triangulation is applied in social science research by making observations from different
points of view, increasing the accuracy of work [22].
One important source of data was a senior civil servant. This key informant, who has an
experience of three decades in a state forest organization, provided important indications on relevant
actors, documents and developments. Thus, the contact with this person generated much more data
(documents, interviews) than other interviewees and helped to explain many complex issues related
to the functioning of forest administration during the whole study. This knowledge is checked by
examining the original documents, statistics and field observations. Very often, the experience of the
key senior civil servant who had participated in international project studies, including work with
different stakeholders involved in the forest sector, contributed to the examination of different data
that would have otherwise been left unconsidered.
During the fieldwork from May 2016 to May 2017, 90 documents were collected. Most are in
Arabic and French, and 80% are non-public. The majority of these documents were obtained under
request (especially internal documents, statistics, annual reports, and projects of law reform). The
collection and analysis of documents relevant to the Tunisian forest sector was a substantial part of this
work. It made possible an understanding of the overall functioning of the forest administration, and
of the different laws and political goals set for the sector. In addition, prior field observations made
in 2013 and 2014 were an important source to check data about causative factors that drive Tunisian
forest policy.
Based on this first analysis, expert interviews were performed with key actors from state forest
institutions, the Ministry of Environment and researchers from the forest-related sector. At many
times, it was important to contact the same interviewee several times (by phone or email) in order
to understand the collected data. Thus, the majority of these interviews were short and related to
specific topics. Conducting many short interviews revealed more information and provided better
understanding than did carrying out long ones. In total, forty email contacts and more than sixty
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phone interviews were made with the actors illustrated in Table A4 (Appendix D). In this table, only
15 interviews that revealed crucial information employed in the analysis are presented.
Finally, regular meetings with the research group provided an important theoretical triangulation
to avoid a personal bias. The logic of the arguments and the theoretical basis were checked.
4. Overview of the Main Actors Involved in the Forest Policy in Tunisia
According to Hasnaoui and Krott [14], the main actors involved in the forest sector in Tunisia are:
• The governmental actors: the General Directorate of Forests and its regional representations,
state research institutions, the forest use authority, the Northwest Silvo-Pastoral office, different
ministries (Agriculture, Tourism and Environment).
• Market actors, including wood and non-wood product industries.
• International organizations/donors who finance development projects, but also intervene in the
elaboration of forest strategies and studies.
• Forest people living in and around forests who have limited legal use rights.
Given that the focus of this study is to evaluate the performance of state forest institutions
regarding forest people, it will present insights into the two following categories of actors: Forest
people and state forest institutions.
4.1. Insights into the Situation of Forest People in Tunisia
The total number of people living in forests is estimated at 750,000, occupying 14 governorates
(from a total of 24) with an average density of 86 users per km2 of forest. This number of forest
people, who have user rights, includes those living in forests and in the area within five kilometers of
a forest [5]. Before this reference material about forest people was collected in 2012, the customary
rights for those living around forests had been abolished, and only people living inside forested areas
kept these rights. Thus, it is essential to define who forest users are. Furthermore, the referential
framework about forest people was realized with the support of the forest administration. This reveals
the difficulties that the state is facing in enforcing the law that deprives a large number of forest people
living around forests of their user rights.
The income of users living in forests includes livestock breeding (58%), logging yards organized
by the state to use or maintain forests (28%), charcoal use (5%) and other forest product use (9%) [5].
This indicator shows the importance of forests in supporting livestock breeding activities, mainly by
providing a pastoral resource.
Based on the statistics of the referential framework [5], Figure 2 was elaborated presenting key
indicators related to forest people in comparison to the national average.Sustainability 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 7 of 27 
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The indicators in Figure 2 show the socio-economic problems forest people are facing. The poverty
rate reached 45.5%, while the national average is 15.5%. This is in addition to an unemployment rate
of 30% against 19% at the national level. Furthermore, forest areas are characterized by very limited
infrastructure. For example, the rate of access to safe drinking water is estimated at 15%, while the
national average is 83%. All these statistics reflect the complexity of the situation and the need for a
forest policy reform that reduces these discrepancies.
4.2. Relevant State Forest Institutions
The evaluation involved two institutions, namely the General Directorate of Forests and
the Northwest Silvo-Pastoral Office. The regional institutions were evaluated together with the
General Directorate despite being administratively independent (under the Regional Commissions of
Agricultural Development existing in every governorate of the Republic). In fact, they are functionally
(technically) managed by this directorate and represent it in regions.
Considering the focus of this study, an evaluation of the Forest Use Authority was not carried
out, since the activities of this institution focus on the use and sales of forest products according
to the forest code and management plans designed by the General Directorate of Forests. It has
low decision-making power and a small impact on forest people, and it collaborates with regional
institutions to control the harvesting process and fieldwork. Nevertheless, the data collected from this
institution (for example the annual reports) were used to evaluate other institutions. Different tasks of
forest institutions at national and regional levels are specified in Appendix A (Table A1). Table A1 was
made based on observations and document analyses, and its information was corroborated by means
of interviews.
4.2.1. The General Directorate of Forests and the regional institutions
The first administrative body of forestry in Tunisia was created in 1883. This body had always
been a separate service assigned to such other entities as the agriculture administration. It evolved over
the years until the creation of the General Directorate of Forests in 1990. This directorate is located in the
Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources and Fishing and is composed of four sub-directorates: forest
conservation, socio-economic development, silvo-pastoral development and regulation and control.
In addition to 1.2 million ha of forests, the Directorate (in collaboration with regional institutions) also
manages grazing lands estimated at 4.5 million ha, as mentioned in the second national forest and
pastoral inventory [23]. This institution fulfills management as well as the authority tasks, which are
defined by Stevanov and Krott to include policy implementation [16].
The regional institutions are under the administration of the Regional Commissions for
Agriculture (known as CRDA in Tunisia). In every commission, there is a division of reforestation and
soil and water conservation supervising a district of forests. This district has many representations at
the local level, which are called units. The link between districts and units is ensured by subdivisions
created to divide the area for better management. The number of districts and subdivisions may vary
depending on the importance of the forest area within a governorate.
The administrative and the technical hierarchies are different. The administrative organization is
as following: (1) The Regional Commissions for Agriculture; (2) Division; (3) Districts; (4) Subdivisions;
(5) Units. However, technically, the General Directorate cooperates directly with the districts so that
the hierarchy is (1): General Directorate of Forests; (2) Districts; (3) Subdivisions; (4) Units [13]. In other
words, to elaborate the annual national program, the Regional Commissions for Agriculture, as well
as the divisions, do not intervene and the cooperation is directly between the national level (General
Directorate of Forests) and the districts. On the other hand, the procurement and maintenance of
equipment for the districts are the tasks of the Regional Commissions of Agriculture.
Since this institution implements both management and authority tasks, the evaluation was
performed by integrating the authority and management indicators in the same evaluation.
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4.2.2. Northwest Silvo-Pastoral Office
This office was established in 1981 in order to manage watersheds in this region. Later, its activities
were extended to provide extension services, donations and micro-credits through the implementation
of development projects funded by international donors. The most relevant contribution of this
institution to such activities was within the project of the Northwest Forest Development (PNO),
with its different phases funded mostly by the World Bank. Collected data show that the Northwest
Silvo-Pastoral Office is implementing the fourth phase of this project (PNO4). The investment budget
of this institution is very limited and highly depends on development projects.
Despite its limited area and scope of intervention, this study focused on the evaluation of the
performance of this institution, since it is the only one whose main task is to support and integrate
rural people. In addition, the Northwest of Tunisia includes an important forest area that represents
nearly 50% of the total forest area [23]. The governorate of Jendouba, which is located in the Northwest
of Tunisia, has the highest number of users and the greatest share of forest area in the country [5].
5. Results: Evaluation of the Performance of the Selected State Forest Institutions
The evaluation by means of the 3L-model showed the multiple contributions of state forest
organizations to the issue of forest people (Figure 3). Tables A2 and A3 of the Appendices B and C
provide detailed information about the criteria and indicators. The results on the General Directorate
of Forests and the Northwest Silvo-Pastoral Office are discussed separately, as shown in Figure 3
and summarized in Table 2. To keep the size of the results section down to a reasonable length,
only the detailed evaluation of the General Directorate is presented, since this institution is the main
state administration dealing with both management and authority tasks. Concerning the Northwest
Silvo-Pastoral Office, the evaluation is summarized in this section. The complete evaluation is found
in the supplementary material section.Sustainability 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 9 of 27 
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5.1. The General Directorate of Forests and the regional institutions
5.1.1. Criterion 1: Orientation toward Market Demand
The first criterion shows whether an institution supports the market orientation of forest people.
Two indicators were used to measure this: supporting market revenue for forest people and the
existence of professional marketing competence.
I.1 Supporting market revenue for forest people: This indicator covers the institution’s support for
forest people to allow them to generate revenue from selling goods and services on the market.
The General Directorate of Forests (in collaboration with regional institutions) takes part in the
legislation formulation and has a role in the enforcement of the law. Legally, selling forest goods is the
task of the Forest Use Authority, which organizes auctions for the majority of these forest products.
However, pursuant to Article 37 of the Forest Code, forest people can use products only to satisfy their
personal need and this use should not have a commercial or industrial aspect [6].
This legislative context can explain the poor socio-economic situation of people living in Tunisian
forests. Despite having the right to participate in public auctions, the competition with wood and
non-wood product industries is very high and unfair. If the orientation is pushed toward market
revenue, it will benefit industrialists and traders but not forest people who are weak within the market
competition. The prohibition of market revenue for forest people means that the support does not exist.
I.2 Supporting marketing/professional competence: This competence concerns the capacity of the
institution to collect, analyze and utilize market information and to support forest people to develop
marketing and professional skills. In the General Directorate of Forests, as well as at the regional
level, there are no marketing departments or competencies working professionally to promote or tailor
products. The performance of the directorate and the regional institutions can be considered not to
be professional and, consequently, they cannot support forest people in this way (except by means of
some initiatives based on foreign money to develop revenue-generating activities).
Performance judgment: By taking into consideration both indicators, the General Directorate of
Forests’ orientation toward market demand can be estimated to be zero or “0” for forest people and
even for the wood-based sector (Table 2 and Appendix B, Table A2).
5.1.2. Criterion 2: Orientation toward Non-market Demand
The second criterion concerns forest goods that are not exchangeable on the market (public goods)
or that are considered to be essential to ensure public welfare. Thus, the contribution of state forest
institutions to poverty alleviation for forest people can be assessed under this criterion by using the
indicators below.
I.3 Plans for production and provision of public/merit goods: These plans concern the area in which the
main goal is protection. They describe the specific amount of public goods that should be produced in
that area. Tunisian forests have an essential role in protection, and the General Directorate of Forests,
as well as regional institutions, have a wide scope of intervention in the whole country, with its varied
climate and vegetation from the North to the South. The General Directorate collaborates with regional
institutions to elaborate the plans of annual activities (e.g., annual reports of 2015 and 2014 [24,25])
to be performed in terms of protection, such as the management of natural reserves and national
parks, plantations on the coasts and in deserts to fix the coastal and desert sand dunes, the protection
of habitats, firefighting, etc. To support the protection of forests means to indirectly support forest
people who depend greatly on forest resources to survive (grazing, firewood, etc.). In addition, the
directorate and the regional institutions contribute to the elaboration of community development
plans that are produced within the framework of development projects (e.g., Ordha-Khadouma 2015,
and Jbel Zaghouan 2015 [26,27]). These community plans necessarily contain a section dedicated to
poverty alleviation by supporting some activities to generate revenue (e.g., beekeeping) for people or
by integrating them in implemented forest activities, as well as by improving their living environment
(e.g., opening forest tracks, providing safe drinking water, etc.).
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I.4 Financial inflow for public/merit goods production/provision: This inflow is defined as the amount
of funding coming from outside the institution in order to finance the different activities related to
producing or provisioning merit/public goods. A substantial financial inflow reflects the importance
given to the orientation toward non-market demand. According to the budget of the national program
of 2015 [28], the amount of money dedicated to forest protection and conservation (protected areas,
firefighting, guarding and protecting forest wealth, etc.) represents about 40% of the total budget
dedicated to different activities within forests. However, the budget devoted to the protected areas
represents 3.7% of the total budget. This budget is considered to be very small (Interview 1). For this
reason, there is strong cooperation between the forest conservation department, in the General
Directorate of Forests, and the Ministry of Environment, which invests in these protected areas.
However, the sources of these funds invested by the Ministry of Environment are mainly international
projects, since the Ministry also has a limited budget (Interview 4). The General Directorate receives a
substantial amount of money to perform protection activities in forests, as well as to support forest
people to create sources of income for them, in order to reduce poverty in these areas. The money
comes mainly from international organizations (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, World Bank, French Development Agency, Japanese project, etc.) and the budgets of these
projects are very important in comparison to the state budget.
I.5 Auditing: It is conducted in order to allow the institution to evaluate the satisfaction of
other public institutions that finance the production/provision of public goods. These professional
examinations indicate the importance of the investment and the orientation toward non-market
demand for the investing institution.
Despite receiving substantial funds from external institutions to conduct some public tasks, there
is no auditing conducted by the ordering side (public institution). For example, some activities inside
protected areas are subject to collaboration between the Ministry of Environment and the Directorate
of Forests to define specifications (Interview 4). Thus, there is no ordering side and no task ordering
taking place for such activities. The organization financing these projects may conduct audits to
monitor budget utilization and different implementations. Therefore, auditing can be considered to be
weak in these institutions.
Performance judgment: By considering all the indicator manifestations, the orientation toward
non-market demand can be evaluated as moderate or “2” (Table 2 and Appendix B, Table A2).
5.1.3. Criterion 3: Sustainability of Forest Stands
The policy goal captured under this criterion is the maintenance of forest size and the capability
to continually produce wood by applying forest management theories. However, maintaining the
ability to produce wood is a narrow goal for sustainability. Other activities such as firefighting should
be considered as well. A broader vision of sustainability benefits forest people.
I.6 Obligation to sustain forest stands: This obligation concerns the maintenance of the production
capacity of forests stands and soil. In the Tunisian Forest Code there is an obligation to protect and
develop forest heritage, which is described as being a part of national wealth that should be extended
and safeguarded by the citizens [6].
I.7 Forest management plans: These plans are produced in order to protect the sustainability of wood
production in the future. The Tunisian Forest Law includes an article clearly stating the obligation of
forest institutions to produce management plans for forests. This document should contain technical
details about wood removal in a determined period, and information about territories to close or open,
such as grazing lands [6]. However, by referring to the latest statistics of the General Directorate of
Forests in 2016, more than 50% of forests do not have management plans [29]. One can conclude that
forest management plans exist for limited forest areas in Tunisia.
I.8 Requirements for sustaining forest stands: This indicator takes into consideration the growing
stock and the current annual increment, which should not decline over the years. This indicator is
based on the information available in national forest inventories. In Tunisia there have been two
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inventories published, in 1995 and 2010 [23,30]. Based on this data the requirements of sustainability
are fulfilled. The current annual increment value for a period of 5 years has recorded a slight increase,
from 513,241 m3 per year to 525,400 m3 per year in 1995 and 2010 respectively. Similarly, the growing
stock has increased, based on the two inventories, from 17.3 million m3 to 22.2 million m3. However,
since the revolution of 2011, other factors should be considered such as the increase of illegal logging
and the number of wildfires and areas they affected. Statistics on illegal logging recorded after the
revolution are not reliable, particularly during the first several years (especially in 2011). For security
reasons, forest agents could not accomplish their task of recording offenses. Concerning wildfires,
the statistics of the General Directorate of Forests [31] showed an important increase in the extent of
the areas burned after the revolution of 2011 (from 227.5 ha in 2001 to 5946 ha in 2014). In addition,
there are exceptional fires caused by military intervention in some zones (Governorates of Kef and
Kasserine), which reached a peak at 8900 ha in 2014 [31]. As a conclusion, we can state that the
requirements for sustainability are not accomplished appropriately.
Performance judgment: By combining these three indicators the performance of the General
Directorate of Forests for this criterion can be assessed as weak or “1” (Table 2 and Appendix B,
Table A2).
5.1.4. Criterion 4: Technical Efficiency
This criterion refers to the impact of technical efficiency of production on the situation of forest
people. This efficiency can be defined as “the degree to which an actual output of a production unit
approaches its maximum” [32]. One type of opportunity for forest people to improve their incomes is
having a temporary job that consists of taking part in state forest activities. High efficiency diminishes
such options for forest people.
I.9 Managerial accounting: This kind of accounting contains the information available for the use
of the managers of the institutions at the internal scale and it serves to support the decision-making
process for a better use of the resources. The General Directorate of Forests has no revenues from
forest activities or products and is not profit-oriented. Moreover, there is no financial department
within the institution. There is only one employee with an economic management background who
manages financial tasks within a development project and who makes additional efforts to deal with
daily financial procedures of the General Directorate (e.g., purchases). This employee also collaborates
with the general director to elaborate the functioning budget of the General Directorate (purchases,
maintenance, etc.) (Interview 13). In addition, by observing different forest programs from 2011 until
2015, the program and the budget are nearly the same [28,33–36]. To conclude, there were no efforts
made in terms of managerial accounting.
I.10 Technical productivity of work: Basically, this indicator is a calculation of the ratio of annual
removals of wood (output) and the total number of employees (input) and it is calculated for at
least three institutions to create intervals of evaluation [16,19]. In Tunisia this calculation is not
feasible since the majority of wood is sold by the Forest Use Department in auctions as standing
wood (Interview 3). According to the annual reports of the Forest Use Department (e.g., 2014 and
2015 [37,38]), a small quantity of wood can be processed by the administration and sold in private
sales by the Use Department. The General Directorate and the regional institutions intervene in
this type of use by conducting forestry activities (thinning, sanitary cutting, etc.). The evaluation is
based on the comparison of the productivity in fieldwork (yards) managed by the administration and
the same activities allocated to private enterprises (also designated by the administration based on
specifications). In 2016, there were no requirements from the administration for the daily productivity
of employees, while private enterprises required of workers a productivity of two to three cubic meters
per day (Interview 15). The administration does not focus on the technical productivity in these yards
because such activities have a political target of reducing unemployment by assigning the maximum
number of working days to the highest possible number of contractual employees (who are generally
old people, people with handicaps or nonqualified persons who do not have another source of income).
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With the absence of productivity requirements for institutions, technical productivity is clearly lower
there than for private enterprises. This low productivity requirement is very convenient for forest
people who are not skilled and who need this work to survive.
Performance judgment: The performance of the institution concerning this criterion can be
assessed as “1” or weak (Table 2 and Appendix B, Table A2).
5.1.5. Criterion 5: Profits from Forests for Forest People
This criterion deals with the support of the state forest institution for forest people in making a
profit from forests.
I.11 Freedom of harvesting: As mentioned previously, the Forest Law provides freedom of harvesting
to forest people as users of the resource. The commercialization of these products is forbidden.
The freedom of harvesting to make a profit is limited, but it allows these people to survive (by grazing,
the use of firewood, etc.)
I.12 Profit-driven reforms: This indicator concerns the presence of reforms or projects for reform
(orientation) to encourage profit making from forests for forest people. The collected data contain
several projects for reform in the Tunisian Forest Law, including the co-management agreement
model elaborated in 2014 [39]. These agreements are developed to allow forest people belonging to
local associations (namely the Agricultural Development Groups) to have access to resources for use,
transformation and profit generation from selling them in the market. However, these reform projects
cannot be considered to be substantial, since they act only at a legal level.
Performance judgment: For this criterion this institution performance has been rated as “1” or
low (Table 2 and Appendix B, Table A2).
5.1.6. Criterion 6: Orientation toward New Forest Goods
The sixth criterion concerns the efforts of the institution to develop new sources of revenue that
benefit forest people.
I.13 Professional market information: The indicator concerns the information collected, treated and
disseminated in a professional way. Such communication does not exist in the General Directorate
and regional institutions (Interview 13). In addition, the majority of forest products are traditionally
sold in auctions by the Forest Use Department, and the revenues generated go directly to the national
treasury. State forest institutions do not benefit from this income.
I.14 Investments into new forest goods: This refers to an investment in transformed or completely new
services and goods that can be considered to be innovative for the institution. This kind of investment
is not a priority for the institution. According to the annual budgets and reports, the expenditure
orientations have been kept the same for several years. There have been some efforts within national
parks to create ecotourism tours and eco-museums (financed almost entirely by development projects),
but there are no applicable entry fees to these parks. The particularity of legislation and decrees related
to the creation of each park and natural reserve makes the applicability of the entry fees complicated.
In some cases, fees for entering the protected areas are required and in other cases entry is free. Some
protected areas are created on collective lands and the problems related to the land ownership are
not solved. No fees are paid to the forest institution to access protected areas, while private agencies
for ecotourism or related associations generate revenues from organizing tours within these areas
(Interview 14). The General Directorate of Forests supports non-wood products such as mushrooms,
pine nuts, etc., based on foreign development project budgets. This institution is currently discussing
the possibility of providing some concessions for creating innovative projects (e.g., the creation of cable
cars in the mountain in the Northwest of Tunisia), which will create job opportunities for forest people
by providing services to visitors. Despite having the intention to produce innovative forest products,
the investment in new forest goods and in the transformation of existing goods is not substantial since
it cannot achieve 30% of the total investments of the institution.
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I.15 New external partners: These partners can be from different companies and organizations
collaborating with the institution to produce or provide new forest goods and services. The main
partners of the General Directorate of Forests are international organizations, NGOs, research
institutions, Ministries of Environment and Tourism, etc. By means of concessions the institution can
form new partnerships that have a market orientation, such as the creation, by innovative people to
whom the concessions have been granted, of eco-touristic projects, or the production of new forest
essences.”. These types of concessions are currently being discussed in the institution, but there has
been no progress in terms of their implementation.
Performance judgment: The performance of the General Directorate of Forests can be judged as
scoring a “1” or “weak” for this criterion by combining these three indicators (Table 2 and Appendix B,
Table A2).
5.1.7. Criterion 7: Advocacy for Forestry
This criterion is related to the role played by forest institutions within the political processes that
manage the utilization and the protection of forest resources. The advocacy’s role reflects the fact that
the institution dominates the representation of the forest sector.
I.16 Trustful cooperation with actors from the wood-based sector: Such cooperation is based mainly
on a partnership with actors from the wood industry or other sectors related to the forest sector. The
main partners mentioned in interviews (Interview 1 and Interview 5) are state institutions (ministries
of environment, tourism and other departments from their institution), research institutions, and
associations that deal with the environment and forests. These answers reveal the orientation toward
cooperation with actors from the wood-based sector. The situation with forest people is considered
to be conflictive, and the main causes for this conflict are overcutting and the illegal exploitation
of resources.
I.17 Aspiration to role of advocate: It refers to the intention of the institution to represent the forest
sector. This role was approved (Interview 1 and Interview 5) by considering the position of the
institution to be very strong in terms of the role of an advocacy for forestry.
I.18 Acceptance of role of advocate: It refers to the perspective of other institutions concerning the
admission of the forest institution’s role as an advocacy for forestry. It has been confirmed that the
General Directorate is considered to be the advocacy for forestry (Interviews 2 and 7). Foresters,
especially in regions, consider strict forest protection to be their main task despite the efforts in the
central administration to build a strategy based on conciliation and the participatory approach of
different actors (Interview 4).
Performance judgment: The General Directorate of Forests engages in trustful cooperation with
actors from the wood-based sector, but not with forest people. In addition, it aspires to the role of an
advocate for forestry and other actors accept it as such an advocate. Thus, the institution is a strong
advocate for forestry and its performance can be judged as being strong or scoring a “3” (Appendix B,
Table A2).
5.1.8. Criterion 8: Mediation of all Interests in Forests
This criterion concerns the capacity of the institution to ensure forest governance, which is
considered an innovative role within processes of forest protection and use policies. This role represents
a preferable option for forest people by considering their interests and offering them the opportunity
to take part in policy processes.
I.19 Trustful cooperation with actors from all sectors: This refers to cooperation based mainly
on partnership with several actors from different sectors, including forest people. In addition to
participating in trustful cooperation, mainly with actors from the wood-based sector (as it was revealed
in criterion 7), there are conflicts leading to a lack of trustful cooperation with other actors. For example,
there is a permanent conflict between the directorate and people living in forests, as mentioned in the
previous criterion. These people are subject to many restrictions related to grazing, since the forest
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administration always advocates sustainable forest use by limiting the access to grazing, or even
prohibiting (for a period of time) the breeding of some animals, such as goats, in some areas.
I.20 Aspiration to role of mediator: This refers to the intent of cooperation of an institution with
actors from different sectors. The Directorate cannot be in a mediatory position, since its main role is
to protect forests (Interview 1 and Interview 5). This fact, associated with a strong cooperation with
actors from the wood-based sector, shows that it does not aspire to the mediator role.
I.21 Acceptance of role of mediator: This concerns the degree to which other actors recognize forest
institutions as being mediators between different interests. State forest institutions in Tunisia claim to
play a conciliatory role. However, the General Directorate of Forests, and especially the employees at
the regional level in practice, are perceived as being very strict when dealing with the forest sector
(Interview 4, Interview 7).
Performance judgment: The General Directorate cooperates mainly with actors from the
wood-based sector. Moreover, it does not aspire toward a mediator role and it is not accepted as a
mediator. By combining these indicators, the resulting score would be a zero or “0” performance
(Table 2 and Appendix B, Table A2).
Table 2. Overview of the evaluation criteria, indicators and results.



































Obligation to sustain forest
stands; forest management
plans; fulfilment of sustained
forest stand requirements
Obligation to sustain forest
stands; forest management
plans; fulfilment of sustained
forest stand requirements
1 1
C4 Technical efficiency Managerial accounting;technical productivity of work
Managerial accounting;
Support for new technology
and high productivity
1 1




Revenue from forests for
forest people; integration of
people in the implementation







investments in new forest




investments in new forest






actors from the wood-based
sector; aspiration to role of
advocate; acceptance of role of
advocate
Trustful cooperation with
actors from the wood-based
sector, aspiration to role of
advocate; acceptance of role of
advocate
3 0
C8 Mediation of all
interests
Trustful cooperation with
actors from different sectors;
aspiration to role of mediator;
acceptance of role of mediator
Trustful cooperation with
actors from different sectors;
integration of people in the
decision-making process
0 1.5
5.2. Northwest Silvo-Pastoral Office
As mentioned earlier, the complete evaluation of the performance of this institution is in the
supplementary material of this paper. The results are summarized below, presenting the highlights of
the performance of the institution vis-à-vis the evaluation criteria of the 3L- model.
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The office has no orientation toward market demand. Its main task is to implement international
development projects. These projects provide some funding to support forest people in the creation of
micro-enterprises that improve their limited incomes. The revenue generated from such enterprises
is limited [40] and is considered to be a contribution to poverty alleviation. It helps to support small
profits from forests with these activities rather than supporting a market orientation. The orientation
toward non-market demand is the focus of the institution, this by contributing to the implementation
of Community Development Plans within development projects. Parts of these plans are dedicated
to forest activities targeting the improvement of forest people livelihoods. Forest activities included
in the Community Development Plans contribute to the sustainability of forests. Nevertheless, this
contribution is not substantial since it is geographically limited to the Northwest region. Also, the main
entity responsible for producing management plans is the General Directorate of Forests. In terms
of technical efficiency, the focus of the institution on poverty alleviation does not make high technical
efficiency and productivity a priority, despite some attempts to slightly improve and use innovative
technologies in the context of microenterprise creation (see supplementary materials).
Similarly, there is no orientation toward creating new forest goods. The office has kept the same
investment line for several years, focusing on merit goods and implementing international projects
without elaborating new orientation. Advocating forestry is the task of the general directorate. The
office adopts a more participatory approach, trying to integrate forest people into the decision making
process. That is to say, it plays a mediator role, considering the interests of local people in their programs.
Nevertheless, it remains a weak mediator role, relying on foreign donors and covering limited areas
that are concerned with the intervention zones of international projects and the office.
The results obtained for the General Directorate of Forests and the regional institutions as well as
the Northwest Silvo-Pastoral Office, summarized in Figure 3 and Table 2, show that both institutions
have similarities in their performance, which is marked by the absence of the orientation toward market
demand, while their performance in the orientation toward non-market demand is considerably better.
In addition, both of them display a weak performance with regard to technical efficiency and sustaining
forest stands. Nevertheless, the institutions have some differences. While the General Directorate of
Forests plays exclusively and strongly the role of the advocacy for forestry, the Northwest Silvo-Pastoral
Office is oriented toward playing the mediator’s role. A profit from forests for forest people is more
supported by the Northwest Silvo-Pastoral Office, while the General Directorate of Forests tries,
although weakly, to look for new forest goods. Given the absence of a market orientation for forest
people, the results in part support the hypothesis that assumes that: State forest institutions employ
different market, non-market and political instruments to influence the use and the protection of forests.
The results revealed also that, at times, a weak performance of the institutions might be
advantageous for forest people. Generally, an institution is asked to improve its technical efficiency.
However, low technical efficiency in the Tunisian case allows forest people with limited technical
skills to remain competitive in terms of being able to realize forestry activities and to generate some
additional income. This confirms the second hypothesis that considers that: The outcomes of these
instruments for forest people differ from those for the general forest sector.
6. Discussion and Conclusions: Optimizing State Forest Institutions’ Performance regarding
Forest People
A specific policy mix is needed to solve the social sustainability issues related to forest people
within the context of state-owned forest resources. A policy mix can be defined as “a combination of
policy instruments which has evolved to influence the quantity and quality of biodiversity conservation
and ecosystem service provision in public and private sectors” [41]. This section will discuss the results
of the performance of state forest institutions in Tunisia regarding forest people. The eight criteria for
evaluation show priorities in the activities of the two state institutions. After discussing the overall
performance, we will highlight three important activities that include a future potential for support for
forest people.
Sustainability 2019, 11, 1954 16 of 29
The market orientation of both state forest institutions is limited. The prohibition of forest product
sales on the market outside the framework of public auctions supports self-supply. In fact, giving
more freedom to market supply can lead to an increase in competition in the presence of market
actors who have more power resources. In that case, forest people might lose their material bases, and
they could have more difficulties in terms of satisfying their own needs as approved by the Forest
Code. Also, strong market-based solutions require more competitive enterprises and can therefore
weaken forest people. State forest institutions’ inactivity in Tunisia regarding the market sector is not
beneficial for the country’s economy, but it does not influence forest people negatively, given their
weak competitiveness. This result is well in line with the criticism by Dressler et al. (2015) on pushing
state forest organizations strongly toward market demands [21].
The non-market demand orientation of state forest institutions is moderate in Tunisia. Poverty
alleviation is considered to be one of the merit/non-market goods. Supporting poverty alleviation and
protecting forests where forest people live directly and indirectly benefits forest people and contributes
to social sustainability. Therefore, state forest institutions could focus more on this issue instead of
supporting market orientation in the future.
For sustaining forest stands the performance of the General Directorate of Forests and the regional
institutions, as well as the Northwest Silvo-Pastoral Office, is weak. Considering the defined policy goal
used for this criterion, which is the “preservation of forest size and ability to produce wood continually
by the use of forest management theories”, the weak performance does not have a direct impact on
forest people, at least in the short term. These people are not competitive in timber production within
the wood market. However, an innovative definition of sustaining forest stands could support the
forest people and the special issue of poverty alleviation. This innovation is based on considering
the traditional know-how of local people in forest policy formulation, especially in regards to the use
and transformation of non-wood forest products, firefighting, etc., without focusing on increasing the
wood production.
Low technical efficiency as displayed by state forest institutions in Tunisia does not affect forest
people negatively. It is even beneficial for them since they have very low technical skills in performing
forest activities. If state institutions were focused on achieving higher technical efficiency, these people
would be excluded from performing these activities and would be replaced by machines. Consequently,
their income from forests would decrease. An adapted technology based on traditional knowledge
and on more technical supervision from the state forest institutions’ employees and experts would be
preferable for forest people.
Profit from forests does not only comprise money gained from marketable products. It also
includes the rights granted to forest people to use forest products. This profit could be supported and
maximized for these people as a priority. In order to increase this profit, state forest institutions could
provide more support for forest people by allowing more legal flexibility, and also by encouraging
effectively the creation of local small markets to commercialize traditional products (essential oils,
honey, etc.).
A future orientation toward creating new forest goods adapted to the needs of forest people would
be of interest to them. For example, the ecotourism sector based on creating and developing local
economies and directly implicating forest people could be one of these new forest goods. Currently,
the ecotourism sector in Tunisia benefits the organizers (mainly travel agencies and individuals) rather
than forest people.
The strong performance of the General Directorate of Forests and the regional institutions as
the advocates for forestry is not in favor of forest people, since it leads to their exclusion from the
decision-making process. Despite the claim that these institutions use a participatory approach
that integrates forest people in their strategies and program formulations, the indicators revealed
that the role of the advocate for forestry is strongly performed by the institutions. However, the
Northwest Silvo-Pastoral Office performs, although weakly, the mediator’s role. Its limited area of
intervention, along with a small budget and dependence on foreign money, are the main causes of its
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weak performance. A better performance of this office could be achieved by empowering its position
and increasing the state budget in order to allow an independent, stable and powerful impact by
this institution. The government could give more decision-making freedom to this institution within
the forest sector in order to play properly the role of a mediator between all interests in forests and
especially the interests of forest people.
(a) Innovative adapted forest technology for forest people: a future option
Adopting forest technology to fit forest people’s needs would be a step forward in the poverty
alleviation process and therefore in social sustainability. An adaptive forest management should be
applied for this purpose. This concept is relatively recent in the management of resources and consists
of “integrating local and scientific systems of knowledge and practice” [42]. The local or indigenous
knowledge can be defined as the practices of local forest users who have received their knowledge
from preceding generations, experts or science and used it to manage their own forests [43]. In the
case of Tunisian forest people, local knowledge consists mainly of traditional technical skills applied in
order to use and transform some forest products such as herbs, nuts, etc. It has been admitted that
neglecting this local knowledge of resource users is one of the most usual defects in the conventional
scientific management of resources [42]. In order to avoid this weakness in Tunisia it is important that
state forest institutions take into consideration these traditional skills of local forest people rather than
encourage high technical efficiency. Basically, state forest organizations have a key role to link and
balance the local knowledge with a high standard of scientific knowledge [44].
(b) Diminishing the dependency of state forest institutions on foreign donors
The balance between national state organizations and international organizations has already
been described [45]. International organizations are becoming more empowered and contribute even
to deregulation in the presence of weak and dependent states [45]. These organizations form coalitions
with domestic bureaucracies and use funding and capacity building through direct access to impact the
reform process of administration structure and policy, which affects natural resources and forests more
precisely [45]. Formally, international organizations may have the role of empowering sustainable
ecological goals, but informally they weaken the role of state actors and support the extraction of
forest production, which consists of an augmentation of wood harvesting and export. Using the
pathway of discourse, the World Bank contributed to a restriction of the forest people’s access to
resources by considering this access to be illegal logging, since this is the main cause of deforestation
in Armenia [45]. In addition, these organizations have informal political and economic interests
since they bring foreign consultants, transfer technologies and extend their markets. Also, they have
political and strategic interests [46]. The case of Armenia could be quite similar to the future of
Tunisian forests, where foreign money received by the state institutions in the context of development
projects, and the number of studies conducted, are increasing. Many of these projects encourage
the market, as well as high productivity and efficiency under the umbrella of poverty alleviation,
especially regarding non-timber products. International organizations encouraged the implementation
of a Forest Code reform, which is oriented toward more open access to resources by investing into
development projects such as the latest project of the World Bank, supporting production chains (The
final project title is “Integrated Landscapes Management in Lagging Regions”) or by financing and
formulating strategies (Forest Strategy 2015–2024 [47]; Forest Investment Program [48], etc.). In Tunisia
there is a great need for a strong national policy that is able to overcome the status of a “fragile state”
characterizing “the countries where there is a lack of political will or capacity to provide the basic
functions needed for poverty reduction, development and safeguarding of the security and human
rights of their populations” [49].
To solve forest people’s issues, it is essential to strengthen forest institutions, with a special focus
on the Northwest Silvo-Pastoral Office, which since its creation has had the role of supporting the rural
population. In order to strengthen it, this institution should first receive a solid state budget, allowing
it to become independent from international funds. In addition, the Office could be legally supported
in order for it to wield a stronger influence on the forest sector. With such a strong legal position and a
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state budget, cooperation with international organizations would be more balanced and the position
of the institution would shift from a limited implementation of projects to a decision-making role.
(c) Strengthening the mediator role of state forest institutions for forest people
In general, if many forest users are organized in groups, they can represent their interests in the
political process more strongly and more efficiently than when they act as separate individuals ([50],
p. 73). In fact, by lobbying, forest associations struggle to limit the impact of political programs on their
interests in forests (e.g., limiting their business activities by imposing additional costs) ([50], p. 81).
In Tunisia, forest people have a weak representation in the forest sector, especially in the presence
of a weak performance by state institutions as the mediators of different interests in the forests. The
weak mediator role of state forest institutions means that forest people have little participation in
the decision-making process and little access to policy formulation. Since 1988, the Forest Code
has recognized in Articles 43 and 44 the right of forest people to participate in the management
of forest resources by creating forest associations with a collective interest [6]. According to the
forest investment program in Tunisia (2016), ten pilot operations of integrated development were
implemented in 1994 [48]. These operations were supported by the Northwest Silvo-Pastoral Office
and consisted of the implementation of ten forest associations with a collective interest [48]. However,
these experiences failed due to the restrictions of resource use in the Forest Code. Later, the Agriculture
Development Groups replaced these associations legally [48]. These groups were not adapted to the
intervention in the forest sector management, since they targeted the organization of agricultural
producers and fishermen for a better production and management of natural resources [48]. Since 2014,
a process of reform has been initiated, along with the objectives of the forest strategy (2015–2024). One
of these reforms is to sign co-management plans with forest structures/associations representing forest
people [51]. The co-management concept can be defined as the compromise to share power between
the state and the community utilizing a resource [52]. This definition fits the definition of community
forestry, described as “forestry practices which straightly involve direct forest users in common
decision-making processes and the implementation of forestry activities” [53]. However, powerful
actors can drive community forestry, since there is a coherence of 82% to 90% between the interests
of powerful stakeholders and the outcomes for local users [54]. In other words, the empowerment of
direct users is essential to allow them to achieve poverty alleviation. The empowerment comprises:
(1) access to information on forests, (2) access to decision-making, and (3) access to forest land and
resources, including the ability to exclude others from using the resources. This relies upon “knowledge,
information, legal restrictions, technical materials, money and informal access to the forest” [53].
To conclude, the comprehensive evaluation of the performance of state forest institutions revealed
that the activities of the state are important factors in forest policy for forest people. Policy concepts
that ignore state forest organizations have a high risk of failing in practice.
Furthermore, linking policy for forest people with reforms of state forest organizations might
be tougher, but would achieve more relevant results regarding social sustainability, the promotion
of which is a statement in the policy programs and development projects, rather than a concern in
real actions.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Tasks of state forest institutions in Tunisia.
Tasks
State Institutions
National Level Regional and Local Levels
Ministry of Agriculture







Subdivisions, and Units *
Forest policy formulation
Engagement in designing forest laws, orders, decrees or other
mandatory and/or voluntary prescriptions other than law,
contribution to designing forest strategies and action plans.
++ + 0 ++
Law implementation
Enforcement of forest laws, implementation control ++ ++ 0 ++
Information providing
Extension services + 0 ++ +
Public reporting about forests ++ 0 0 ++
Economic support
Financial support
(incentives, compensations, investment credits, donations
in kind)
+ 0 ++ 0
Technical support (conducting operations in state-owned
forests, extension excluded) ++ + ++ ++
Implementation and support of development projects ++ 0 ++ ++
Planning
State-wide level ++ 0 0 +
Regional level planning ++ 0 ++ ++
Local level ++ 0 ++ ++




National Level Regional and Local Levels
Ministry of Agriculture







Subdivisions, and Units *
Representing the owner
(Setting the goals; Making decisions on concessions if
some; etc.)
++ + 0 ++
Management of state assets
(Management of real estates, lands other than forests) ++ 0 0 +
Management of forests
Producing wood products ++ 0 0 ++
Producing non-wood products ++ 0 0 ++
Wood harvesting
(organizing tenders for wood sales, thinning and sanitary
cutting)
0 ++ 0 +
Non-wood products harvesting
(Cork, Pistacia lentiscus, rosemary, mushrooms, charcoal,
myrtle, thyme, Aleppo pine nuts, etc.)
0 ++ 0 +
Infrastructure amelioration and socio-economic development
(Tracks, access to drinking water, etc.) + + ++ +
(+): task legally based; (++) task legally based and has high priority for the institution; (0) task not fulfilled by the institution; (*) administratively under the Regional Commissions of
Agriculture (CRDA) and technically under the General Directorate of Forests.
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Appendix B
Table A2. Performance of state forest institutions with management and authority tasks: General Directorate of Forests and regional institutions. (source: Stevanov
and Krott, 2013, some indicators and “performance raw” modified).
Criterion (C) Ordinal Scale Combination of Indicators Performance
C1:
Orientation toward market demand
3 Supporting market revenue for forest people substantial
a AND Support for professional
marketing competence exists
0
2 Supporting market revenue for forest people substantial AND Support for professionalmarketing competence does not exist
1 Supporting market revenue for forest people not substantial AND Support for professionalmarketing competence exists




3 Plans for production/provision of public/merit goods exist AND financial inflow forpublic/merit goods production/provision substantial b AND auditing exists
2
2 Plans for production/provision of public/merit goods exist AND financial inflow forpublic/merit good production/provision substantial AND no auditing
1 All other combinations
0 No plans for production/provision of public/merit goods AND financial inflow forpublic/merit good production/provision not substantial AND auditing exists OR not
C3:




stands on the whole area
(cca. 3/3)
alternative B
(Obligation to sustain forest stands exist)
AND (forest management plans exist for the
substantial c forest part) AND (sustained





stands on the greater area
(cca. 2/3)
(Obligation to sustain forest stands exists OR
not) AND (forest management plans exist on
substantial forest part) AND (sustained
forest stand requirements fulfilled on the
greater area)
Sustainability 2019, 11, 1954 22 of 29
Table A2. Cont.
Criterion (C) Ordinal Scale Combination of Indicators Performance
1
Sustained forest
stands on the lesser area
(cca. 1/3)
All other combinations
0 No sustained forest stands
(Obligation to sustain forest stands does not
exist) AND (no forest management plans for
the substantial part of the forest) AND
(sustained forest stand requirements fulfilled




3 Managerial accounting exists AND technical productivity of work is higher than the averagefor private enterprises
1
2 Managerial accounting exists AND technical productivity of work is nearly the same as forprivate enterprises
1 Managerial accounting exists OR not) AND technical productivity is lower than the averagefor private enterprises
0 Presence OR absence of managerial accounting AND zero productivity
C5:
Profits from forests for forest people
3 Freedom of harvesting substantial d AND profit-driven reform substantial e
12 Freedom of harvesting exists f AND profit-driven reform substantial
1 Freedom of harvesting exists AND profit-driven reform exist g
0 No freedom of harvesting AND no profit-driven reform
C6:
Orientation toward new forest
goods
3 Existence of professional market information AND investments into new forest goodssubstantial h AND new external partners exist
12 All other combinations
1
[Existence of professional market information AND no substantial investments into new
forest goods AND no new external partners] OR [Absence of professional market information
AND no substantial investments into new forest goods AND new external partners exist] OR
[Absence of professional market information AND investments into new forest goods
substantial AND no new external partners]
0 Absence of professional market information AND no substantial investments into new forestgoods AND no new external partners
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Table A2. Cont.
Criterion (C) Ordinal Scale Combination of Indicators Performance
C7:
Advocacy for forestry
3 Trustful cooperation with actors from the wood-based sector AND advocate’s role aspiredAND advocate’s role accepted
3
2 Trustful cooperation with actors from the wood-based sector AND advocate’s role not aspiredAND advocate’s role accepted
1 Trustful cooperation with actors from the wood-based sector AND advocate’s role aspiredAND advocate’s role not accepted
0 Trustful cooperation with actors from wood-based sector AND advocate’s role not aspiredAND advocate’s role not accepted
C8:
Mediation between all interests in
forest
3 Trustful cooperation with actors from different sectors AND mediator’s role aspired ANDmediator’s role accepted
0
2 Trustful cooperation with actors from different sectors AND mediator’s role not aspired ANDmediator’s role accepted
1 Trustful cooperation with actors from different sectors AND mediator’s role aspired ANDmediator’s role not accepted
0 Trustful cooperation with actors from different sectors AND mediator’s role not aspired ANDmediator’s role not accepted
Legend: (3) strong, (2) moderate, (1) weak performance, (0) zero; a- substantial support of market revenue for forest people: when the state allows forest people to generate revenue
from more than 70% of harvested forest products; b- inflow is considered substantial when ≥30% of total revenue flows in (from outside the institution) for public/merit goods
production/provision; c- substantial forest part means more than 2/3 of the total forest area under the management of a state forest institution; d- freedom of harvesting is substantial
when the state institutions allow harvesting for forest people for their own use and for commercialization as well; e- profit-driven reforms are substantial when they exceed 30% of the
realized reforms and they are validated by the law (in execution); f- freedom of harvesting is only for subsistence use; g- profit-driven reforms exist when they consist of less than 30% of
the reforms of the institution or/and they are still projects of reforms (not executed); h- substantial, making 1/3 of all investments or more.
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Appendix C
Table A3. Performance of a state forest institution with management tasks: Northwest Silvo-Pastoral Office. (source: Stevanov and Krott, 2013, some indicators and
“performance raw” modified).
Criterion (C) Ordinal Scale Combination of Indicators Performance
C1:
Orientation toward market demand
3 Supporting market revenue for forest people substantial
a AND Support for professional
marketing competence exists
0
2 Supporting market revenue for forest people substantial AND Support for professionalmarketing competence does not exist
1 Supporting market revenue for forest people not substantial AND Support for professionalmarketing competence exists




3 Plans for production/provision of public/merit goods exist AND financial inflow forpublic/merit goods production/provision substantial b AND auditing exists
2,5
2 Plans for production/provision of public/merit goods exist AND financial inflow forpublic/merit goods production/provision substantial AND no auditing
1 All other combinations
0 No plans for production/provision of public/merit goods AND financial inflow forpublic/merit goods production/provision not substantial AND (auditing exists OR not)
C3:




stands on the whole area (cca. 3/3)
alternative B
(Obligation to sustain forest stands exist)
AND (forest management plans exist for the
substantial c forest part) AND (sustained
forest stand requirements fulfilled on the
whole area)
1
2 Sustained foreststands on the greater area (cca. 2/3)
(Obligation to sustain forest stands exists OR
not) AND (forest management plans exist on
substantial forest part) AND (sustained
forest stand requirements fulfilled on the
greater area)
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Table A3. Cont.
Criterion (C) Ordinal Scale Combination of Indicators Performance





(Obligation to sustain forest stands does not
exist) AND (no forest management plans for
the substantial part of the forest) AND
(sustained forest stand requirements fulfilled




3 Managerial accounting exists AND Support for new technology and high productivity high d
12 (Managerial accounting exists OR not) AND Support for new technology and highproductivity moderate
1 (Managerial accounting exists OR not) AND Support for new technology and highproductivity low
0 (Presence OR absence of managerial accounting) AND No support for new technology andhigh productivity
C5:
Profits from forests for forest people
3 Revenue from forests for forest people substantial
e AND integration of people in realizing
activities defined by development plans/projects substantial f
2
2 Revenue from forests for forest people exist AND (integration of people in realizing activitiesdefined by development plans/projects Substantial OR exits)
1 (Revenue from forests for forest people exist OR not) AND integration of people in realizingactivities defined by development plans/projects exits
0 NO revenue from forests for forest people AND no integration of people in realizing activitiesdefined by development plans/projects
C6:
Orientation toward new forest
goods
3 Existence of professional market information AND investments into new forest goodssubstantial g AND new external partners exist
02 All other combinations
1
[Existence of professional market information AND no substantial investments into new
forest goods AND no new external partners] OR [Absence of professional market information
AND no substantial investments into new forest goods AND new external partners exist] OR
[Absence of professional market information AND investments into new forest goods
substantial AND no new external partners]
Sustainability 2019, 11, 1954 26 of 29
Table A3. Cont.
Criterion (C) Ordinal Scale Combination of Indicators Performance
0 Absence of professional market information AND no substantial investments into new forestgoods AND no new external partners
C7:
Advocacy for forestry
3 Trustful cooperation with actors from the wood-based sector AND advocate’s role aspiredAND advocate’s role accepted
0
2 Trustful cooperation with actors from the wood-based sector AND advocate’s role not aspiredAND advocate’s role accepted
1 Trustful cooperation with actors from the wood-based sector AND advocate’s role aspiredAND advocate’s role not accepted
0 Trustful cooperation with actors from wood-based sector AND advocate’s role not aspiredAND advocate’s role not accepted
C8:
Mediation between all interests in
forest
3 Trustful cooperation with actors from different sectors AND integration of people in thedecision-making process substantial
1,5
2 Trustful cooperation with actors from different sectors AND integration of people in thedecision-making process moderately substantial
1 Trustful cooperation with actors from different sectors AND integration of people in thedecision-making process exists
0 Trustful cooperation with actors from different sectors AND integration of people in thedecision-making process does not exist
Legend: (3) strong, (2) moderate, (1) weak performance; a- substantial support of market revenue for forest people: when the state allows forest people to generate revenue from more than
70% of harvested forest products; b- inflow is considered substantial when ≥30% of total revenue flows in (from outside the institution) for public/merit goods production/provision; c-
substantial forest part means more than 2/3 of the total forest area under the management of a state forest institution; d- high support when more than 80% of realized activities support
the use of new technology and pushes toward high productivity; e- Substantial when the institution helps to generate a revenue covering more than 80% of their needs; f- substantial when
more than 70% of planned activities are realized by forest people; g- substantial, making 1/3 of all investments or more.
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Appendix D
Table A4. List of interviews.
Date Interview Number Type of Interview Position of the Interviewee Institution
25/05/2016 Interview 1 Sent via email Responsible forsilvo-pastoral development General Directorate of Forests
21/09/2016 Interview 2 Questionnaire Responsible for forest protection General Directorate of Forests
21/09/2016 Interview 3 Face-to-face Responsible for forest product sales Forest Use Authority
22/09/2016 Interview 4 Face-to-face Responsible in the Environmentdepartment Ministry of Environment
29/09/2016 Interview 5 Questionnaire Responsible for silvo-pastoraldevelopment General Directorate of Forests
29/11/2016 Interview 6 Sent via email Responsible for silvo-pastoraldevelopment General Directorate of Forests
09/12/2016 Interview 7 Phone interview Lecturer in forest science Silvo-Pastoral Institute ofTabarka (Tunisia)
15/12/2016 Interview 8 Sent via email Responsible for silvo-pastoraldevelopment General Directorate of Forests
24/01/2017 Interview 9 Sent via email Responsible for silvo-pastoraldevelopment General Directorate of Forests
30/01/2017 Interview 10 Sent via email Responsible for and coordinator ofprojects
Northwest Silvo-Pastoral
Office
30/01/2017 Interview 11 Sent via email Responsible for silvo-pastoraldevelopment General Directorate of Forests
01/02/2017 Interview 12 Sent via email Responsible for and coordinator ofprojects
Northwest Silvo-Pastoral
Office
08/02/2017 Interview 13 Sent via email Responsible for administrative andfinancial affairs General Directorate of Forests
10/02/2017 Interview 14 Phone interview Doctoral students working on ecotourism National Agronomic Instituteof Tunisia
27/02/2017 Interview 15 Sent via email Responsible for silvo-pastoraldevelopment General Directorate of Forests
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A B S T R A C T
Since the end of the 19th century, there have been three main periods of forest management evolution in Tunisia:
(i) the French colonial period (1881–1956), characterized by a coercive and authoritarian management system,
(ii) the postcolonial period (1956–2011), during which forest bureaucracy maintained and promoted this
coercive and police management, and (iii) the period following the revolution of 2011, marked with policy
reforms pushing more sustainable forest management. The paper analyzes the pre-revolution performance of
forest administration and the reform discourses of post-revolution forest policy programs. From a methodolo-
gical perspective, the three-layer model is applied to evaluate the performance of state forest institutions
comprehensively before the revolution and then to illustrate the assumed impact of the new policy programs on
this performance with two new forest policy programs serving as case studies. Data used in this paper were
collected between 2016 and 2018 through field observations, public and non-public documents analysis and
expert interviews. The results indicate that post-revolution forest policy programs fail to foster an efficient
implementation of their objectives and the improvement of the performance of forest administration as well.
Two major reasons can be put forward to explain this failure. First, the lack of comprehensiveness and coherence
of the objectives. Second, the gap between these objectives and the time needed for an efficient implementation.
To conclude, this study highlights the need to pay more attention to particular causative factors in the design and
implementation of post-revolution `strong´ policies in the forest domain.
1. Introduction
Since 1881, Tunisian forests have been the object to a state man-
agement (Bouju et al., 2016). Over the years this management in-
creasingly became authoritarian regarding the access and the utiliza-
tion of resources (Bouju et al., 2016). After the independence of Tunisia
from the French occupation in 1956, the first forest code was promul-
gated in 1966, anchoring the restrictive colonial decrees with more
limitation regarding the access to resources. In 1988, the forest code
was redesigned to recognize the right of forest people to participate in
resource management (République Tunisienne, 2011). Later in 2005,
the notion of public-private partnership was introduced with the law of
concessions. However, according to the Program of Forest Investments
(2016), this forest code does not contain any effective mechanism of
incentive to encourage actors to invest and participate in the resource
management. Furthermore, forest administration suffered from a lack
of personnel and was unable to efficiently execute the strategic man-
agement activities (Bouzid et al. 2005). For example, the administration
was able to spend only 47% of the budget allocated to the im-
plementation of the National Strategy of Forest and Pastoral Develop-
ment 2002–2011 (République Tunisienne, 2016).
After breaking down the old repressive regime on 14 January 2011,
the first election was organized on 23 October 2011 to form the
National Constitutional Assembly with 217 members, after which a
government of coalition was born (The Carter center, 2011). This cir-
cumstance created many opportunities for formulating new policies. In
the forest sector, some actors gained more power to influence the for-
mulation of forest policy programs. However, these policies cannot be
properly implemented without considering the state forest institutions
since>90% of Tunisian forests are state-owned (Boussaïdi, 2012;
République Tunisienne, 2016). The focus of this study is not to make a
comparison between the performance of state forest institutions before
and after the revolution but to identify the new orientations of the post-
revolution policy programs. Nevertheless, the post-revolution perfor-
mance is built on the existing state actors and processes from the pre-
revolution period. Thus, in addition to the evaluation of the
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performance of the forest administration before the revolution, this
study (i) scrutinizes the post-revolution policy programs and their dis-
courses (ii) highlights some factors that can hinder the implementation
process and (iii) suggests some recommendations for improving this
implementation which is an essential factor to evaluate the success of a
policy program. In this study, the three-layer model (3L- model) was
tested to evaluate the performance of state forest institutions before the
revolution by applying criteria and indicators covering all the pillars of
sustainability. This model was successfully applied in different contexts
such as selected Western Balkan countries, Poland and Brazil (Stevanov
et al., 2018; Chudy et al., 2016; da Motta Bustamante et al., 2018). In
the case of Tunisia, which has different context and forest management,
the challenge was to adapt the operationalization of this model. Some
of the indicators were adapted in order to measure the performance of
these institutions as described in the theoretical part. The theoretical
basis of the 3L- model allows a causative evaluation which identifies the
driving factors leading to the failure or the success of the institutions
(Krott and Stevanov, 2008; Stevanov and Krott, 2013). In the case of
Tunisia, the causative explanation in the results' section was also va-
luable to discuss the factors that could affect the implementation of
post-revolution forest policy programs claiming to solve the problems
related to the new context of the forest sector.
2. Theoretical framework
The first part of this study consists of the evaluation of the state
forest institutions' performance before the revolution. For this purpose,
theory is important for understanding the amount of tasks that state
forest institutions conduct in the forest sector. The use of the 3L-model,
designed by Krott and Stevanov (2008), as the theoretical basis in this
study is relevant since it allows a comprehensive measuring of the state
forest institutions' performance covering the economic, political and
ecological aspects. This comprehensiveness is an advantage of the 3L-
model compared to other evaluation models focusing only on economic
perspective such as profit and efficiency. Further, the 3L-model makes
clear the link between political debate, theories and empirical data.
This is an additional specificity of the model in comparison to other
comprehensive evaluation models mixing all aspects together
(Stevanov et al., 2018). As shown in Fig. 1, political relevance, theories
and empirical evidence form the main three layers of the model (Krott
and Stevanov, 2008; Stevanov and Krott, 2013). The strength and the
major advantage of this model is linking theory with political programs
and empirical measurement. The theory (represented by geometric
forms in Fig. 1) brings more accuracy to the terms used in political
discourses, which are generally vague and thus illustrated in Fig. 1 by
clouds (Chudy et al., 2016; Krott and Stevanov, 2008; Stevanov and
Krott, 2013). In total, eight evaluation criteria (C1–C8 in Fig. 1 and
Table 1) emerged by linking policy to theories. The empirical level al-
lows to observe these criteria by the use of indicators I (Fig. 1). The
theoretical basis that contributed to the emergence of these criteria are
described elsewhere in Krott and Stevanov (2008) and Stevanov and
Krott (2013).
One main challenge related to the model is the application of its
indicators in different contexts. Nevertheless, the theoretical basis of
the criteria creates a sufficient flexibility to adapt the indicators to the
Tunisian context which has some particularities in comparison to other
countries where the model has already been used such as selected
countries of western Balkan, Poland and Brazil (Stevanov et al., 2018;
Chudy et al., 2016; da Motta Bustamante et al., 2018). For example,
state forest institutions in Tunisia do not generate revenue from selling
forest products. This revenue goes to the national treasury. Thus, for the
criterion “orientation toward market demand”, the evaluation concerns
the support provided by state forest institutions to create profit from
forests. There are different stakeholders from the private sector making
market profit which is facilitated by the state forest institutions.
After the evaluation, new forest policy programs that resulted from
the revolution were analyzed. This analysis allowed to deduce the as-
sumed influence of the newly formulated programs on the performance
of the forest administration vis-à-vis the eight criteria. This was fol-
lowed by a discussion of the driving factors that might lead to the
failure of program implementation in the future.
A forest policy program can be defined as “statements by forest
stakeholders made in a social context concerning the utilization and/or
protection of a forest” (Krott, 2005). The main elements formulating a
forest policy program are laws, administrative guidelines and budgets
(Krott, 2005; Sadath and Krott, 2012). There are four main elements in
a rational forest policy program: (1) specific policy issues to deal with,
(2) goals and objectives of the policy program, (3) intended impacts of
the program, and (4) the implementation of the program (Krott,
2005:29; Rahman et al., 2016; Sadath and Krott, 2012).
In a context of globalization, the influence of non-domestic actors
on domestic policy-making processes is increasing (Bernstein and
Cashore, 2010; Rahman et al., 2016). In general, there are four main
ways in which international regimes influence domestic policies: (1)
international regulations and rules, (2) international normative dis-
courses, (3) the use of markets, and (4) direct access (infiltration) to
domestic policy-making processes (Bernstein and Cashore, 2000;
Bernstein and Cashore, 2012; Burns et al., 2017).
In the specific context of revolution in Tunisia, international actors
got the opportunity to influence the formulation of forest policy at the
national level using mainly the pathway of direct access to domestic-
policy making processes. This direct access could be achieved through
providing funding, contributing to capacity building, education and
training, as well as technical assistance (Bernstein and Cashore, 2012;
Rahman et al., 2016).
The theoretical framework provides a basis to formulate four hy-
potheses related to our research questions about the post-revolution
forest policy programs, factors hindering their implementation and
future solutions:
H1. Linking vague political programs to theory-based causative factors
allows to identify the hindering elements causing implementation
failures in the future. The post-revolution forest policy programs
claim to solve major problems but an analysis of the vague programs'
terms does not show the critical factors influencing the implementation
process. The 3L-model leads to reveal such factors shaping the
implementation of forest policy programs.
H2. Management plans and inventories' implementation require
national human capacities to have an impact in practice. Core tools
to achieve forest sustainability are inventories and forest management
plans. However, they can only make a difference in practice if there are
sufficient human capacities.
H3. Different policy goals need different periods for implementation.
This means that if the implementation processes of different goals starts
simultaneously, some can be immediately implemented (such as
investing in agriculture, harvesting) while others will require much
more time (such as forest protection or regeneration). This gap between
the needed time to implement profit-driven changes (e.g. harvesting)
Table 1
The eight evaluation criteria of the 3L-model (Stevanov and Krott,
2013; Chudy et al., 2016).
C1 Orientation toward market demand
C2 Orientation toward non-market demand
C3 Sustainability of forest stands
C4 Technical efficiency
C5 Profit from forests
C6 Orientation toward new forest goods
C7 Advocacy for forestry
C8 Mediation between all interests in forest
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and planning the protection and production of forests can cause some
imbalances.
H4. Developing and sustaining forest stands need to get the support of
forest people by integrating and considering their subsistence use of
resources first. The social dimension of sustainability requires an
integration of people using forest resources for subsistence purposes.
In addition, the potential of local forest people to support or hinder the
implementation can be met by a better integration.
3. Empirical methods
To understand and analyze the forest sector's situation, multiple
empirical methods were performed. Empirical data and documents
were collected from May 2016 until February 2018.
A substantial part of this study was to collect documents related to
the Tunisian forest sector. These documents consist essentially of the
forest law (the forest code, projects of law reform realized in 2014),
strategies and policy programs (National strategies for the development
of forest sector for the periods of 2001–2011 and 2015–2024, Forest
Investment Program, National Forest Program (2004–2006) and its
elaboration studies), 20 annual reports in addition to statistics from the
General Directorate of Forests and the Forest Use Department from the
period before and after the revolution, workshop reports (two reports of
the elaboration of the of the forest strategy and the lists of participants),
five management plans covering different forested areas, 13 develop-
ment projects, studies (e.g. study for institutional reform of the forest
administration, 2016), etc. The documents are written in French and
Arabic. The majority of these documents was obtained under request,
especially when it comes to internal reports and statistics.
A senior civil servant with more than three decades of work ex-
perience within the Tunisian forest administration at central and re-
gional levels is a substantial source of collected data. This person took
part in the elaboration and implementation of several projects and
strategies which involved different categories of stakeholders before
and after the revolution of 2011. All data provided by this civil servant
was checked by field observation made previously from 2013 in addi-
tion to the analysis of original documents.
All the document analysis, observations and collaboration with the
civil servant were completed with the selection of key experts' inter-
views. More than 50 phone calls and email exchanges were made with
the most relevant and key informative actors from the state institutions
(research, forestry, Environment). The seventeen interviews in Table C
(Appendix C) represent the key interviews which revealed substantial
and key information regarding this study. These interviews were held
face to face, as well as sent and filled in via e-mail or by phone calls.
Concerning the criteria C7 and C8, a questionnaire was filled in by two
experienced employees from two different departments of the general
directorate of forests in order to obtain the maximum of information
about the institutions' partners and cooperation. To avoid a personal
bias in the analysis of the collected data, meetings within the research
group took place regularly allowing to provide a substantial triangu-
lation. In social sciences, triangulation is applied by making observa-
tions from different perspectives for more work accuracy (Neuman,
2014).
3.1. Insights into the forest sector in Tunisia
According to the second national forest and pastoral inventory
(2010), Tunisian forests cover about 1.2million ha, while grazing lands,
which are also managed by state forest institutions, account to around
4.5 million ha. Nearly 750,000 people live in or close to a forest (five
kilometers radius around) (Tounsi and Ben Mimoun, 2012). Forest re-
sources represent the main source of income for these people. This use
is limited to satisfy the individual needs of these people to survive and
cannot be commercialized (République Tunisienne, 2011). More than
90% of forests are state-owned. Softwood species form the substantial
part of forest stands. The main forest species existing in pure stands are
the Aleppo pine (Pinus halepensis Mill.), representing 53% of the total
area; cork oak (Quercus suber L.), 10%; Eucalyptus (Eucalyptus ssp.),
6%; in addition to Barbary Thuja (Tetraclinis articulata (Vahl) Mast.),
6%; and stone pine (Pinus pinea L.), representing 3% of the total area.
3.2. About the State forest institutions in Tunisia
State forest institutions in Tunisia consist mainly of three entities:
(i) The General Directorate of Forests: created in 1990, this
Fig. 1. The 3L-Model: designing criteria (C) and indicators (I) for a comprehensive evaluation of state forest institutions (Chudy et al., 2016; Stevanov and Krott,
2013).
⁎National Strategy for the Development and Sustainable Management of forests and Rangelands (2015–2024).
⁎⁎Forest Invest Plan in Tunisia.
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directorate is the result of the evolution process of an adminis-
trative forestry body created in 1883. The directorate is located in
the Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources and Fishing. The in-
stitution is responsible for the authority and management tasks
covering forest and grazing lands (Interview 6).
(ii) Regional institutions: they depend administratively on the
Regional Commission for Agriculture known in Tunisia as CRDA.
These commissions exist in every governorate and have a broad
scope of activities covering the agricultural sector. In every com-
mission there is a division for reforestation and soil and water
conservation under which there is a district. This district is re-
presented at a local level by units, and the coordination between
the district and the unit is achieved by a subdivision which is
created to divide the forest area for easier management.
Technically, regional institutions are under the General Directorate
of Forests which cooperates directly with the districts.
(iii) Forest Use Authority: it was created in 1973 and has a financial
autonomy. Its budget is linked to the state budget and is under the
control of the Ministry of Agriculture. The main activities of this
authority is cork and wood harvesting according to forest man-
agement plans realized by the General Directorate of Forests and
regional institutions. Also, this authority is responsible for orga-
nizing forest product sales according to the procedures detailed in
the forest code (The World Bank and DGF, 2016; Interview 9).
Technically, the institution depends on the General Directorate of
Forests.
State forest institutions have state partners such as the Northwest
Silvo-pastoral Development Office which intervenes at the regional and
local levels to implement many projects in collaboration with forest
institutions.
Since the Forest Use Department has a limited activity related only
to the use and the sales of forest products, and since regional institu-
tions execute the activities of the General Directorate of Forests at the
regional and local levels, all institutions will be considered as one in-
stitution for the evaluation. In other words, the complementarity of
these institutions' activities allows a comprehensive evaluation re-
garding all 3L-model criteria.
4. Results and discussions
In the following, we evaluate the performance of state forest in-
stitutions before the revolution using the criteria and indicators of the
3L-model. The results and the combinations of indicators are sum-
marized in Table A, Appendix A. Later, we assume the future impact on
the performance in case the main forest policy programs formulated
after the revolution of 2011 are implemented. This evaluation is based
only on the impacts which are formally claimed. Then some of these
assumed impacts are selected and discussed by analyzing the causative
factors that could hinder the intended implementation process in
practice.
Criterion 1: Orientation toward market demand
This criterion reveals whether a state forest institution supports the
market demand orientation benefiting different stakeholders from pri-
vate sector. In general, forest administration does not generate revenue
from selling forest products. In other words, sales revenue goes directly
to the national treasury except for a small amount generated from the
private sales realized by the Forest Use Authority and spent on the
functioning of this institution (Interview 11). For measuring the criteria,
two indicators were developed: supporting market revenue and the
support of professional marketing competence.
I.1 Supporting market revenue: This indicator concerns the support
of the forest administration for market actors to allow them to generate
revenue from selling goods and services on the market. Legally, the
Forest Use Authority is responsible for organizing public auctions and
private sales to sell forest products. Based on their annual reports (for
example, those of 2009 and 2010), forest administration offered many
products for sale such as wood, cork, non-wood products (pine nuts,
Aleppo pine nuts, herbs…). The majority of forest products listed in the
forest inventory of 2010 were available for use. Generally, forest ad-
ministration allows hunting according to an annual code of hunting
published by the General Directorate of Forests. Hunters pay hunting
fees via the post service to the regional institutions and this money goes
directly to the national treasury (Interview 8). In 2009 and 2010, re-
spectively 99% and 100% of the proposed amount of wood was sold.
This means that market revenue support is substantial.
I.2 Professional marketing competence: This competence refers to
the ability of the institution to gather, analyze and use market in-
formation. Forest administration in Tunisia at the national and regional
levels had no marketing departments or competencies professionally
working to promote and tailor forest products before the revolution.
Currently, this situation is still valid (The World Bank and DGF, 2016;
Interviews 17 and 13). The performance of the institutions can be con-
sidered as not professional.
Performance judgment: By combining both indicators, state forest
institutions' orientation toward market demand can be estimated at
moderate or “2” (Table A, Appendix A).
Criterion 2: Orientation toward non-market demand
This orientation concerns forest goods that are not exchanged on
market (public goods) or that are considered as e for maintaining public
welfare.
I.3 Plans for production and provision of public/merit goods: These
plans cover areas where the main target is protection and they give
information about the amount of public or merit goods to be produced
in this area.
State forest institutions in Tunisia were oriented toward the pro-
tection of forests, as well as the coastal line (for example, pine forests of
Zouarâa in Northwest planted to fix the sand) and zones endangered by
sand dunes in the south. The annual programs of activities elaborated
by the General Directorate of Forests and regional institutions ne-
cessarily contain a section for forest protection, firefighting, national
parks budgets, etc. They also collaborate with the Northwest Silvo-
pastoral Development Office in order to produce Community
Development Plans which have poverty alleviation as main target
(Interviews 10 and 12).
I.4 Financial inflow for the production/provision of public/merit
goods: This financial inflow is the amount of money flowing from
outside the forest institution to finance activities related to the pro-
duction or provision of public/merit goods. In general, the state budget
could not be considered as substantial. Between 2002 and 2004, 77% of
the total budget allocated to the forest sector was dedicated to paying
the workforce (Bouzid et al. 2005). Furthermore, the annual budget of
the 1990s was multiplied 10 times as compared to the 1980s due to the
implication of international projects in the implementation of the na-
tional strategy of reforestation and desertification fighting. Later, this
budget considerably decreased starting from the year 2000 after the
completion of development projects, especially the project of forest
development funded by the World Bank (Bouzid et al. 2005). The
Ministry of Environment is one of the important state partners of the
General Directorate of Forests in terms of resource protection, parti-
cularly concerning national parks and natural reserves (Interview 2).
However, the Ministry of Environment also depends on international
funds to support the General Directorate (Interview 4). Thus, financial
inflow can be considered as substantial.
I.5 Auditing: It is used to allow state forest institutions to evaluate
the degree of satisfaction of the other public institutions which provide
funds for the production/provision of public goods. This kind of au-
diting has never existed within state forest institutions. The Ministry of
Environment intervenes in national parks according to specifications
made by the General Directorate of Forests. Thus, there is neither or-
dering side nor task ordering within this collaboration (Interview 4). The
only auditing that can take place is in the frame of international
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projects and is realized by international organizations.
Performance judgment: By considering all the indicators, or-
ientation toward non-market demand can be assessed as moderate or
“2”(Table A, Appendix A).
Criterion 3: Sustainability of forest stands.
This criterion deals with the preservation of forest size and ability of
continuous wood production by applying forest management theories.
Nevertheless, other activities such as firefighting should also be con-
sidered in order to meet sustainability requirements.
I.6 Obligation to sustain forest stands: This concerns the compulsion
to maintain the productive capability of soil and stands in forests. The
Tunisian forest code clearly mentions this obligation to protect and
develop forest heritage which is considered as a national wealth and
every citizen has a duty to contribute to its extension and conservation.
I.7 Forest management plans: These plans are elaborated to protect
sustained future wood production. The elaboration of these plans in
Tunisia is limited. According to the statistics of the General Directorate
of Forests (2016), in 2009 only 72 of 179 forest units had valid forest
management plans. In addition, these 179 plans concern<50% of the
total forest area. Thus, these plans existed for a limited forest area.
I.8 Requirements for sustaining forest stands: Based on this indicator
for sustained forest stands, the growing stock and the current annual
increment should not decline over the years. According to two in-
ventories published in 1995 and 2010, the requirements of sustain-
ability were fulfilled. For a period of 5 years, the current annual in-
crement slightly increased from 513,241m3 per year to 525,400m3 per
year in 1995 and 2010 respectively. Also, the growing stock from
17.3millionm3 to 22.2millionm3 according to these inventories (DGF,
1995; Selmi et al., 2010). However, all this data is criticized regarding
its reliability. In the old regime, many statistics were hidden, such as
burned areas, to show a perfect situation of sustainability in reports
(Interview 16). This means that the requirements for sustainability could
not be considered as properly accomplished.
Performance judgment: These three indicators show that the
performance of state forest institutions regarding this criterion can be
assessed as weak or “1”(Table A, Appendix A).
Criterion 4: Technical efficiency
Technical efficiency could be defined as “the degree to which an
actual output of a production unit approaches its maximum” (Färe and
Lovell, 1978). Based on this definition, this criterion measures to which
extent state forest institution is pushing toward high efficiency.
I.9 Managerial accounting: This type of accounting provides in-
formation for the internal use of the institutions' managers and it is
conducted to support the decision-making process for an efficient use of
resources. Tunisian state forest institutions definitely have no depart-
ments dealing with this kind of accounting. (Interviews 13 and 17).
I.10 Public tender harvesting: This indicator aims to define the
amount of wood sold in public tenders and used by private enterprises.
In fact, the efficiency of private enterprises concerning the use of wood
is much higher than the state forest institutions's efficiency. For ex-
ample, in 2009 private enterprises were able to harvest 84% available
wood for them, while forest administration harvested only 41% in the
context of forest activities (report 2009). Furthermore, the more state
institutions sell wood in public tenders to private enterprises the better
technical efficiency is. In 2009 and 2010, 79.3% and 78%, respectively,
of the total amount of produced wood was sold in public tenders. This
means that public tender harvesting is substantial.
I.11 State harvesting: This indicator measures the wood that is
harvested by the forest administration. This wood is mainly cut during
forestry activities (sanitary or thinning cut, etc.). In 2009 and 2010 this
wood consisted respectively of 20.7% and 22% of the total wood pro-
duction available for use. These amounts are not considered as sub-
stantial.
Performance judgment: Based on these indicators, orientation
toward more technical efficiency is considered as moderate or “2”
(Table A, Appendix A).
Criterion 5: profits from forests
The fifth criterion aims to evaluate the importance of revenue that is
generated from forests. This profit can be money, as it is the case with
wood and other forest products sold in public tenders, allowing private
enterprises to generate revenue from these products. The other type of
profit is allowing subsistence use of forest products for forest people
(firewood, pastoral use for breeding, etc.) or even to allow them to
generate revenue from these products. Profits from forests will be re-
duced if the institution has more wood that is harvested by forest
people via contracts paid by the state budgets.
I.12 Profit from public tenders: As mentioned in the previous cri-
terion,> 70% of annual wood production is sold in public auctions,
which allows to consider the profit for the private sector as substantial.
The transformation of non-wood products such as the extraction of
essential oils from herbs (Rosemary, thyme, mastic, etc.) is valuable
since these products are used in cosmetic and medical industry, and is
also exported (INS, 2015). It is important to mention that industrials do
not have any direct contact with state forest institutions and that there
are no statistics about the exact number of industrials who transform
forest wood. Forest enterprises, which can be individuals or firms, are
intermediates between the administration and the industrialists
(Interview 1).
I.13 Profit for forest people: Based on the Article 37 of the forest
code, forest people can use forest products only to satisfy their own
needs, and any commercial or industrial use of these products is legally
forbidden. Thus, this profit is not a market revenue, but rather a sub-
sistence use.
I.14 State harvesting activities: In the context of forestry activities,
state institutions harvest a small amount of wood via employing forest
people who are paid for each working day. This wood is then sold in
private sales and some of the generated money is used for the func-
tioning of the Forest Use Department, while the General Directorate of
Forests does not get any revenue. The productivity of this kind of wood
harvesting is low and it has more a political target of poverty alleviation
by providing daily wages for forest people. Thus, this harvested wood is
not substantial.
Performance judgment: The combination of these three indicators
shows that profits from forest can be estimated at moderate or “2”
(Table A, Appendix A).
Criterion 6: Orientation toward new forest goods
This criterion focuses on the steps made by the institutions in order
to create new sources of revenue from forests.
I.15 Professional market information: The indicator is related to the
information which is gathered, processed and spread in a professional
way. In Tunisian state forest institutions such a professional market
information does not exist and there is no marketing department within
the forest administration (Interview 13 and 3). Furthermore, the sub-
stantial part of forest products is traditionally sold in public auctions by
the Forest Use Department. The generated revenue is automatically
going to the national treasury, while forest institutions in general do not
have any benefits from them (except little money generated from pri-
vate sales and money which contributes to the functioning budget of the
Forest Use Authority as previously mentioned).
I.16 Investments into new forest goods: This indicator concerns the
investment into new or transformed goods and services which are in-
novative for the institution. Before 2011, there was no investment into
new forest goods. Annual reports of activities (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010)
show the same investments of the institution. It is important to mention
that even after the revolution, state forest institutions kept the same
investment orientations as shown in annual reports of 2014, 2015 and
2016 for example. A substantial part of the budget is allocated to the
payment of the workforce realizing forestry activities. In 2005, there
was an initiative to allow concessions of forests for the private sector in
order to implement some projects. However, this law had never been
applied due to the existence of many constraints and requirements for
getting the permission for these projects (République Tunisienne,
A. Hasnaoui and M. Krott Forest Policy and Economics 105 (2019) 99–111
103
2011; République Tunisienne, 2016).
I.17 New external partners: This partnership could be established
between state forest institutions and different firms and organizations
working together to produce new forest goods and services. The main
partners of the state forest institutions before the revolution were some
Ministries (tourism, environment), but essentially international orga-
nizations providing funding in the frame of projects. The development
projects started in 1988 with the World Bank (Project of Forest
Development), after which came many other opportunities of funding
with the German cooperation GIZ, the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA), etc. All these projects were focused on the
development of the forest cover and the mitigation of the over-
exploitation and degradation of resources as well as the environmental
issues. They also supported the concept of integrated forest manage-
ment to deal with the socio-economic situation of forest people.
However, no new forest products that would result from these colla-
borations were mentioned.
Performance judgment: The performance of this institution con-
cerning the sixth criterion can be assessed as weak or “1” (Table A,
Appendix A).
Criterion 7: Advocacy for forestry
This criterion deals with the role that forest institutions play within
classical political processes managing the protection and use of forests.
The advocate's role means that the institution focuses on specific in-
terests in forests without considering all interests of other actors.
I.18 Trustful cooperation with actors from the wood-based sector:
The collaboration concerns wood industry actors or different sectors
linked to the forest sector. Based on Interviews 2 and 5 state forest in-
stitutions in Tunisia maintained the same main partners before and
after the revolution. These partners are essentially international orga-
nizations NGOs that are active in the forestry sector, forestry research
institutions, the Ministry of Environment, etc. These answers reveal that
the institution cooperates the most with actors from the wood-based
sector.
I.19 Aspiration toward a advocate's role: This indicator refers to the
willing of the institution to represent the forest sector. This role was
confirmed (Interviews 2 and 5) by the consideration of the institution to
be strong in terms of the advocate for forestry role.
I.20 Acceptance of the advocate's role: It concerns the perception of
other institutions regarding the acceptance of the forest institutions as
the advocate for forestry. Indeed, they are considered as the advocate
for forestry (Interviews 4 and 7). The strict forest protection, especially
at the regional level, is perceived as their main task despite the efforts
to adopt a strategy based on conciliation and a participatory approach
of different actors at the central level (Interview 4).
Performance judgment: State forest institutions have trustful co-
operation with actors from the wood-based sector. Further, it aspires to
an advocate's role for forestry and it is accepted by other actors as the
advocate. They can be considered as the strong advocate for forestry
and their performance can be judged as strong or “3”(Table A,
Appendix A).
Criterion 8: Mediation of all interests in forests
This criterion is about the ability of the institution to apply forest
governance which has an innovative role in policy processes dealing
with forest protection and use. The mediation role offers different sta-
keholders the opportunity to participate in policy processes.
I.21 Trustful cooperation with actors from all sectors: This indicator
concerns the partnership of the state institutions with actors from dif-
ferent sectors related to forests. As shown in the previous criterion, the
interviews revealed a trustful cooperation basically with actors from the
wood-based sector. Additionally, there was a lack of trustful coopera-
tion with other actors such as forest people. The permanent conflict that
still exists until today between the state institutions and people living in
forests is due to restrictions related to grazing since forest administra-
tion always advocates sustainable forest use by limiting the access to
grazing and even prohibiting the breeding of some animals, such as
goats, in certain areas for a specific period of time. This was also con-
firmed by other studies which described the old forest management as a
police forest management (Bouju et al., 2016)
I.22 Aspiration toward a mediator's role: The indicator deals with
the intention of the institution to collaborate with actors from several
sectors. By considering the role of forest protection played by the state
institutions, its position and role of a mediator could not be completed
(Interviews 1 and 5). In addition, the strong cooperation of the institu-
tions with actors from the wood-based sector shows that the role of a
mediator is not really aspired in practice despite some political dis-
courses.
I.23 Acceptance of the mediator's role: It refers to the recognition of
forest institutions as a mediator (between all interests). Despite
claiming to play the role of a conciliator, forest directorate and its
employees (especially in regions) have always been considered, before
and after the revolution as rigid in terms of dealing with the forest
sector in practice (Interview 4). The political context before the re-
volution was more favorable for these institutions to play the restrictive
role with the domination of the state and the police regime.
Performance judgment: State forest institutions cooperate mainly
with actors from the wood-based sector. Moreover, they do not aspire
toward a mediator role and they are not accepted as a mediator. By
combining these indicators, the result would be a zero or “0” perfor-
mance (Table A, Appendix A).
To conclude, state forest institutions' performance before the re-
volution regarding the different evaluation criteria is moderate (or-
ientation toward market, non-market demand, technical efficiency and
profit from forests), while their performance is weak regarding or-
ientation toward new forest goods and sustainability. The performance
is strong only in the case of advocacy for forestry role. These results are
summarized in Fig. 2 and Table A (Appendix A).
4.1. Postulations and assumed impacts of post-revolution policy programs
The Tunisian forest sector has been facing many challenges related
to the management for several decades. After the revolution, the quick
collapse of the state repressive role was one of the main factors which
led to an important increase of illegal logging and a huge number of
wildfires as shown in Fig. 3. It is important to precise that all data of
2011 are underestimated and do not reflect the real situation since
during this year and also in 2012 forest agents were not able to record
the exact number of offences and burned areas due to security threats.
The state forest institutions also lost the control on forest people in
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Fig. 2. Evaluation of state forest institutions' performance before the revolution
in Tunisia.
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2010 a worker was asked to remove cork from 30 trees per day and was
paid only 4TND8001 per day. After the revolution a worker proceeds
only three trees and is paid 14TND per day (almost three times more)
and with poor quality of products (Interviews 3 and 15). From an eco-
nomic point of view, the increase of wages might be not very mean-
ingful if considering the rising inflation rate, the consumer price index,
the financial resources of the institutions…etc. Nevertheless, when as-
sociated with the aforementioned decline of productivity, it reflects the
weakening of the state's coercion resources. In this context, studies have
been realized in order to formulate new strategies and programs for the
forest sector, claiming to solve forest issues and to fit to the new socio-
economic situation in Tunisia.
The result of these different studies and meetings in joint colla-
boration between state forest institutions and international organiza-
tions consists mainly of the National Strategy for the Development and
Sustainable Management of Forests and Rangelands 2015–2024 (DGF,
PCFM, 2014) and the Forest Investment Program (République
Tunisienne, 2016).
4.1.1. National strategy for the development and sustainable management
of forests and rangelands (2015–2024)
The elaboration of this strategy was funded by the German co-
operation GIZ in the frame of the regional project Silva Mediterranea-
PCFM.2 Its formulation was based on the results of the evaluation of the
old forest strategy 2002–2011 and the analysis of the National Forest
Program. These results were presented and discussed during two
workshops, in the north and in the south of Tunisia in November 2013,
gathering the steering committee of the study, regional forest admin-
istration actors and their institutional and non-institutional partners.
Later a draft of the strategy and the action plan were discussed in
presence of the Minister of Agriculture and key actors from the forest
administration in February 2014.
4.1.2. Forest Investment Program (2016)
It is one of the three programs of the Strategic Climate Fund (SCF)
which itself represents one of the funds of the Climate Investment Funds
(CIF). These funds are managed by the Multilateral Development Bank
(MDB) and have as main target to help developing countries to combat
climate change. They support the mobilization of funds to facilitate the
mitigation of emissions linked to deforestation and forest degradation.
In May 2015, Tunisia was selected to be one of the pilot countries of the
Forest Investment Program's second phase. Tunisia received a grant of
250,000 USD in order to elaborate its program with the support of
Multilateral Development Bank and coordinated by the World Bank.
The formulation of the program was under the responsibility of the
Tunisian government represented by the Ministry of Agriculture and
assisted by the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). A Franco-
Tunisian consultancy group was designated to realize this task.
After the description of the Tunisian forest sector context, the pro-
gram selected two main projects to be implemented: (i) the first project
is entitled “Integrated landscape management in Tunisia's lagging re-
gions”; (ii) the second project is called “Integration of trees in the pri-
vate degraded agriculture lands.” The details concerning these two
projects are summarized in Table B, Appendix B.
The documents of the Forest Strategy and Forest Investment Plan
satisfy the requirements of a rational policy program (Krott, 2005) since
they identify (1) specific policy issues, (2) goals and objectives, (3)
intended impacts, and (4) the implementation of the program.
In the following, this content is analyzed in order to get insights into
the intended impact of these programs on the state forest institutions'
performance vis-à-vis the eight criteria of the 3L-model. This specific
analysis provides a clearer understanding of the orientations of the
post-revolution programs.
The orientation toward market will be enhanced in case the programs
are implemented. Forest strategy underlines the lack of resource va-
lorization. Only half of annual wood production is harvested in addition
to non-wood products which are weakly used. The strategy has the
objective to provide subsidies to young entrepreneurs. The public-pri-
vate partnership (PPP) through the co-management of resources is also
an important sub-program in the strategy and was one of the first
projects of the law reform to be discussed in 2014 and 2015. In total,
28% of the budget allocated to the strategy was dedicated to the pro-
gram of optimizing the contribution of forest sector to socio-economic
development. The Forest Investment Plan considers to develop the
market orientation via its first project in which there is orientation
toward the privatization of forest trees´ nurseries and the public-private
partnership to manage the protected areas that were totally under the
state management. In addition, the project plans to support the en-
trepreneurship to develop different production chains by strengthening
the Enterprise Support Services that collaborate with specialized con-
sulting groups in order to guide the micro, small and medium en-
terprises in their business. In this context, a Fund for Productivity and
Innovation will be created and financed by the project in order to sti-
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Fig. 3. Offences and burned areas' statistics in Tunisian forests between 2009 and 2017 (DGF 2016c; Dhaouadi, 2017).
1 TND: Tunisian Dinar.
2 The full project title is: Adapting the framework for forestry policy to meet
the needs of climate change in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa).
It was commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation
and Development (BMZ) for the period 2009–2015.
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The orientation toward non-market demand will also increase based on
the policy programs. Forest protection is one of the most highlighted
issues in this orientation. 30% of the strategy budget will be allocated to
the maintenance and the amelioration of environmental functions and
services. This part of the strategy includes biodiversity protection, in-
frastructure improvement and provision of firefighting equipment (in-
stalling a monitoring system with a warning device). Poverty allevia-
tion, as a non-market orientation, is also considered in both policy
programs. It mainly consists of an integrated forest management and of
co-management plans between the administration and forest people.
This will allow them to generate revenue from forest resources and
from realizing forest activities with better technical performance.
Regarding the sustainability of forest stands, the performance of state
forest institutions will be improved based on the new policy programs.
The strategy allocates nearly 40% of the total budget to the ameliora-
tion of forest and pastoral resources program. Additionally, about 20%
of this budget is devoted to the elaboration, the maintenance and the
revision of forest management plans. The Forest Investment Program,
through its first project, considers the amelioration of the land use
planning by the elaboration of many plans including (i) a new national
inventory, (ii) a national plan for afforestation and reforestation, (iii)
new/updated management plans for state forests, and (iv) an in-
formation and monitoring system of forest and grazing lands. This land-
use planning will get about 25% of the total budget of the first project.
The second project allocates around 40% of its total budget to finance
forest plantations (to produce essentially non-wood products and to
introduce the medicinal and aromatic plants in agriculture and pastoral
lands subject to erosion threats.
Concerning technical efficiency, the performance will be improved by
increasing the orientation toward market. By supporting public-private
partnership and the co-management of resources, technical efficiency is
assumed to increase. In fact, private enterprises have already a better
performance in using forest products than the forest administration, as
evaluated in the previous section. Improving the technical skills of
forest people who are realizing different forestry activities is also one of
the targets of post-revolution programs.
The profit from forests will be enhanced as well. The co-management
plans will allow forest people to make profit, not only by using the
resources to survive, but also by transforming some products and selling
them legally on the market. Also, the valorization of wood which is
considerably underused would increase the available wood proposed
for sales in public tenders allowing private actors to make more profit.
New forest policy programs push toward new forest goods.
Concessions and co-management could be a good opportunity for in-
novative projects, especially in ecotourism. It is important to mention
that due to the legislative particularities of each national park creation,
there are no access fees imposed by state forest institutions (Interview
14). Also, 30% of the first project budget of the Forest Investment Plan
is allocated to agroforestry and organic agriculture.
The advocacy for forestry role will be the only criterion where the
performance will be weakened based on policy programs. The forest
strategy claims that multifunctional forest administration is no more
adequate to the current situation of the country after the revolution.
The legislation is also targeted by these programs in order to facilitate
the access to resources. However, institutional capacity building gets
limited resources with only 0.12% of the total budget of the strategy
and with 3% of the total budget of the first project of the Forest
Investment Plan. These 3% are not only for technical and material ca-
pacity building, but also for the reorganization of forest and pastoral
administration. This means that the individual capacity building budget
is even more limited. Weakening the state advocacy's role and sup-
porting the decentralization process and the public-private partnership
will contribute to strengthen the mediation between all interests' role
played by the administration. The different assumed impacts of the
post-revolution forest policy programs on state forest institutions' per-
formance are summarized in Fig. 4.
4.2. Causative factors possibly affecting the assumed performance of state
forest institutions in the future
Making an evaluation based on the content of the formulated policy
programs showed a positive future impact on the forest sector and the
performance of state forest institutions managing>90% of forests in
Tunisia. However, this impact could be very different in practice if we
consider the causative factors that are neglected in these programs. In
the following, we highlight some of the potential causative factors to be
considered for a better implementation process.
4.2.1. Forest management plans and national forest inventories assumed to
improve sustainability and capacities
A better knowledge and planning of forestlands is assumed to con-
tribute to the reduction of the illegal logging and to limit the conversion
of forestlands into agriculture lands. While these goals could be partly
implemented, other actors would probably have more interest in this
information system. International organizations can use this informa-
tion to define their orientations and to make decision to invest (or not
invest) in a forestland based on wood or other forest resource avail-
ability. Furthermore, in the case of Argentina, the realization of new
inventory assisted by the World Bank was an advantage for the agri-
cultural sector which fights to gather information about lands that
could be converted into agriculture lands (Burns and Giessen, 2015).
The given definition of tree height in this inventory excluded a con-
siderable part of lands that were previously considered as “native for-
ests”. This gives the opportunity to agricultural policy sector to work on
transforming these lands (Burns and Giessen, 2015). In Tunisia, in-
troducing the development of agriculture lands threatened by erosion
as an entire and independent project in the Forest Investment Plan (see
second project) might be a sign of the importance that is getting this
sector and that could lead to other future policy change in favor of
agriculture, especially in the presence of weakened forest bureau-
cracies. Moreover, new forest policies in Tunisia allocate a negligible
budget to individual and institutional capacity building compared to
the importance of the role played by these institutions in charge of both
authority and management tasks in forests and rangelands. These
budget amounts are between 0.1% and 3% in the formulated programs.
In the implementation stage of the strategy programs, there is a clear
and repeated mentioning of the needed cooperation with private sector
and international organizations. In other words, forest administration
would not get enough technical and material staff to be able to im-
plement these strategy programs without the support of private sector
and international organizations. The lack of resources might hinder the
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Fig. 4. The assumed impact of post-revolution forest policy programs on state
forest institutions in Tunisia.
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has been decreasing since the year 2000. For example, according to the
forest strategy (2015–2024), there was a loss of 18% of the personnel
between 2000 and 2008 (2.3% per year), mainly because of the non-
replacement of those who retired. Additionally, forest rangers who had
been informing about forests in case of wildfires, illegal logging, etc.,
were removed by the post-revolution government arguing that these
police and informing practices remind people of the old dictatorship
(Interview 16). The lack of personnel in the field was one of the main
factors causing the increase of illegal logging and wildfires. Paying
more attention to the individual and institutional capacity building is a
priority that can make management plans and inventories useful. This
confirms the first and the second hypotheses considering that:
H1. Linking vague political programs to theory-based causative factors
allows to identify the hindering elements causing implementation
failures in the future.
H2. Management plans and inventories' implementation require
national human capacities to have an impact in practice.
4.2.2. New forest policies neglecting the time dimension
According to Krott (2005), it is substantial to consider the time di-
mension since the processes of production take more time compared to
the economic sector activities. From previous experiences in developing
countries, new policy programs formulated in collaboration with in-
ternational organizations have affected forest sustainability. Armenia is
one of these cases where the World Bank formally claimed to empower
sustainability in forests and informally weakened the state role. It en-
couraged more resource extraction and export by supporting forestland
privatization and by limiting the access of forest people to resources
arguing that their illegal logging is the main cause of deforestation
(Burns et al., 2017). In Argentina, the intervention of the World Bank
led to the creation of many laws in the forest sector aiming to ease the
investment in forest plantations without owning the land. However,
these laws do not mention any obligation to replant the area where the
trees were cut. In other words, these lands could be changed into, for
example, agriculture land (Burns and Giessen, 2015). Consequently, the
implementation of these laws caused a considerable increase of private
companies' investments in the forest sector and this affects the sus-
tainability since resource exploitation is much faster than producing
forest stands.
Allocating 40% of the forest strategy's budget to develop forest re-
sources (including the production of forest management plans) appears
to prioritize and increase sustainability. This sustainability improve-
ment is assumed to be more important by additionally adopting co-
management plans with forest people. In these plans people are allowed
to use a certain area of forests and in return they are asked to develop
and protect forest resources from wildfires, illegal logging, etc.
However, by considering the time factor, sustainability goals are more
difficult to achieve than assumed. In fact, co-management plans go
through long procedures to be applicable in all forested area (from law
approval, to pilot experiences, then to generalization) without forget-
ting the considerable efforts that are needed to convince forest people
and build their capacities to use forest resources sustainably. This can
take decades to be effectively functioning in practice. Before accom-
plishing this long-term goal, there will be no qualified people capable of
protecting and developing new planted forest stands or to implement
forest management plans, which would engender considerable natural
and financial loss. This supports the third and the fourth hypotheses
assuming that:
H3. Different policy goals need different periods for implementation.
This means that if the implementation processes of different goals starts
simultaneously, some can be immediately implemented (such as
investing in agriculture, harvesting) while others will require much
more time (such as forest protection or regeneration).
H4. Developing and sustaining forest stands need to get the support of
forest people by integrating and considering their subsistence use of
resources first.
5. Conclusion
The revolution of 2011 in Tunisia led to a transitional period during
which many actors gained more power allowing them to influence
policy formulation in the forest sector. Our study analyzes these forest
policy documents assuming a feasible implementation of sustainability
goals. Applying the 3L-model allowed to deeply understand the func-
tioning of the old forest administration which had an overall medium
performance with a strong advocate for forestry role and a restrictive
management limiting the access to resources. In addition, the model
criteria were used to show the new orientations of post-revolution
programs assuming to improve the performance of forest institutions
concerning the different criteria except the advocacy for forestry role
which will be weakened. The particularity of the 3L-model is the
linking of vague political programs to the theories, which reduces the
complexity of these programs, but which also helps to identify the
causative factors leading to a certain performance of the institution.
Testing the 3L-model in a different context with specific objectives was
a good opportunity to check the degree of flexibility of this relatively
new model. Despite the limit of indicators' applicability, it was possible
to operationalize the model by adapting these indicators to the local
context. In addition, the 3L-model presents a selection of theories that
can anchor the vague political terms. This implies that selecting these
specific theories does not exclude the possibility to choose other the-
ories related to the same policy goals. Based on the 3L-model, the study
highlighted a selection of causative factors that might affect the im-
plementation of the forest policy programs in the future. The time di-
mension is an essential factor to consider since setting too many goals
simultaneously without prioritization could be not realistic enough
regarding their implementation. Different goals require different im-
plementation time. Some objectives can be achieved quickly and are
implemented first, while the implementation of other goals that need
more time is not prioritized. Regarding state forest institutions, the
budget allocated to individual and institutional capacity building is
limited. Capacity building in new forest policy programs is more fo-
cused on producing inventories and informative systems which are not
necessarily a current priority for the Tunisian forest sector. The lack of
forest agents in the field and the socio-economic problems are identified
as the main causes of wildfires and illegal logging, especially after the
revolution. Given the relative permanence of bureaucracies, they are
considered as the optimal political institutions that are able to imple-
ment policies (Meier et al., 2018). The administration bodies and the
officers have in general permanent positions within these institutions
compared to politicians (Krott, 2005). Since the revolution, new poli-
tical parties have been created, several governments have been re-
placed due to their failure in implementing new development policies
in Tunisia. Despite this instability, the state employees remained un-
changed. Capacity building within the forest administration have better
chances to influence steadily the implementation of long-term forest
development policies. This study leads to conclude that allocating more
budget to individual and institutional capacity building is one im-
portant requirement to improve the implementation process. An effi-
cient implementation of forest policy programs needs to take into
consideration the time required for every goal to be completely im-
plemented. In addition, the impact of forest policy programs can be
improved when they are better linked to the priorities of the national
forest sector.
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Appendix A. Appendix
Table A
Performance of state forest institution with management and authority tasks.
Criterion (C) Ordinal 
scale




3 Supporting market revenue substantial a AND Professional marketing competence exists 
2
2
Supporting market revenue substantial AND Professional marketing competence does 
not exist 
1
Supporting market revenue not substantial AND Professional marketing competence 
exists 
0







Plans for production/provision of public/merit goods exist AND financial inflow for 
public/merit goods production/provision substantial b AND auditing exists
2
2
Plans for production/provision of public/merit goods exist AND financial inflow for 
public/merit good production/provision substantial AND no auditing 
1 All other combinations
0
No plans for production/provision of public/merit goods AND financial inflow for 







stands on the whole 
area (cca. 3/3)
alternative B
(Obligation for sustaining forest stands exist) AND (forest 
management plans exist for the substantial c forest part) AND 




stands on the 
greater area (cca. 
2/3)
(Obligation for sustaining forest stands exists OR not) AND 
(forest management plans exist on substantial forest part) AND 
(sustained forest stand requirements fulfilled on the greater area) 
1
Sustained forest 







(Obligation for sustaining forest stands does not exist) AND (no 
forest management plans for the substantial part of the forest) 
AND (sustained forest stand requirements fulfilled on whole OR 





Managerial accounting exists AND Public tenders harvesting substantial d AND State 
administration harvesting not substantial 
2
2
Managerial accounting does not exist AND Public tenders harvesting substantial AND 
State administration harvesting not substantial
1
(Managerial accounting exists OR not)  AND Public tenders harvesting not substantial 
AND State harvesting substantial e
0
Presence OR absence of managerial accounting AND No Public tenders harvesting AND 




3 Profit from public tenders substantial f AND Profit for forest people substantial g AND 
State harvesting profits  not substantial
2
2 Profit from public tenders substantial AND Profit for forest people exists AND State 
harvesting profits  not substantial
1 Profit form public tenders not substantial AND Profit for forest people exists AND State 
harvesting profit substantial i
0 No profit from public tenders AND No profit for forest people AND State harvesting 
profit not substantial
or












3 Existence of professional market information AND investments into new forest goods 
substantial j AND new external partners exist
1
2 All other combinations
1 [Existence of professional market information AND no substantial investments into new 
forest goods AND no new external partners] OR [Absence of professional market 
information AND no substantial investments into new forest goods AND new external 
partners exist] OR [Absence of professional market information AND investments into 
new forest goods substantial AND no new external partners]
0 Absence of professional market information AND no substantial investments into new 




3 Trustful cooperation with actors from the wood-based sector AND advocate’s role 
aspired AND advocate’s role accepted
3
2 Trustful cooperation with actors from the wood-based sector AND advocate’s role not 
aspired AND advocate’s role accepted
1 Trustful cooperation with actors from the wood-based sector AND advocate’s role 
aspired AND advocate’s role not accepted
0 Trustful cooperation with actors from wood-based sector AND advocate’s role not 






3 Trustful cooperation with actors from different sectors AND mediator’s role aspired 
AND mediator’s role accepted
0
2 Trustful cooperation with actors from different sectors AND mediator’s role not aspired 
AND mediator’s role accepted
1 Trustful cooperation with actors from different sectors AND mediator’s role aspired 
AND mediator’s role not accepted 
0 Trustful cooperation with actors from different sectors AND mediator’s role not aspired 
AND mediator’s role not accepted
Source: Stevanov and Krott (2013), some indicators and “performance raw” modified.
Appendix B. Appendix
Table B
Forest Investment Program: projects and provisional budgets.
Project Components Budget (million
USD)
First project: Integrated landscapes management in Tunisia's lagging reg-
ions.
Component 1: Strengthening the integrated management of landscapes 80.0
Component 2: strengthening the agro-silvo pastoral production chains 40.0
Component 3:Strengthening the institutional and legal framework 7.0
Component 4: the project management 10.0
Total project 1 137.0
Second project: Integration of trees in the private degraded agriculture
lands.
Component 1: conception and implementation of a sustainable funding system 0.6
Component 2: Support for recipients to prepare their technical and financial
dossiers
2.9
Component 3: Investment to integrate trees in private degraded lands 41.4
Component4: the Project management and monitoring-evaluation 4.1
Total project 2 49.0
Source: Forest Investment Program (2016).





Date Interview number Type of interview Position of the interviewee Institution
25/05/2016 Interview 1 Sent via email Responsible for silvo-pastoral development General Directorate of Forests
21/09/2016 Interview 2 questionnaire Responsible for forest protection General Directorate of Forests
21/09/2016 Interview 3 Face-to-face Responsible for forest products sales Forest Use Department
22/09/2016 Interview 4 Face-to-face Responsible in the Environment department Ministry of Environment
29/09/2016 Interview 5 questionnaire Responsible for silvo-pastoral development General Directorate of Forests
28/11/2016 Interview 6 Sent via email Responsible for silvo-pastoral development General Directorate of Forests
09/12/2016 Interview 7 Phone interview Lecturer in forest science Silvo-pastoral institute of Tabarka (Tunisia)
15/12/2016 Interview 8 Sent via email Responsible for silvo-pastoral development General Directorate of Forests
23/01/2017 Interview 9 Sent via email Responsible for silvo-pastoral development General Directorate of Forests
30/01/2017 Interview 10 Sent via email Responsible and coordinator of projects Northwest Silvo-pastoral Office
30/01/2017 Interview 11 Sent via email Responsible for silvo-pastoral development General Directorate of Forests
01/02/2017 Interview 12 Sent via email Responsible and coordinator of projects Northwest Silvo-pastoral Office
08/02/2017 Interview 13 Sent via email Responsible for administrative and financial affairs General Directorate of Forests
10/02/2017 Interview 14 Phone interview Doctoral students working on ecotourism National Agronomic Institute of Tunisia
27/02/2017 Interview 15 Sent via email Responsible for silvo-pastoral development General Directorate of Forests
05/02/2018 Interview 16 Phone interview Responsible for silvo-pastoral development General Directorate of Forests
23/02/2018 Interview 17 Phone interview Responsible for silvo-pastoral development General Directorate of Forests
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Abstract 
Since the sixteenth century, the land tenure system in Tunisia has been progressively centralised by state 
bureaucracies at the expense of local communities. However, this hegemony of the state in regulating the 
access to forestland resources was significantly affected by the Tunisian revolution of 2011 that occurred 
in the context of Arab Spring. Taking into account this political change, the aim of this paper is to scrutinise 
the dynamics of power between state bureaucracies and non-state actors, including local populations, in 
the access processes and control of forestlands in northwest Tunisia. From a methodological perspective, 
the paper presents an in-depth empirical analysis of two decades (2000 – 2019) of the politics of forestland 
access in rural Tunisia. Particular attention is paid to ruptures and continuities induced by the revolution 
of 2011.  First-hand data used in this research was collected from April 2019 to February 2020. In addition 
to the qualitative approach employed (archives, face-to-face interviews, field observations, document 
analysis), a mapping method was used, which consisted of a quantitative and cartographic analysis of 
forestland cover change over the last two decades. The results show that one of the major effects of the 
revolution in rural Tunisia, which was the start of all the Arab Spring protest movements, was the collapse 
of state authority in the governance of forestland resources. The paper also reveals that the use of coercion 
measures was the main power element employed by state bureaucracies before the revolution. The use of 
this coercion before the revolution, without combining it with other power elements such as incentives, 
has become inefficient after the revolution. From a theoretical angle, this paper brings an important 
contribution to actor-centred power theory. It provides empirical evidence for the notion that the use of 
coercion in a post-crisis context can only be effective if the ‘potentate’ or powerful actor (i.e., state) is able 
to deal with the ability of the ‘subordinate’ or weak actor (i.e., local communities) to resist the potentate. 
This resistance can be achieved through a set of ‘dominant information’ items such as the use of deliberate 
concealment or informality in illegal logging and forestland conversion to agriculture.  





State forest ownership and government-led forest management have been introduced in several colonies 
since the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries (White and Martin 2002). New governments, especially 
in Africa, America and South East Asia, deprived native peoples of their rights and granted authority to 
public agencies over almost all natural forests (White and Martin 2002). Globally, forest ownership is still 
dominated by the state, and the proportion of private and other types of ownership is around 10% and 4%, 
respectively (FAO 2020; Agrawal et al. 2008). In Tunisia, almost all forests are owned and managed by 
the state (Chriha and Sghari 2013; Aini and Bedhief 2010). The current state of land property heritage in 
Tunisia results from a social and historical process that can be traced back to the sixteenth century. The 
local communities were autonomous and powerful until the early stages of the Ottoman empire invasion 
and occupation (Henia 1996). Following this invasion, the Ottoman regime aimed to bring more land under 
the central authority of the empire, which progressively took the form of a ‘state domain’.  
With the arrival of French colonisation in 1881, multiple land property regimes overlapped in Tunisia, 
including ‘indigenous’ customary right, the Arabic and Ottoman land tenure regimes. Colonial authorities 
used this variety of regimes to allocate the best lands (arable areas) under traditional legal status to the 
French settlers. After independence in 1956, the Tunisian post-colonial state started a process of bringing 
back the colonial expropriated lands to the new independent state property domain. This process was 
followed by a total nationalisation of expropriated lands in 1964. Later, this process of nationalisation was 
extended to the Tunisian lands that had traditional legal status in the (pre) colonial era. This allowed the 
post-colonial state to accumulate an important patrimony of arable lands that was approximately 800,000 
ha, (Elloumi 2013; Mares and Lahmayer 2019). Between 1979 and 1982, part of state-owned arable land 
was transferred back to private owners. Gharbi (1998) states that, of 4.8 M ha of arable land, only 500,000 
ha is state-owned, which represents nearly 10%. These lands remain underused despite being the most 
productive (where the French settlers were installed) (Gharbi 1998).  
Before 2011, the state-owned agricultural lands were often rented in the long term by private users who 
were close to the old regime (Elloumi 2013). Forests covering 1.2 million ha were almost entirely 
controlled by the forest administration. The Tunisian forest code  (2011) grants users rights to nearly 
730,000 forest inhabitants living inside, or within a five-kilometre radius of, the forests. However, the law 
does not allow forest people to make any commercial or industrial use of forest products (Tounsi and Ben 
Mimoun 2012). Following social protests against the oppressive regime in Tunisia, which started late in 
2010, the revolution occurred in January 2011, marking the start of a series of protests in the Arab world 
called “the Arab Spring”. Since this revolution in 2011, the control capacity over the access to forests and 
agricultural lands for specific land uses in Tunisia has dropped dramatically, while forest people have 
gained more power. The main observations after the revolution showed that the lands, either agricultural 
land or forests, that were under extensive state control are considerably affected by illegal logging and 
fencing. This shows that these people are struggling in order to gain back their power and control over the 
access to lands, as it was many centuries ago. The legal frameworks that have been developed since the 
sixteenth century to support the state’s power over the access and use of forestland resources has not 
stopped the increasing grassroots efforts to reclaim the access and property rights of local communities 
(Elloumi 2013).  
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By means of a case study from the northwest of Tunisia, this paper aims to (i) scrutinise the power relations 
between two main categories of actors: state bureaucracies in charge of forestland policy in Tunisia and 
non-state entities (forest people and private users), (ii) identify potential power shifts over two decades of 
forestland governance that may have been affected by the 2011 revolution; (iii) understand the root causes 
of these shifts and the related policy changes. The case study area is characterised by the existence of 
different overlapping land uses (e.g., forest stands, agriculture, grazing lands) resulting in competing 
interests regarding the use of available resources. By considering this overlap, we use the term ‘forestland’ 
in this study to address all these different categories of lands. 
From a conceptual angle, the actor-centred power theory (Krott et al. 2014) was used as a core theoretical 
framework for this research.  
 
2. Conceptual and theoretical framework 
Land use activity, as a structural process of the relationship between humans and nature, was identified 
10,000 years ago through foraging, fishing, collecting and hunting activities (Stephens et al. 2019). The 
notion of ‘land use’ can be defined as being “the arrangements, activities and inputs by people to produce, 
change or maintain a certain land cover type” indicating the influence of the actions of people in their 
environment on the dynamics of land cover (Di Gregorio and Jansen 1998). Kayden (2000) considers that 
land use planning is made by state officials who should comprehensively analyse and make 
recommendations for a sustainable future use of specific land areas. Public regulation of land use includes 
four main aspects: the “type, density, effect and the aesthetic impact of use” (Salsich Jr. and Tryniecki 
2015). The state derives its regulatory authority from the police power (Salsich Jr. and Tryniecki 2015). 
The power employed by the state to regulate land use encounters resistance by other actors who want to 
have access to these lands and who make use of different power elements to achieve this. Having access 
to natural resources, whether legally or illegally, is an essential need for the livelihood of many forest-
dependent people, especially in developing countries (Sunderlin et al. 2005). In other words, there are 
different forms of access to resources and not all of them are legally authorised by a “politico-legal 
institution” (Sikor and Lund 2009). The notion of  ‘access’, with regard to natural resources governance, 
was briefly defined by Ribot and Peluso (2003) as “the ability to derive benefits from a thing”. Access to 
resources is seen as consisting of specific bundles of power within webs of power that allow different 
actors to “gain, control and maintain” this access (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Power is perceived by Peluso 
and Ribot (2020) as being the result of struggles within emerging social relations. Furthermore, the 
attempts to gain, control and maintain access are seen to be struggles within social relations, and this allows 
one to consider “the bundle of powers as relational” (Peluso and Ribot 2020). In the theory of access, those 
who control and those who attempt to gain and maintain access have different types of relations (Peluso 
and Ribot 2020). These relations can comprise “competition conflict and negotiation” (Peluso and Ribot 
2020). Controlling access is mediation of the access of others but also their exclusion. Gaining and 
maintaining access is only possible when there exist relations with those who control (Peluso and Ribot 
2020). 
At least since the works by Max Weber, the concept of power has been extensively scrutinised in academic 
literature. Despite the proliferation of works related to this concept, there is no consensual definition of 
power. A constellation of a multitude of proposals and interpretations regarding the concept of power exist 
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in the literature, depending on social context and disciplines. These definitions include those from a 
political science perspective (Dahl 1957; Allison and Zelikow 1971; Wight 2002), from political 
philosophy (Foucault 1991) and sociology (Crozier and Friedberg 1980; Scott 2010). On the one hand, 
some definitions of power consider it as a ‘possession’, which cannot be shared and which should have a 
specific function and place. This perception of power was supported in particular by the development of 
the theories of sovereignty and legitimate authority (Holeindre 2014). On the other hand, power is seen by 
some in contemporary societies as being a ‘social relation’ between actors (Revault d'Allonnes 2014). 
Foucault perceives power as a relation or practice in which the behaviour of an actor can be changed by 
another actor without any apparent coercion (Foucault 1991). Weber considers that power is not limited to 
the capacity but to the execution of this capacity. He defines power as the option of imposing one's will 
within a social relation despite resistance and regardless of the means on which this option relies (Weber 
1978[1922]). In the same vein, the state, according to Weber, has the exclusive legitimacy to use coercion 
and force in order to enforce the law while imposing a ‘general interest’ over self-interest (Weber 
1978[1922]). 
From a more empirical angle, Krott et al. (2014) developed further the definition of power and its 
fundamental elements in the frame of an ‘actor-centred power’ approach (ACP). According to the authors, 
power can be empirically defined as “a social relationship in which actor A alters the behaviour of actor B 
without recognising B’s will”. In such a relationship, the relation between A and B can be summarized as 
follows: Actor A acts as a ‘potentate’ (the actor who is altering the behaviour of the other actor) who forces 
actor B to react as a ‘subordinate’. Many power theories consider that behaviour and outcomes are both 
part of the essence of power. ACP considers that achieving a certain outcome in a power relationship does 
not only depend on the behaviour of actors but also depends on other technical and natural factors. The 
outcome is the objective of the actor for which he/she will struggle to enforce his position within a certain 
social relationship by forcing the other actor(s) to change their activities. The effective achievement of 
these objectives is influenced additionally by ecological, economic and social factors. It might even happen 
that if the potentate has a wrong understanding of ecological factors, he/she may force a behaviour that 
causes an outcome opposite to what he/she expected. Power is seen as an important social factor but not 
the only factor shaping outcomes. The three fundamental power elements defined by the ACP are: 
coercion, (dis)incentives and dominant information.  
(a) Coercion 
Coercion's aim is “altering the behaviour of a subordinate by force”. The force can be linked to physical 
actions that are declared or anticipated. For example, this might be prohibiting the physical access to 
forestland resources above ground (wood, wildlife, arable land) and below ground (mining, oil) and fencing 
a certain area, or restricting its access through the deployment of armed forest rangers. In this case, the 
subordinate can try to resist by crossing/destroying the fencing, or accessing the forestland in the absence 
of the forest rangers. Resistance to the potentate’s coercion can also include the use of violence (e.g., armed 
rebellion, wildlife poaching, illegal logging). In a way similar to real force, the threat of force is also 
considered a form of power in this kind of social relationship. These threats are often used by the forest 
administration to force people to comply with laws in case of disobedience and are, in the majority of 
cases, enough to implement a certain political process. The subordinate’s belief regarding the potentate’s 
source of power determines the extent of the threat’s effect. This belief builds on the degree of visibility 
of the potentate’s sources of force. To threaten, the potentate can make use of the subordinate’s belief even 
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if the actual power resources are weaker in practice than are perceived. Furthermore, some of the threats 
are observable within public or closed discourses in the political processes. As an example, forest law 
contains different sanctions that comprise physical force, such as incarceration. The state has the power of 
sanctions, which includes physical force. Forest administrations can threaten with these sanctions to 
influence the behaviour of subordinates. 
(b) Incentives and disincentives 
The use of (dis)incentives aims at “altering the behaviour of the subordinate by means of disadvantages or 
advantages”. An example of disadvantages are the penalties employed by state bureaucracies of forest 
police vis-à-vis illegal logging operators, or facilities offered to certified wood in government procurement 
and public markets. The potentate in this case does not follow the will of the subordinate. Instead, the latter 
is strongly encouraged to change his/her behaviour and comply with the rules of the potentates in order to 
avoid penalties or to benefit from specific advantages. Using disadvantages to alter the behaviour of the 
subordinate is closely linked to the coercion of the potentate in order to force the subordinate to consider 
the risk of losing a benefit by not changing his/her behaviour to meet the potentate’s interest. Being forced 
to pay a penalty is coercion, whereas the amount of the penalty is a disincentive.  
There are material and immaterial (dis)incentives. Material incentives can be implemented by providing 
money, equipment (e.g., machines, tools), or vital resources (e.g., food, water).  Immaterial incentives can 
be implemented by offering social and psychological advantages, such as those based on moral demands, 
education, or healthcare. The same sources can also be used as disincentives such as cutting some subsidies 
or acknowledging that certain actions are disturbing the social conventions. 
(c) Dominant information 
Krott et al. (2014) defined dominant information use as a situation in which a powerful actor such as the 
potentate aims at “altering the behaviour of subordinate by means of unverified information”. ACP 
differentiates between ‘shared information’, which considers the availability of a certain level of the 
information for the other actor and ‘dominant information’, which limits the capacity of the subordinate to 
verify it. In the latter case the potentate provides information omitting some of the facts. Based on this 
partial information the subordinate makes wrong decisions and behaves in a manner not in accordance to 
his will. The inability to verify the provided information in such a situation can be (i) unavoidable if the 
subordinate is obliged to accept the information as is, simply due to a lack of means of verification. For 
example, forest-dependent people are rarely able to check the reliability and exhaustiveness of the 
information provided by forest industries regarding forest management as the basis for benefit-sharing of 
forest revenues. It can also be (ii) voluntary when the subordinate trusts the ‘good will’ of the potentate 
and the ideologies that he represents.  
Based on the theoretical framework described above, we developed three hypotheses: 
H1: The major political crises, such as the revolution of 2011, can significantly change the power relations 
between state and non-state entities involved in the governance of specific land uses.  
H2: In a post-revolutionary context, the use of coercion by state bureaucracies in regulating forestland use 
cannot be efficient without combining coercive measures with other core elements of power, such as 
incentives and dominant information.  
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H3: A loss of power through the use of dominant information by state bureaucracies in a post-crisis 
situation does not necessarily lead to a better sharing of that information among non-state actors involved 
in the governance of forestlands.  
  
3. Methodology 
3.1. Presentation of the study area 
The selected study area is located in the northwest of Tunisia, Governorate of Jendouba in the city of 
Tabarka. It covers a total area of 12,437 ha1, which includes three forest series within the forest of Mekna 
(Mekna I, Mekna II and Mekna III). Forest series are the units dividing the forest of Mekna and are 
allocated to different local forest administrations for an easier management. Every forest series has its own 
management plan, and is made of several parcels. Currently, these forest series have no valid management 
plans. The most recent plans were made in 1983 and covered the period from 1984-2007. However, these 
management plans are the only official source from which we can get information related to forest 
ownership, forest area and species. 
All the area selected is under a forest regime which is defined in the forest law as being a set of specific 
regulations applicable to the forests, the lands suitable for forestry, national parks and natural reserves etc., 
to ensure the protection, conservation and sustainable use of the resources, as well as to grant the legal 
users’ rights.  
3.2. Justification of the choice of the study area 
The study area has several specificities that allow the observation of different dynamics in terms of 
forestland access and use.  In the following paragraphs we present the main motivation for the selection of 
the three forest series in Mekna. 
(a) Forest ownership 
Except for a negligible area that is mentioned in the management plans as being privately owned land, the 
area studied falls under the most common forestland ownership category in Tunisia: state ownership. The 
law defined different legal categories of state ownership, all of which are represented in the case study 
area. The main two categories of state ownership are: (i) State forest domain, which includes forestlands 
that are registered (with titles) or those which are just claimed to be state-owned (requisition), in addition 
to lands dedicated to reforestation activities; (ii) State private domain, which includes lands that are 
managed based on the law of state agricultural property management. When they are under the forest 
regime, the forest service intervenes only to control, but not to manage (Table A and B Annex 2). Choosing 
a study area that is almost entirely state-owned allows one to better analyse the state’s power to regulate 
different types of land use, as well as any possible resistance from the forest people living in these areas.  
(b) The effect of existing infrastructure 
Studies have shown that the development of road networks contributes to a facilitation of the access to 
forests and thus to an increase deforestation,  as well as to wildlife and carbon storage vulnerability 
                                                          
1 Area calculated by the expert who made the maps 
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(Mayaux et al. 2013; Kleinschroth et al. 2019). The dense road network of the study area and its closeness 
to the city of Tabarka were additional factors that motivated us to focus on it. Furthermore, the creation of 
a water dam in 2003, on state-owned land, required a suitable solution not to affect the livelihoods of 
inhabitants who were living in the area and from the existing resources. This allowed the observation of 
more dynamics in terms of land access and use, especially with regard to the decisions concerning 
relocation of these people to other regions.  
(c) The location 
By selecting these three forest series, different ecosystems and forest functions were taken into account. 
They consist of (i) an area near the urban and touristic zones of Tabarka (Mekna I); (ii) a forest on the 
coastal line, which plays an important role in fixing the sand dunes (Mekna III) and a vulnerable cork oak 
ecosystem with good access to roads, expanding urbanization and agriculture (Mekna II).  
3.3. Data collection and analysis 
Empirical data was collected from April 2019 to February 2020. It consists mainly of (i) document analysis 
(e.g., management plans, annual reports, statistics of the local administration, forest laws and strategy) and 
(ii) cartography of land use in the study area, showing the evolution of forestland use (e.g., forest cover 
change, logging, forestland conversions to urbanisation and agriculture). Our diachronic analysis covered 
the period from 2000 to 2019 for a comprehensive overview of the land use dynamics before and after the 
Tunisian revolution of 2011. The initial reasoning was to elaborate the maps for the sequences of nearly 
five years (for the years 2000, 2005, 2009, 2014, 2019) covering equally the periods of pre and post-
revolution. However, due to the poor quality of available images from the years 2005 and 2009, we chose 
the year 2010 instead of 2009. As a result, we made the maps of land use for the years 2000, 2010, 2014 
and 2019, which allowed a more accurate calculation of the different areas. This cartography was based 
on Landsat images available online2. The selected images were taken in August for a better detection of 
forest landscapes. The image processing started with the atmospheric correction and the image cropping 
of the selected study area. Then, a supervised classification into six classes was made (forest, grassland, 
buildings, agriculture, bare soil/sand and water). The different polygon areas were calculated and the layers 
for airport, roads, rivers, wildfire (2015 and 2017), as well as the limits of the study area, were added.  (iii) 
Face to face, phone and email interviews with selected experts in the governance of forestlands in Tunisia 
and the study area included former civil servants and researchers. These interviews allowed us to clarify 
and complete the missing data and aspects that were unclear, related to the forest management in the study 
area. In the course of the study there was a high number of phone interviews. The table in Annex 1 shows 
only a selection of key interviews. In addition to this first round of interviews, 80 semi-structured 
interviews (Annex 1) with local ‘forest people’ (forest-dependent people) took place in the area where the 
forest services recorded the highest numbers of offences. Our empirical data reveals that the number of 
inhabitants in 2014 was about 9,700 inhabitants. However, this number has considerably decreased due to 
the construction of the water dam in the study area. Inhabitants were required to leave their houses 
(Interview 7). 
 
                                                          
2 Landsat 7 for the year 2000; Landsat 5 for the year 2010 and Landsat 8 for the years 2014 and 2019 with a spatial 




As we pointed out in the conceptual and analytical framework, the qualitative power evaluation presented 
in the results section is based on actor-centred power theory, which defines three main categories of power 
elements (coercion, (dis)incentives and dominant information).    
In its focus on the dynamics of forestland use change in the study area, this evaluation applies a scale of 
three grades:  
-strong power (++), if a power element used by an actor is clearly mentioned in the law, identified in 
practice and/or clearly mentioned in documents;  
-no power (0), if there is no evidence and no use of this power element by the actors; and  
-intermediate power (+), between (0) and (++), if an increase or decrease in the use of power elements 
between the pre and post-revolution periods is identified and/or if there is little use of a certain power 
element by a specific category of actors. As an example, in the case of deforestation the results show that 
the use of dominant information by the state before the revolution was strong (++), because only the state 
had very good information on forest use. Since the revolution, the quality of the state's information has 
decreased. However, there is no data with which to measure exactly the quantity of the information. Thus, 
the grade assigned to describe this decrease is (+).  
The two main categories of actors considered in this evaluation are state and non-state actors´ groups. In 
Tunisia, the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources manages most of the use of forests, water, and 
agricultural resources. Under the Ministry there are different General Directorates that manage forest, 
agriculture and water resources; they are represented at regional and local levels. Thus, the state actors are 
mainly the Ministry of Agriculture and the related directorates. Nonetheless, this does not exclude the 
intervention of other ministries, like the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of State Property and Land 
Affairs, the Ministry of Environment, in decision-making. 
Regarding non-state actors, forest people, who comprise farmers and private logging 
companies/individuals, are the main actors intervening in the study area.  
Table 1 shows the power relations and their changes after the revolution in the three important land use 
issues of deforestation, infrastructure project building, and use of state-owned agriculture lands.  The 
following section presents the results in detail.   
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Table 1: Change in power resources of state bureaucracies and non-state actors in the governance of forestland 
use in Northwest-Tunisia before and after the 2011 revolution. 
Land use   Time 
period 
Regulation by power sets 
Actors Power elements 




*State  ++ + 0 ++ 
**Non-state + 0 + + 
After 
revolution  
State + + 0 + 






Actors Power elements 




State  ++ ++ 0 ++ 
Non-state 0 0 + 0 
After 
revolution 
State ++ ++ 0 ++ 







Actors Power elements 




State  ++ + 0 ++ 
Non-state + 0 + 0 
After 
revolution 
State + + 0 + 
Non-state ++ 0 ++ 0 
0: no power observed; ++ strong power; +: all other intermediate power between 0 and++;  
 Opposed actors’ power;      Change/ shift of power identified after the revolution 
*State actors: Ministry of Agriculture (regrouping sectorial policies related to forest, agriculture, water dams and hydraulic 
projects); **Non-state actors (forest-dependent people, which, in addition to dwellers, can include farmers or private logging 
firms/individuals) 
4.1. Regulating deforestation in the pre- and post-revolution periods 
This section focuses on an analysis of the power of state and non-state actors related to forest protection 
activities. Overall, a shift in power sets has led to a change in the existing regulatory effect. The state lost 
the effectiveness of its coercion measures and dominant information, while non-state actors gained more 




(a) The state’s regulation of forestland use 
The maps (Figure 1) show the land use dynamics over almost two decades, from 2000 to 2019. A full-size 
version of these maps can be found in Annex 4.  
 
Figure 1. Dynamics of the land uses in the study area between 2000 and 2019. 
Forest area has decreased in the study area over the selected period by nearly 1,500 ha (Figure2). However, 
the areas for different land uses, as estimated from the maps (Figure 2), revealed that the forest loss in the 
pre-revolution period (nearly 1,000 ha) was much higher than in the post-revolution period (about 500 ha). 
This means less forest area was lost or converted into other land uses after the revolution than was in the 
pre-revolution period. In turn, this raises the question of whether a more powerful state was involved in 
forest resource protection after the revolution.  
The analysis shows that one of the driving factors behind the forest losses before the revolution was the 
strong investment in infrastructure projects in this town. The state-driven urbanisation development was 
much faster between the years 2000 (map A) and 2010 (map B), where it increased by 79 ha (from 33 ha 
to 112 ha) of building area, as opposed to the increase after the revolution, of only 43 ha. The pre-revolution 
development projects included the construction of a regional hospital (officially announced in 2007 and 
unveiled in 2013), two professional training centres related to tourism services (built in 2005), and the 
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construction of new hotels in the tourist zone of Tabarka. These constructions are located on the state-
owned lands and were controlled and planned mostly by the state authorities (erecting public institution 
buildings, providing tourist services, and developing new housing). After the revolution, the expansion of 
infrastructure projects slowed down and the new drivers of deforestation were mainly illegal fires and 
logging. 
  
Figure 2. Evolution of the change in forestland use between 2000 and 2019  
In addition to the 328 ha of forests lost, due mainly to illegal logging between 2010 and 2019 (Figure 2), 
there were 289 ha altered by wildfire in 2015 and 2017 (Annex 3). Overall, before the revolution, forest 
depletion was regulated mostly by the state bureaucracies involved in planning the projects mentioned, 
whereas after the revolution the state lost coercion capacity, and therefore forest depletion was mostly 
beyond its control.  
(b) How forest administration deals with illegal logging 
The statistics of the local forest administration between 2000 and 2018 show that the number of recorded 






















Figure 3. Evolution of recorded infractions in the forests and the clear-cut areas between 2000 and 2018  
The comparison of recorded infractions shows a substantial change. During the pre-revolution period, 
illegal logging in most cases was limited to illegal use of forest bush, exploitation of non-timber products 
(e.g., harvesting pine nuts) or selective cutting of a limited number of trees. In general, the pre-revolution 
statistics show that the quantity of forest products illegally harvested was limited to the transportation 
capacity of one person or a small group. After the revolution, a considerable increase in clear cutting 
happened. The forest area cleared in this period was between 729 ha in 2011 and 48,150 ha in 2018, which 
is much higher than the maximum of 1,190 ha before the revolution, achieved in 2004. These kinds of 
infractions in the forest were often mentioned in the administration’s statistics, together with a change in 
land use (e.g., occupying the forest land illegally by erecting new constructions). Furthermore, different 
forest agents in central and local forest administrations confirmed that the recorded areas for 2011 and 
2012 do not reflect forest depletion entirely, because the administration faced serious security issues during 
the revolution period, and this influenced agents’ capacity to monitor illegal logging properly (Hasnaoui 
and Krott 2019).  
(c) The access of forest people to forestlands 
Before the revolution, the physical presence of forest people on state-owned forestlands was one of the 
main reasons for the forest services to tolerate some illegal harvesting or conversion of limited forest areas 
to agriculture, in order to enable people to survive. After the revolution, the weakened state was forced to 
show more tolerance, to continue providing contracts as incentives for these people, and to increase their 
wages despite the limited budget. In addition, the forest administration has recently implemented a project 
of forest law reforms, made under the pressure of international organisations, to recognise the rights of 
forest people to formally profit from selling forest products. However, this is only if they adhere to a 
structure called Agricultural Development Groups.  
The use of forest products by forest people was diversified. Forest access focuses mainly on two targets 
(see Figure 4). The first one is peoples' survival, mainly by using firewood, grazing resources and oak 
acorns (also used to feed animals). The second target is to legitimise their presence in a defined area, or to 
demark a corresponding territory by fencing, which requires bush collection from the forest. This is their 
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main use of forestland resources. While fencing seems to be an important activity, forest people do not 
consider land property to be an important issue. Their main concern with the forest services is the 
confiscation of the extracted forest products. Figure 4 shows that the main goal of forest people is to have 
access to resources for their livelihoods. Acquiring the property of forestland does not seem to be a priority, 
since for many of them fencing is enough to prove their legitimacy and property rights, especially after the 
revolution, and it is observed most frequently within state-owned forestlands.  
 
Figure 4. Main forms of forest use by forest people (left) and the main conflicts between forest people 
and the administration (right)  
Since the revolution, forest people have been playing a crucial role within the process of forest product 
sales, despite not benefiting directly from this commercial activity. Before the revolution forest services at 
national and regional levels had the capacity to limit the area and quantity of forest products to be harvested 
by private enterprises or individuals. Generally, the sales happen in public auctions organised by the state, 
and the harvesting process following the sales is controlled by the state forest agents on the field. After the 
revolution the state's capacity to verify and control activity on the field were weakened (especially at night 
or in areas with difficult access), while market actors gained more access to illegal harvesting by 
trespassing beyond the areas defined by the administration. To be able to successfully hide the illegal 
logging information, market actors were employing forest people who knew the most about the resources 
available and the best time to harvest in order to avoid the authorities.  
These results allow to better understand the shift in actors’ power (Table 1). Before the revolution, the state 
relied mainly on a high degree of coercion to control and regulate deforestation, including logging 
activities. This was done either by issuing permissions to cut or by applying sanctions, while the non-state 
actors, particularly forest people, exploited forests to survive. After the revolution, the state lost this 
capacity to sanction the illegal logging, while forest people gained more power to access the forestland 
resources, especially through fencing of specific areas (coercion) and their conversion into agriculture land. 
The state continued to provide weak incentives consisting of small contracts in order for forest people to 
carry out the forestry activities. Despite the increase in wages for forest people, these incentives cannot be 
considered to be strong, since they are limited to few weeks of work per year (Interview 1). The presence 
of forest people on the state-owned lands appears to be a source of power vis-a-vis the state. This physical 
presence of forest people forces the forest administration to take into account the risk of conflict and social 
movements that could emerge from a potential eviction or strict access prohibition. This power source for 
forest people is a disincentive for the forest administration. This motivation increased after the revolution, 
and the state was asked to give more freedom to these people for the use of forest products. 
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Through the example of illegal logging the results revealed a shift of power in terms of dominant 
information. In general, information was never shared between state and non-state actors. Before the 
revolution, the state was able to control illegal logging because forest officers were able to supervise 
different commercial activities, among other reasons, because they had more personnel available. This 
allowed the state authorities to keep the upper hand on dominant information regarding the availability, 
conditions of access and the use of forest products.  
After the revolution, the weakened forest administration was no longer able to maintain dominant 
information on the quantities of forest products to use, the areas to harvest etc. At the same time, forest 
people profited from the context of the revolution and gained more confidence to challenge state 
bureaucracies or to hide their illegal logging activities. In other words, if illegal logging is successfully 
hidden the state will not be able to apply sanctions, even with an abundance of resources. Therefore, 
dominant information by land users is blocking the coercive means of the state.  
 
4.2. Using incentives to relocate displaced inhabitants  
From 2003 to 2019, a water dam (see maps C and D, Figure 1 and Appendix 4) was installed within the 
study area. As summarized in Table 1, the results show that the state regulated the process of the dam 
installation by combining strong coercion, incentives and dominant information. Since the 2011 revolution 
the state has been able to maintain this regulatory effect without any change. 
This project started quite a long time before the revolution. Tunisian law secures the rights of citizens 
settled informally on state-owned land to obtain compensation (e.g., land, crop losses) if they are removed 
in order to install a project of general public interest3. In the study area 90 households were successfully 
resettled outside the project area, which was a state-owned land surrounded by forest stands. There is 
currently an ongoing process of compensation for 25 additional households affected by landslides in the 
same area (Interview 3).  
Before the start of the dam construction, the Ministry of Agriculture, in collaboration with other 
bureaucracies involved, decided to compensate these people by providing new agricultural lands with 
property titles and/or financial resources. Those who had agriculture lands exceeding two hectares, or those 
who were living in poor social conditions and had agricultural land covering 0.5 to 1.9 hectares, were all 
compensated with a property grant of land in better location, and with better access to different facilities. 
Regarding the dwellers' buildings and other property (e.g., trees) state experts evaluated the damage and 
the state provided money and land for construction. Households perceived this deal positively, and the 
Ministry of Agriculture was able to implement the construction of the dam easily, without facing claims 
(Interviews 2 and 3).  
The state authorities mentioned above made use of strong coercion supported by the land ownership. These 
authorities were able to physically force inhabitants to move from a specific area to another in order to 
implement a public-interest project, which is a legal action. However, when relocating these inhabitants, 






the state provided many incentives, which allowed it to avoid local resistance and conflicts. At the same 
time, the state, through the Ministry of Agriculture, has strong dominant information, based on the 
technical expertise of its sectoral bureaucracies, to evaluate the compensations and also to justify the choice 
of the project’s area.   
For non-state actors, the power sources related to these kinds of project are quite limited as compared to 
the sources for state actors. Only their physical presence is a disincentive for the state. As an example, this 
disincentive compels the forest administration to explore regularly alternative solutions for local 
communities when planning infrastructural projects, which cannot be implemented without land 
expropriation, and displacements and relocation of forest-dependent people. While forest protection 
activities show a considerable shift in the balance of power sets between state and non-state actors, this 
infrastructure project, which is clearly planned and based on compensation, has not revealed any change 
in terms of actors’ power since the revolution. 
4.3. Access and control of state-owned agricultural lands  
Results show a weakening of the state’s coercion and dominant information, while the non-state actors 
gained a reinforcement of their coercion and disincentive power (Table 1). Thus, the regulation has been 
disturbed since the revolution. The forestland areas that were changed to agricultural use increased since 
the early 2000s, from 2,143 ha to 2,955 ha in 2019 (Figure 2). However, in this time interval there were 
two different forestland cover changes: (i) agriculture in the south replaced grassland in most cases. (ii) 
the fragmentation of agricultural lands in the north, which were invaded by forest and grassland (Annex 
5). This northern agricultural land has been a state-owned farm for a long time. It was owned by French 
settlers before the independence of Tunisia (Interview 5). This farm covers a total area of 352 ha and today 
it is facing management issues and is almost abandoned (Interviews 4, 5 and 7). After the revolution the 
situation of this land remained unclear. Currently it is managed by limited number of staff, with poor 
capacity of control over the whole farm (Interviews 4 and 7). The abandoned land offers a good opportunity 
for people living around this farm to access some parts of it, by fencing selected areas for private 
agricultural use. The weak management and lack of maintenance has led to the growth of grasslands and 
forest vegetation inside the farm. The fragmentation seen on the maps (Annexes 4 and 5) is a consequence 
of surrendering and mismanaging this land, which facilitated the access for other, new actors, and of the 
growth of new forested areas and grasslands where there was no more activity. In February 2020 it was 
announced that this state-owned farm would be allocated to a specific type of private agriculture structures 
called “companies of agricultural valorisation and development”4.  
The only power shift related to agriculture in this land use happened in terms of coercion (Table 1). Before 
the revolution the state was able to limit the access to these agricultural lands. After the revolution the 
weakened state became unable to limit physical access, while local inhabitants started informally fencing 
small areas for their private interests. This explains the described increase of coercion through the increase 
in fencing activities. The state bureaucracies also lost their capacity to govern through the use of dominant 
information regarding these areas. Since the farm was abandoned, the limited number of workers precludes 
control both of productivity and the of the actual situation regarding the progress of informal fencing. 
Nevertheless, it has not led to an increase in the dominant information of local inhabitants, since they are 




not able to hide from the state authorities the physical fencing, their activities and information about the 
farm’s productivity or situation.  
Regardless of the efficiency of the state management, the land property substantially supports the state’s 
incentive power. The large share of forests and agriculture lands owned by the state allows different 
authorities to keep their power to provide incentives, like compensations before and after the revolution, 
in order to regulate the different forms of land use. However, this incentive power cannot be considered to 
be strong. With the exception of projects of public interest that require relocating inhabitants, the state has 
no clear strategy for the use of these agricultural lands to support local communities. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
The results allow us to test the hypotheses. The first hypothesis, that “The major political crises such as 
the revolution of 2011 can significantly change the power relations between state and non-state entities” 
was analysed regarding the three land use issues. It was confirmed only in the case two of these land uses 
(deforestation and agriculture) but not in the case of the infrastructure project. One of the main causes of 
power stability regarding the infrastructure project is the sufficiency of state-owned land and resources 
kept by the state after the revolution, which can be used for compensations. In addition, the state maintained 
expertise and the legal basis for coercion. In the other two land uses (agriculture and deforestation), and 
despite the unchanged legal bases, the effect of the threat of implementing the law to affect people 
decreased considerably after the revolution. In addition, people gained coercion by means of active use 
and land fencing. Furthermore, in the context of the revolution, the costs caused by the forest people's 
resistance increased for the state (e.g., worsening the state’s image, protests to increase wages).  
The case of the effective regulation of infrastructure project confirms the second hypothesis, that “In a 
post-revolutionary context, the use of coercion by state bureaucracies in regulating forestland use cannot 
be efficient without combining coercive measures with other core elements of power”. The issue of the 
infrastructure project clearly shows that efficient regulation is built on strong coercion combined with 
incentives and dominant information. In the other two land uses, there were no strong state incentives and 
no dominant state information that could strengthen weak coercion.  
The third hypothesis states that “in a post-crisis situation, a loss of power through dominant information 
by state bureaucracies does not necessarily lead to a better sharing of that information among non-state 
actors”. In the issue of state-owned agriculture land, the state has lost its dominant information since the 
revolution. Nevertheless, the non-state actors have not gained more shared information. The issue of 
deforestation also shows a loss of dominant information by the state, while the non-state actors gained 
dominant information by hiding their illegal access to forest products.    
Based on the actor-centred power, this research allowed us better to explain the actor’s power behind the 
access to forestland resources in a post-revolutionary context using a case study from Northwest Tunisia. 
The actor-centred power approach differentiates clearly between the power of potentates and subordinates. 
Potentates are actors who are able to alter the behaviour of the subordinates within a social relationship 
(Krott et al. 2014).  
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In contrast with the existing empirical cases, our case study made visible the power elements of the 
potentate and those of the subordinate, and compared the possible changes. By using this approach, we 
were able to identify power losses for the state and to differentiate them from power gains for non-state 
actors. The governance effect is a sum of the state’s power and the resisting power of non-state actors. The 
advantage of our approach is that we were able to show the substantive power gains of non-state actors 
after the revolution, based on coercion, as well as disincentives and dominant information.  
Regarding actors’ categorisation, Maryudi and Sahide ( 2017) focused on differentiating between state 
actors. Within the same bureaucracy there are conflicting interests. Considering them as a single unit might 
lead to imprecise power relation analyses. Furthermore, inaccurate categorisation might result in ignoring 
powerful actors in the analysis (Maryudi and Sahide 2017). In our study we approached the actors’ 
identification according to the actor-centred power concept of potentate and subordinate, and we examined 
additional factors. Within this social relationship between state and non-state actors, we consider that each 
actor makes use of its own power set. We selected a specific area as an empirical case study and we 
identified different dynamics of land use through different data sources (e.g., maps, interviews, field 
observations, document analysis). This approach allowed us to identify and focus on the main intervening 
actors, and we regrouped them into two main categories: state and non-state actors. State bureaucracies 
seek to dominate the non-state actors, like the local population, while these non-state actors attempt to 
resist this domination. The observations related to the access forms selected showed that different state 
institutions at national and local levels have the same main objective of controlling access, while the non-
state actors, mainly forest people and private users, have been struggling to gain more access to forestlands 
and to maintain it. 
 Prabowo et al. (2016) consider that the interests and power of actors may change over time. To capture 
these dynamics and possible shift of power balance, it is important to consider a long time period to apply 
the actor-centred power approach. Covering the period from 2000 to 2019 provided sufficient hindsight 
about a power shift related to the revolution of 2011. According to our observations, the main power shift 
that happened in the course of the revolution was due to the state's loss of coercion power and to non-state 
actors' specific gains in power 
5.1. Shared information and dominant information in relation to the use of coercion  
Coercion, as defined in actor-centred power theory (Krott et al. 2014), builds on the use of force as a source 
of power. This theory endorses Max Weber’s perception of the state, through its different administrations, 
as the main actor dominating the use of political force. In addition, the rights of control and sanctions 
provided to the state by the law are considered to be a support for the coercion power element. Based on 
the results of this study, the main requirement to properly use coercive power is the existence of shared 
information among the potentate and the subordinates. In other words, state coercion works only properly 
as long as state and non-state actors have the same knowledge about (i) the existing resources, (ii) how 
much of this can be used, when and where (iii) the possible sanctions that the non-state actors risk when 
they commit infractions such as illegal logging. Once non-state actors acquire the power of dominant 
information, the sharing of information between the two categories ceases to exist, which affects the 
coercive capacities of the state despite the existence of a legal framework supporting the use of coercion. 
Below, we explain these interactions between shared information, dominant information and coercion 
through the example of hidden illegal logging, which we consider to be dominant information power.  
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Krott et al. (2014) defined dominant information as being a source of power for an actor A (potentate) 
when it is not verified by an actor B (subordinate), who might additionally trust the provided information 
and makes use of it without checking its validity. This can be voluntary if the subordinate forfeits 
verification and criticises his own ideologies, or if the subordinates trust the ‘good will’ of the actor 
providing the information. Subordinates can also be forced to accept information and not verify it because 
of a lack of means or specific methods. The actor-cantered power theory illustrates these different types of 
dominant information through examples that focus mainly on expertise, knowledge and ideologies. The 
same theory categorises hidden illegal logging as a form of coercion. By hiding illegal logging the 
subordinates are hindering the coercive capacity of forest authorities (guards) to stop it physically. In 
contrast, the current study observes that hidden illegal logging encompasses the use of dominant 
information in addition to coercion. For example, the collaboration between the private forest users and 
forest people detailed in the results’ section increases the knowledge and the possibility for more access to 
resources, but also the possibility of hiding information from the state.  On the other hand, the lack of 
personnel in the administration, needed to control all the activities in the field, reduces the access of the 
state to information about harvested quantities, which in turn forces the authorities to accept the 
information provided. Additionally, the state has no other choice but to accept the illegal logging happening 
at night or in areas they cannot reach, because of limited means of control. We consider this example to be 
empirical evidence of the relevance of considering hidden illegal logging to be a source of dominant 
information employed by forest users, in addition to coercion. Furthermore, a better regulation of illegal 
logging, or any other forest-related activity, by coercion works only if the state associates coercion with 
either shared information or its own dominant information. If a non-state actor becomes able to hide 
information about illegal logging, this equal sharing of information is extinguished and instead turns into 
dominant information used as power source. In this case, the state regulation is lost due to a loss of 
information. Overall, dominant information destroys shared information that supports the coercive power 
of the state. 
5.2. Ways to keep stable power sets: associating coercion with incentives  
The state-owned agriculture and forests in Tunisia are a major advantage for the state. In addition to the 
forests, the state owns currently around 500,000 ha of agricultural land5 and is unable to manage them 
efficiently due to a lack of resources. Nevertheless, this land ownership has been one of the main supports 
for the state’s power of coercion since its independence. The use of force by the state has been associated 
with the power of financial sanctions (disincentives) for any illegal physical access to the state-owned 
resources. This power set, used by the state before the revolution to implement different policies, has shown 
its limits. This orientation of the Tunisian state resulted in an unstable balance of power and in permanent 
resistance from forest users, who wait for any unusual event that may destabilise the authorities, such as 
the revolution, to gain more access to resources. In another example, in Indonesia, the weakened capacity 
of the state to enforce law and to provide incentives formed a main factor that contributed to an 
empowerment of farmers in terms of access to forestlands (Maryudi et al. 2016). 
The example of the relocation of households away from the dam site is an example of how the state can 
use incentives as an alternative power element that can be much more efficient in implementing the 
relocation decision. Instead of forcing people to move or simply expropriating their assets, allocating 




compensation lands with better access to the city was enough motivation for them to move from the project 
area without challenging the state authorities. Using incentives instead of the exclusive use of sanctions 
can ease the existing conflicts between the administration and forest users, especially if based on a clear 
legal framework that regulates the provision of this kind of incentives. It can also encourage the citizens 
to have a more caring relation in regard to natural resources. Implementing the law while providing 
incentives proved that it can bring more stability into the power balance.  
To conclude, the use of an empirical, actor-centred power approach (Krott et al. 2014) in a post-revolution 
political context, allowed us to identify possible interactions between the defined power elements in regard 
to an effective regulation of conflicts. The actors make use of different power sets that vary according to 
the land use case. The main contribution of this paper consists of showing that coercion, which is 
considered to be the main power source for the state, cannot be effectively used without the existence of 
shared information or without monopolising the use of dominant information. Furthermore, by observing 
the power sets’ evolution over time in the pre- and post-revolution periods, we noticed that the main shifts 
of power from the state to non-state actors occurred when the state relied on its coercive capacities before 
the revolution. In the case study scrutinised in this paper, combining coercion with incentives resulted in a 
stronger effect on the regulation of conflicts by state bureaucracies. In the same vein, this research also 
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Position of the interviewee Institution 
15.01.2020 Interview 1 Phone  Retired civil servant General directorate of forests 
12.02.2020 Interview 2 Phone Responsible for implementation of 
the water dam in the study area 
Ministry of Agriculture 
14.02.2020 Interview 3 Email Responsible for implementation of 
the water dam in the study area 
Ministry of Agriculture 
24.02.2020 Interview 4 Phone Lecturer of forest ecology Silvo-Pastoral Institute of 
Tabarka (Tunisia) 
24.02.2020 Interview 5 Email  Lecturer of forest ecology Silvo-Pastoral Institute of 
Tabarka (Tunisia) 
25.02.2020 Interview 6 Phone Retired civil servant General directorate of forests 
26.02.2020 Interview 7 Phone Local inhabitant - 
28.02.2020 Interview 8 Phone State representative at the locality 
level  
Delegation of Tabarka  
Table B. Interviews with forest people 
Forest series Dates of interviews Type of interview Number of interviewed persons 
Mekna 1 27.04.2019 Face to face 28 
29.04.2019 
Mekna 2 22-04.2019 Face to face 30 
24-04-2019 
03.05.2019 







Table A. Different forms of state ownership of forests  
State ownership Category  Explanation/included sub-categories  
State forest domain - The forestlands registered as state forest domain 
- Forestlands or lands dedicated to be reforested (acquired by agreement with 
owner or by expropriation decisions) 
- Forestlands that are not registered but are claimed/presumed to be state-owned 
(requisition) 
State private domain - Includes forests that are registered under the Private state domain and not forest 
state domain 
They are considered as agriculture lands and are under the law of state 
agricultural property management  
Certain parts can be rented to private users for agricultural use.  
When these lands are under forest regime, the forest service intervenes in the 
control but not the management. 
 
Table B. Different forms of state ownership of forests in the study area 
Forest series Existing Categories of state forest 
ownership 
Available details in the management 
plans 
Forest series Mekna I State forest domain (Requisition)  
State private domain 
Requisition (around 85%) 
Private state domain (about 15%) 
Forest series Mekna II State forest domain (Requisition)  
State private domain 
State forest domain (registered) 
Old management card shows that the 
dominant categories of  ownership are 
Requisition and state forest domain  







































Figure A. State farm before and after the revolution 
